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ABSTRACT
Gender oppression is sustained in part through enforcement of and compliance with
gender norms. Understanding how they work is therefore salient to the goal of gender liberation.
According to the category-based view, which is common in analytic feminist philosophy,
gender norms are assigned to individuals based on their assigned gender category, such as
woman or man. I argue that this is insufficient, because it ignores the experiences of those who
are marginalized or excluded from those categories.
On a category-based view, individual responsiveness to gender norms will track gender
category assignment; only individuals assigned the category woman will be responsive to and
evaluated under feminine norms, and so forth. However, many trans and GNC people experience
themselves as responsive to norms that were not assigned to them. For example, a person who
hasn’t been assigned the category woman may nevertheless feel that they ought to follow
feminine norms. This cross-category norm responsiveness has considerable power over choice
and behavior; but a category-based view does not explain this it. Moreover, many marginalized
people are actively excluded from dominant, white-centric, cisnormative gender categories.
However, the norms associated with these categories are nevertheless enforced on marginalized
in particularly brutal ways, in part because they are not afforded full gender category
membership. In neither of these cases does the category-based view in fact capture the way
gender norms are enforced or experienced as normative.
I argue that gender norms primarily operate by attaching to traits. Traits are descriptive
features of individuals or groups, which are coded as masculine or feminine in a context.
Dominant social contexts mandate the coherence of a set of traits; if some individual or group
exemplifies a feminine-coded trait, they are thereby expected to exemplify the rest of the set.

However, individuals who are disposed to express a trait which does not “match” other traits
they are observed to express can thereby feel responsive to the norms associated with the trait in
question, rather than with their assigned category. For example, a person who is disposed to
express a masculine trait may therefore feel responsive to norms of masculinity. Similarly, those
who are excluded from a gender category can nevertheless be punished for non-coherence.
Gender norms may be enforced on marginalized based on the gendered traits they do express,
even as they are excluded from category membership. I proceed over the course of four chapters.
Chapter 1 examines the literature on gender norms in analytic feminist metaphysics, and
distinguishes between a commitment to ascriptivism and a commitment to the category-based
view (CBV), which are often conflated in this tradition. I articulate the advantages of
ascriptivism, but suggest that the CBV will face serious problems.
Chapter 2 motivates two major objections to the CBV, as outlined above; the
responsiveness objection and the evaluability objection. I argue that the CBV fails to explain
gender’s normative power because it centers those with significant privilege.
Chapter 3 explains and defends my positive view, traits ascriptivism (TA). TA holds
that gender norms are assigned on the basis of traits, rather than gender categories. TA has many
advantages over existing views in the metaphysics of gender, while maintaining their valuable
core commitments and insights. I explain how the view captures the important desiderata for a
positive view of gender norms enforcement, and respond to objections.
Chapter 4 explores the normative power of authenticity over behavior. Gender norms are
often experienced as authentic, despite being socially assigned and morally bad. Drawing on
metaethical notions of normative authority and an existentialist tradition of socially embedded
authenticity, I explain how gender norms can be authentic and therefore action-guiding.

GENDER NORMS AND GENDERED TRAITS

by
Rowan Bell

B.S., East Tennessee State University, 2014

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy.

Syracuse University
July 1, 2022

Copyright © Rowan Bell 2022
All Rights Reserved

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It takes a village to raise a dissertation—particularly during a pandemic!—and I could not
have completed this project without mine. A few people require special notice.
The first and perhaps most significant thanks to Hille Paakkunainen, the Platonic form of
the thesis advisor. There are so many things I could thank you for. Here, I will make specific
reference to your constant support, insightful commentary, rigorous interlocution, generosity
with your time and intellectual labor, and maximal thoughtfulness. You’ve made this possible.
Thanks also to my committee members for long hours spent in discussion, engagement,
and comments. Particular thanks: to Kara Richardson, without whom I likely would not be doing
feminist philosophy; to Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson, whose insight from beyond my narrow
analytic corner of the theoretical world continues to shape the way I think about so many things;
and to Katharine Jenkins, whose stunning combination of intellectual charity and philosophical
precision has made this dissertation a hundred times better. Finally, thanks to Luvell Anderson
for your evaluation and expertise, requested and given at the eleventh hour.
Thanks also to several faculty members at Syracuse University, including but not limited
to Ken Baynes, Fred Beiser, Ben Bradley, Janice Dowell, Bob van Gulick, Karin Nisenbaum,
and Michael Rieppel, for many years of professional and personal support.
Thanks to the graduate student community at Syracuse University, present and past,
without whom both my work and my well-being would be worse. Particular thanks to Teresa
Bruno-Niño, Carolyn Garland, Çağla Çimendereli, Naomi Dershowitz, Nicole Dular, Nikki
Fortier, Kellan Head, Weiting Huang, Li Kang, Stacy Kohls, Thiago de Melo, William (Chip)
Osborne, Adam Patterson, Roger Rosena, Byron Simmons, Jan Swiderski, and Josh Tignor.

v

Thanks to all of the queer and trans philosophers in the world; but, in particular, thanks to
E. M. Hernandez, Sofie Vlaad, Harry Ainscough, Carolina Flores, Jas Heaton, Genae Matthews,
Luke Roelefs, and J.M. Wong, for your insight, engagement, and support, and most of all for
making me feel like I belong in this profession.
Thanks to my undergraduate mentors, most particularly: David Harker, whose advice on
writing I heed to this day; Allen Coates, whose input made me consider going to graduate school
in philosophy; Leslie MacAvoy, who (with the help of Butler, Fanon, Frye, and Young) taught
me what philosophy was really about; and Paul Tudico, who already knows he changed my life.
Thanks to the organizers, presenters, and audience at every talk I’ve given, particularly:
Social Ontology 2018 (for whom I wrote an abstract that spawned the entire project); the Early
Queer Scholars Program at Syracuse University; the 2019 graduate conference at Concordia,
“Liberating the Future”; the 2019 Minorities And Philosophy Spring Workshop Series; the 2019
Society for Women in Philosophy Workshop; the 2020 Trans Philosophy Spring Workshop;
three meetings of the APA (Eastern 2021, Central 2021, and Pacific 2022); and, of course,
Syracuse University’s Working Papers, WAGM Working Papers, and ABD Workshop Series.
Thanks to my best friends, Mandi Wild and Elizabeth (Elf) Ross, who never failed to
reassure me that I would finish this thing--but also made me absolutely certain that, either way, I
would never lack for good company, bad jokes, and intelligent conversation about Star Trek.
Most importantly, far more than mere thanks to my incredibly clever, effortlessly kind,
devastatingly funny, eternally patient partner, Justin. Thank you for moving across the country
with me; for making sure I ate, slept, and went outside (especially at the very beginning and very
end of this journey); for keeping the house clean, the dinners cooked, and the cat fed while I
locked myself in my office for days at a time; for listening to me go on about Heidegger and

vi

Haslanger for countless hours, a few moments of which you may actually have enjoyed; for
supporting me even when the path seemed uncertain; for never letting me, even for a moment,
fear that I would have to do this alone. I make a living out of words, but when I try to describe
what you mean to me, they fall utterly short. I love you.
Finally, of course, thanks to the people I have undoubtedly forgotten to mention. I have
not forgotten your contributions.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

1

Chapter 1: Ascriptivism and the Category-Based View

17

Chapter 2: Against the Category-Based View

46

Chapter 3: The Traits-Based View

87

Chapter 4: Authenticity and Normative Authority

148

Bibliography

181

Vita

189

viii

I am learning that adults react the same way to my interest in makeup as they do
to my interest in matches and lighters. As if maybe, by being what I am,
I might burn down something very important to them.
Something that makes their life more comfortable and easy.
Jennifer Coates
If the body is always a sign being read, then not communicating is impossible.
Riki Anne Wilchins

INTRODUCTION
Gender norms shape our lives in ways large and small. They tell us what kind of work we
should do; who we should have relationships with, and of what kind; how and when we should
speak, and to whom; even how we should comport, move, understand, present, decorate, and
generally inhabit our own bodies. Very often, these prescriptions are deeply harmful, unequal,
and oppressive. They afford power and privilege to some, while enabling the subordination and
oppression of others. They create patterns of behavior which sustain unjust systems of power,
and then render themselves invisible so that the behavior appears natural and unprompted. In
brief, they differentially restrict us based on arbitrary features, thus creating an unequal social
world where some people and groups are unjustly constrained and punished while others are
unjustly enabled.
It is under these terms that many domains of gender norms, particularly the hegemonic
norms enforced in dominant colonial contexts, have been the target of feminist critique. This is
true of most or all features of gender. However, what is distinctive about gender norms in
particular is that they seem to have a distinctive normative power over our behavior. They don’t
just tell us what the world is like, or what we are like, or even what we are permitted or able to
do. They try to tell us what we should do. They affect our sense of how the world ought to be,
and thus guide our behavior such that we aim to make it so. That is, gender norms have the
power to affect our normative deliberations. What is most disturbing about this is that they seem
1

to be able to do this irrespective of our preferences. Rejecting the legitimacy of gender norms
doesn’t always mean shaking off the power they exert over our choices. If we want to understand
how systems of oppressive power are perpetuated, even by those who are aware of and opposed
to their normative structures, we need to understand how this works.
In her forthcoming book, The Great Gender Divergence, Alice Evans investigates the
question of why, in the 10,000 years since the agricultural revolution, a majority of human
societies have become patriarchal--in the literal sense that they have been ruled and organized by
males (Evans forthcoming, Conover & Evans 2022). The answer is, unsurprisingly, complex.
Evans’ account describes a myriad of interlocking economic, social, and biological factors that,
on the whole, tend to create a feedback loop where patriarchies accrue the wealth and privilege
necessary to sustain themselves, while matriarchies or egalitarian societies tend to transform into,
or be overthrown by, patriarchies. Moreover, patriarchies tend to involve control of females,
while matriarchies tend to be more egalitarian. According to Evans, this is a major reason why
patriarchies don’t often transform into matriarchies; men control women, but women don’t
control men.
Evans describes the mechanisms which perpetuate this as surprisingly consistent. For
example, as societies become stratified in terms of wealth--a phenomenon which tends to follow
from the transition to agrarian life--it becomes important for the wealthy to preserve their
lineage, in order to pass that wealth down to their children. To do this, male leaders of
households need to be certain that their children are, in fact, their children. No such concern
arises when females are the leaders of households. Powerful males therefore have motivations to
control the women in their lives, in order to ensure that these women do not bear the children of
other men. There are many ways of doing this. The men might, for example, control these
2

women physically, by enforcing limits on their movement. They might also control them
socially, by forbidding them from interacting with others.
However, there are more effective and insidious methods of control. What stands out
most to me about Evans’ account is her description of the way that societies reproduce
themselves by creating apparently self-sustaining patterns of behavior. That is, successful
societies persist because they manage to consistently motivate groups and individuals to act in
ways that sustain the social order. According to Evans, those ways re-occur in predictable
patterns across societies. As societies become more patriarchal, they also tend to develop
normative structures that constrain women’s lives. It becomes, not just forbidden, but wrong for
women to work or to socialize outside of the home. It becomes just as wrong for men to allow
them to roam free. A good woman is one who stays home, out of public life, and away from men
outside her family; a good man is one whose women follow these rules. These normative
structures are often enshrined in complex social mores, such as honor codes or religious laws.
For example, Evans points to the fact that over a third of the rules in Zoroastrianism, an early
monotheistic religion, are aimed at controlling the behavior of women (Conover & Evans 2022).
Such normative structures are highly effective in maintaining structures of power.
Moreover, they can constrain behavior long after the structures are gone. As societies become
less patriarchal, the associated norms do not disappear. On the contrary; as the more coercive and
obvious power systems fade, we see the norms evolving to compensate, often becoming more
subtle and misleading in order to be effective (such as racist and sexist norms that pass
themselves off as colorblind or gender-neutral; see Alexander 2010, Manne 2017).
But why do societies consistently develop normative structures to shape behavior? That
is, what is it about norms that gives them so much power to perpetuate the social order? Evans’
3

answer is twofold: “People either internalize these ideas, [e.g.] that there’s eternal damnation for
stepping out of line; or, it’s not that they really believe it--they might be privately critical--but
the costs of noncompliance are so huge that you have to comply” (Conover & Evans 2022). That
is, coercive social norms shape behavior in two ways. Either individuals internalize the norms
and come to follow them as if they are really consequential, or they follow the norms because
they fear punishment for failing to do so.
These two ways of reacting to a norm map nicely onto a phenomenon described by
Charlotte Witt in her 2011 monograph The Metaphysics of Gender. Witt raises the following
question: “Why are individuals responsive to and evaluable under social norms?” (2011, 42,
emphasis added). That is, given the structural nature of social norms such as gender norms, and,
crucially, the fact that we often reject or disprefer these norms, why do we feel we should follow
them, and why do we evaluate others accordingly?
I argue that this is a crucial question for understanding how gender oppression sustains
itself. Put broadly, norms operate as a functional bridge between the macroscopic structures of
oppressive power that shape our world, and the practical agency of those who participate in,
contribute to, and maintain those structures. Of course, oppressions such as racism, sexism, and
coloniality are not solely, or even primarily, caused and perpetuated by individuals. (According
to some poststructuralists, the opposite is actually true.) But I think we cannot understand this
system without understanding how norms shape agency--with or without the knowledge,
preference, or consent of agents. Iris Marion Young writes:
Oppression in this sense is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices or
policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the
assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following
those rules.... In this extended structural sense oppression refers to the vast and deep
injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and
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reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural
stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms—
in short, the normal processes of everyday life. (Young 1990, 41, emphasis added)
Broadly speaking, I seek to understand what makes certain processes “normal” or “ordinary”
while being, at the same time, constructed, institutional, “vast and deep.” I want to know how
these agential bridges are built.
This is, in some ways, the “biggest picture” version of the question. In this dissertation, I
will address what I take to be a relatively narrow, but crucial, part of it. If we want to know how
gender norms shape agency, we need to know how they attach to us, and how that attachment
creates reasons in us. Recall Witt’s question. Why do we respond to the call of gender norms,
and why do others judge us according to them? Specifically, why does this happen differently to
different people, in a way that generates reasons for many of those people, and often enables
oppression? I take this to be a useful point of entry.
Witt has an answer for this. She argues that individuals are assigned to social positions,
which come with collections of norms. That is, according to Witt, what explains gender norms’
differential power over us is the gender categories that we occupy. This is in agreement with
many other philosophers in recent analytic feminist philosophy, in particular Haslanger (2012),
Ásta (2018), and Dembroff (2018b, 2020). On this family of views, gender categories both
ground gender norms--that is, the categories are the reason the norms exist--and they explain
how those gender norms are assigned to us.
However, I think that this answer, although ontologically tidy, is too narrow. It primarily
explains the experiences of those who are already centered in hegemonic gender categories--i.e.
those who have significant privilege. But many marginalized people--in particular transgender
(trans) and gender-nonconforming (GNC) people and people of color--often have very different
5

experiences of gender’s normative power. That is, those who are marginalized within, or
altogether excluded from, dominant gender categorization often experience gender norms as
exerting force over us in ways that do not align with gender categorization. For example, many
trans and GNC people experience gender norms which have ostensibly not been assigned to us as
exerting force over our behavior and giving us reasons to act. Similarly, many people who are
excluded from particular categories on the basis of racialization, colonization, or general gender
unintelligibility, are nevertheless subjected to the associated gender norms in particularly brutal
ways. Moreover, these harms are not visited merely at the level of the individual, but are
enforced against entire cultures, societies, and ways of life.
To ignore these experiences is a significant theoretical oversight. If we want to
understand how gender norms exert normative power over the world, we need to consult those
who have the best epistemic perspective on this power: those who have experienced it from
multiple intersecting angles, and who are frequently in its crosshairs. This project therefore
proceeds from the assumption that the experiences of people marginalized along dimensions of
gender—who will, on an intersectional view, turn out to be far more than just those classed as
women—ought to be centered in a study of gender norms.
How, then, should we understand gender norm assignment? I will argue that we should
adopt a traits-based view. That is, I will argue that gender norms are assigned, and thus exert
force, on the basis of the traits that some entity is perceived to have. “Entity” here is understood
broadly; an individual can be an entity, but so can a group, a society, or an entire way of life. A
traits-based view allows for a much more modular, malleable, context-dependent account of
gender norm assignment, one that can capture the advantages of a category-based view without
falling prey to its biases. With a traits-based view in hand, we can understand how gender norms
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apply differently on the basis of various features--including those associated with sexed
embodiment, such as genital structure and secondary sex characteristics, but also including other
embodied features (such as racialized features), features of behavior, character traits, appearance
and dress, and so on. This approach, I argue, can explain the normative experiences of
marginalized people while also capturing what is attractive about a category-based view.
Before I say more about what the project is, let me say a little about what it is not. First, it
is not an empirical inquiry about why individuals behave in ways that conform to gender norms.
Sociologists have often described internalization in purely behaviorist terms, without reference
to the normative deliberations, reasons, or other “internal” states of the individual. For example,
sociologist John Finley Scott (1971) argues that norms become internalized as a response to
social sanctions. This has come to be known as the internalization hypothesis, which is widely
influential in the social sciences (Sripada & Stich 2006). According to Scott, internalization is
best described in purely behavioral terms: ”the actor has been sufficiently conditioned by
sanctions that his behavior conforms to the norm at a spatial or temporal remove from sanctions”
(Scott 1971, 92). Scott explicitly argues against the investigation of so-called “subjective
aspects” of normative commitment, arguing that phenomenological states such as obligation are
largely unknowable except by introspection (21). Since, according to Scott, introspection is
unreliable at best, producing data that is “bewildering, contradictory, and often highly
implausible” (25), Scott argues that the empirical scientist ought to focus only on that which is
observable and quantifiable: behavior.
But this project is not primarily empirical. I do not aim, nor am I qualified, to give a
scientific study of the causes of norm-compliant behavior. Rather, I am interested in what I am
calling the normative structures of the world. I want to know how practical agency shapes and is
7

shaped by gender norms, and how agents (individual and collective) come to have and act on
gendered reasons that weigh heavy in their normative deliberations.<*> There are, of course, a
wealth of empirical issues in the vicinity: How do individuals come to be inclined towards
gendered behavior? How does behavior become gendered in the first place? What causes
individuals to consider different gender norms as candidates or non-candidates for possible
reasons? How do particular norms affect the way individuals behave? These are all fascinating
questions that I am neither qualified nor attempting to answer. Rather, I am interested in what I
take to be a separate and distinctively philosophical question: How does gender shape the
landscape of agency in ways that justify and enable oppression?
Second, I do not take myself to be giving an account of “what gender is.” Similarly, I am
not interested in questions about what gender categories are and what it takes to count as a
member of a category, what gender identity is and what it takes to have one, and so on. I want to
give these questions as wide a berth as possible. If one holds a view of gender on which it is
partially or wholly constituted by gender norms, elements of my view will certainly have
implications for what gender is. But I don’t address these issues. On the contrary, following
Mikkola (2016) and Antony (2020), I suggest that a focus on these kinds of questions has
dominated gender metaphysics for too long, and distracted us from our more pressing goals. My
aim is to focus on those features of the world which have traveled under the banner of gender,
and to study the ways in which these features have enabled and justified various oppressions and
harms. Again, following Mikkola (2016), I argue that I don’t need a particular “metaphysics of
gender” to do this. I only need to be able to talk about it in an intelligible and meaningful way-which I am already doing.
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Relatedly, and perhaps more radically, I do not try to give a clear answer to the question
of what makes a gender norm a gender norm. I understand that gender norms are difficult to
cleanly distinguish from other normative domains, such as etiquette or aesthetics. My aim in this
project is not to defend gender norms as a distinctive and univocal domain. While I maintain that
I want to avoid giving a metaphysics of gender, I will lay bare here at least one commitment. It is
received wisdom that gender oppression is co-constructed with other social oppressions. I
understand this as a strong metaphysical claim. In particular, the gender system which dominates
the modern colonial world is inseparable from the racial and economic systems; it is, in the
words of bell hooks, a “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (2000, 4). This is a phenomenon
which is, I think, significantly under-theorized in analytic gender metaphysics. I understand this
co-construction as entailing at least a partial co-constitution. In a very real sense, colonial,
gender, racial, economic, and other oppressions constitute one another, and cannot be
meaningfully disentangled without erasing those who are most targeted by this co-construction.
In Chapter 4 I suggest that dominant domains of gender norms are likely unified by particular
oppressive aims, such as maintaining the colonial social order. This is compatible with the
thought that they are not wholly ontologically distinct from other domains. I want to leave it
open whether such ontological distinction is possible for everything that we want to call “gender
norms.” However, I do not think it is necessary to do that here. My aim is to understand the
dimensions of normative power that have traveled under the banner of gender, in order to pursue
the political aims of ameliorating the oppressions and harms they enable. Again, following both
Mikkola (2016) and Antony (2020), I hold that we don’t need to complete the ontological project
before proceeding with the political one. I’ll say a bit more about this in Chapter 3.
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Third, I am not trying to answer questions about what agents are. Certain ways of
engaging with the questions I’ve raised thus far might be interpreted this way. For example,
Foucault (1983) argues that human beings are “made subjects” by the normative structures of
power which bound the social world. “Subject” here has two senses: first, it means a conscious
agent (i.e. a subject as opposed to an object); second, it means something that is subjected to a
greater force (i.e. the subject of a monarchy). For Foucault, the two are intertwined; subjects in
the first sense exist because they are “subjected” in the second sense--they are made subjects. On
this picture, then, normative power creates the agent. Similarly, specific to the gender
case, Judith Butler (1990, 1993) argues that subjects are in part constituted by the linguistic and
cultural gender norms that bound their behavior. For Butler, there is no stable gender
identity behind or before the boundaries of gendered language and convention through which the
subject acts and is interpreted. The performance of gender, which is always necessarily
constrained by available language and normative convention, constitutes the subject. This is a
radically anti-essentialist gender metaphysics--a picture on which it’s not just that gender is
socially constructed, but bodies and individuals themselves are constructed by gender.
My project, however, does not commit itself to a particular metaphysics of subjecthood. I
take my claims here to be consistent with these approaches, as well as potential others. If agents
are understood as analogous to “subjects” in the sense articulated by Foucault or Butler, then my
central questions will certainly bear on how subjects come to be. But this is not specifically
intended as an upshot of my view. Rather, I am interested in the mechanisms by which normative
power shapes agency and choice itself. The question of where (or whether) the subject comes in
is, I think, orthogonal. (To take a radical example, my view seems consistent with a view on
which there is no such things as individual agents, but only agency arranged agent-wise, as it
10

were.) I do at times speak as if there is a clear line between agent and world; for example, I
sometimes ask how norms “get into” the agent. However, I take this to be a handy way of
describing the apparent distinction between subject and world as it is experienced by that
(apparent) subject, rather than a claim that the distinction is really substantive. In chapter 4, I will
discuss what it takes for a subject to construct themselves authentically; but again, my aim is not
to discuss authentic subjecthood in itself, but rather how practical choice is guided by the
normative demands of authenticity.
Fourth, and finally, I am not engaging in ideal theory. Broadly speaking, I want to study
normativity, not in its robust, abstracted, and ideal form, but in terms of the actual, constructed,
context-dependent, and imperfect normative standards and norms that in fact shape the agential
landscape. The literature on agency in metaethics and philosophy of action has largely concerned
itself with questions about relatively idealized normative standards, such as morality, prudence,
or rationality. These things, it is sometimes thought, give us real reasons to act, in a way that is
(explicitly or implicitly) contrasted with the merely apparent reasons given by other kinds of
standards, such as etiquette. For example, Wodak (2019) argues that authoritative norms are the
only real norms, and that other standards are “fictionally” normative--they imitate real
normativity in the same way that a fake duck imitates a real duck, and therefore only seem to
give us reasons to act. That is, we might act “as if” etiquette gives us a reason, but it doesn’t
really. What’s missing from this discussion, I think, is the fact that many people seem to take
ostensibly non-”real” normative standards, such as gender, to be giving them real reasons. But I
think some of the tools used to study “traditional” idealized normativity can nevertheless be
useful here, as I hope will become apparent.
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My overall strategy will be as follows. I will begin by discussing recent trends in the
analytic metaphysics of gender on the matter of gender norms. I show that many prominent
theorists in this tradition are committed to what I call the category-based view, or the view that
gender norms apply on the basis of the gender categories that individual agents occupy. I then
raise two major objections against the category-based view, both drawn from the experiences of
marginalized people: I argue that it cannot explain how transgender (trans) and gendernonconforming (GNC) people are responsive to gender norms, and that it cannot explain how
many people and groups (such as colonized people and societies, enslaved people, and gendernonconforming people) are evaluable under gender norms. In place of a category-based view, I
argue that we should adopt a traits-based view, which can explain these phenomena while also
doing the work we want a category-based view to do. Finally, I explore the question of why
gender norms that are assigned on the basis of traits seem to be able to give us reasons to act that
can weigh heavy against other considerations, such as morality or prudence. Let me discuss each
of these moves in more detail.
In Chapter 1, I situate my discussion of gender norms within the existing literature in
analytic feminist metaphysics. First, I give a sense of what prominent theorists in this tradition,
in particular Witt (2011), Haslanger (2012), Ásta (2018), and Dembroff (2018b, 2020), have
meant by saying that gender is socially constructed. I then draw out what these theorists have
said about gender norms. I argue that theorists in this tradition have tended to conflate two
commitments: thin ascriptivism, or the view that gender norms apply to agents without their
participation or consent, and the category-based view, or the view that gender norms apply
to agents on the basis of the gender categories that they occupy. I defend thin ascriptivism on the
grounds that it is good fit for social constructionism and other feminist commitments, such as
12

structuralism. I then raise two major objections to the category-based view, which I discuss only
briefly; I will elaborate at length in Chapter 2. I raise them here to argue that there are good
reasons to distinguish thin ascriptivism from the category-based view.
In Chapter 2, as promised, I motivate the two major objections to the category-based
view discussed briefly in Chapter 1. I begin by returning to Witt’s question: Why are
individuals responsive to and evaluable under gender norms? I frame these as two major
components of gender’s normative power. Accordingly, I raise two objections to the categorybased view: the responsiveness objection and the evaluability objection. First, I argue that the
category-based view cannot explain how agents are responsive to gender norms. I identify the
phenomenon of cross-category norm responsiveness. Many trans and GNC people experience
themselves as responsive to norms associated with gender categories that were not assigned to
them. For example, many people who have not been assigned the category “woman”
nevertheless experience themselves as responsive to feminine norms. Importantly, this often
happens when the individual in question also does not understand themselves as belonging to the
category associated with the norms to which they are responsive. I argue that a category-based
view does not explain this. Second, I argue that the category-based view cannot explain how
agents, and other social entities, are evaluable under gender norms. Many people who are
actively excluded or ejected from dominant gender categories are nevertheless held as evaluable
under the associated norms. For example, Lugones (2007, 2010) argues that membership in
dominant gender categories of “man” and “woman” is historically reserved for white colonizers;
Black and Brown colonized people are excluded from membership in these categories. Similarly,
Spillers (1987) argues that Black enslaved bodies are ungendered through the legacy of chattel
slavery. And Wilchins (1997) points to the ways in which trans and GNC people are treated as
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“gendertrash,” outside the boundaries of binary classifications. However, the gender norms
associated with dominant gender categories are nevertheless enforced on those excluded from
dominant categories in particularly brutal ways—in part because they are denied gender category
membership. More broadly, gender norms do not only function at the level of the individual
agent, as a category-based view suggests. For example, as Lugones has argued, macro-level
social entities such as groups, societies, and ways of knowing are treated as evaluable under
gender norms; this is a key feature of the construction of dominant gender norms through the
legacy of coloniality. I conclude that a category-based view focuses on the experiences of those
who are already privileged within dominant gender categories. We should therefore dispense
with it.
However, a category-based view has one significant advantage: It gives us a clear and
parsimonious explanation of the grounds on which gender norms are assigned, one that captures
the way in which they apply differently to individuals based on how they are differently situated
and interpreted within a gendered social system. Rejecting a category-based view also strips
away some of this explanatory richness. We are left without an account of the mechanism of
gender norm assignment. We need to provide a view that does not encounter the same problems
that face the category-based view, but is still compatible with other feminist commitments, like
social construction. What might fill this role?
In Chapter 3, I give an answer. I propose that we shift focus from gender categories to
gendered traits, and adopt what I call a traits-based view about gender norm assignment. This
shift, I contend, can provide a clear account of the mechanism by which gender norms are
assigned and enforced, while maintaining the advantages of previous accounts in feminist
philosophy, and avoiding the problems faced by a category-based view. I begin by identifying
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six desiderata which I take to be crucial for explaining how gender norms attach to features of
the world: responsiveness, evaluability, social construction, nonconsensual assignment,
differential assignment and embodiment, and oppression. I explore how interactions between
these desiderata can help prepare us to construct a positive view. I then explain and defend a
traits-based view. Gender norms, I argue, are assigned to entities in the world based on the traits
that they are perceived to display, where traits are understood as “bare descriptive facts” about
entities. Particular traits are gender-coded, typically as either masculine or feminine. If an entity
is perceived to exhibit a particular trait that is gender-coded in their locality, that person is
thereby evaluated under the associated gender norm. In contexts where gender is assumed to
function as a strict and exclusive binary, gender norms are expected to cluster together; this
cluster can be enforced as normative. I suggest that a traits-based view is better suited to explain
the way gender norms are experienced as normative, and enforced against, marginalized people,
than a category-based view. I discuss the ways in which it meets the six desiderata I have
identified, in the process further exploring its commitments. I then respond to three objections
against the traits-based view, each from the perspective that the category-based view is better
suited to explain gender norm assignment. I conclude that each objection fails, and that we
should adopt a traits-based view in place of a category-based view.
In Chapter 4, I address the ways in which certain gender norms can be experienced as
providing authoritative or “real” reasons to act, even when an individual might be subjected to
multiple and conflicting standards. Trans and gender-nonconforming people sometimes say that
certain gender norms--often those which conflict with their assigned categories--are authentic for
them. For example, a trans man might say that abiding by norms of masculinity tracks who he
really is. Authenticity as a standard is sometimes taken to appeal to an essential, pre-social
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“inner self.” It is also sometimes understood as a moral notion. Authenticity claims about gender
norms therefore appear inimical to two key commitments I have already articulated: social
construction, and oppression (which I extend to entail the claim that many domains of gender
norms are both morally and prudentially bad.) I argue, however, that that this apparent tension is
illusory. Concordant with existing trans narratives of authenticity, I articulate an existentialist
view that understands authenticity as a socially embedded, constructive project undertaken in a
non-ideal social world, rather than a reflective uncovering of a pre-given, essential self. I then
show that authenticity and morality can come apart; what is authentic for someone need not be
either morally good or good for them. I conclude that the authenticity of gender norms does not
cut against the feminist commitments that I identify. This conclusion enables a theoretical space
that is both respectful of trans experience and critical of dominant gender norms, an important
liberatory goal.

16

CHAPTER 1: ASCRIPTIVISM AND THE CATEGORY-BASED VIEW
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On a prominent family of views in analytic feminist metaphysics, gender norms are
understood as the normative standards which delimit appropriate behavior for individuals who
are assigned to a given gender category. The story goes like this: An individual is sorted into a
gender category by others in their social context on the basis of some observed or imagined
feature or features, generally connected to their sexed embodiment (Witt 2011, Haslanger 2012,
Ásta 2018). Each of these categories comes pre-loaded with a normative standard for “good” and
“bad” behavior relative to the category—typically masculinity (for the category “men”) or
femininity (for the category “woman”) (Haslanger 2012). Each standard is constituted by a group
of interrelated gender norms. Those gender norms are then enforced on an individual via
sanctions (rewards and punishments). Over time, the individual learns to calibrate their behavior
relative to that standard, and become responsive to those norms (Witt 2011). On this picture,
gender norms are understood relative to a gender category; their primary function is to guide the
behavior of individuals in the relevant category so that it falls in line with the “appropriate”
behavior assigned to that category.
A view like this has many advantages. Primarily, it gives a plausible social
constructionist explanation of how individuals come to be responsive to gender norms. Another
way of explaining this is to appeal to ‘natural’ or ‘innate’ gendered features; individuals feel
moved to comply with gender norms because those individuals are ‘naturally’ or ‘innately’
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feminine or masculine. (For a plausible and trans-inclusive version of gendered innateness, see
Serano 2007.) However, on a social constructionist view, gender is not natural or innate, but
rather is socially constructed. Elements of gender come to appear natural or innate in order to
obscure the mechanisms by which they are constructed, and thus to make gender hierarchy also
appear natural or innate (see Haslanger 2012, Ásta 2018). Prominent views in analytic
philosophy aim to capture both the socially constructed nature of gender norms and the way in
which they affect our choices. Relatedly, they explain why individuals often find themselves to
be responsive to and evaluable under gender norms even when they do not like, prefer, or
identify with those norms or the associated category. Since people learn gender norms over time
through conditioning, they come to follow those norms by habit, and find themselves responding
to them even when they would prefer not to (Witt 2011).
I argue that views in this tradition often conflate two commitments; thin ascriptivism, or
the view that gender norms are socially assigned to individuals without their participation or
consent, and the category-based view, or the view that gender norms apply to individuals on the
basis of the gender category of which they are a member. Thin ascriptivism is an important view
for feminist purposes, and I argue that we should keep it. However, the category-based view
faces serious objections, in particular those drawn from the experiences of people at the margins
of dominant gender categories. I briefly discuss two such objections. First, the category-based
view does not explain the way that individuals actually experience gender norms as applying to
them. For example, many transgender (trans) and gender-nonconforming (GNC) people,
experience gender norms which do not match their assigned gender category as exerting
normative force over them and guiding their actions. Second, the category-based view does not
explain the way gender norms are enforced. Often, those who are not included in a particular
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gender category are nevertheless treated as evaluable under associated norms. These examples
suggest that gender norms do not apply solely on the basis of gender categorization.
My primary aim in this chapter will be twofold. First, I will outline the commitments of
prominent existing views in the literature on feminist analytic metaphysics with respect to gender
norms. In particular, I will discuss the work of Witt (2011), Haslanger (2012), Ásta (2018), and
(to a lesser extent) Dembroff (2018b, 2020). Second, based on these exegetical conclusions, I
will argue that this tradition tends to conflate thin ascriptivism with the category-based view.
Specifically, each of these views either implicitly or explicitly adopts a version of thin
ascriptivism that either defends or presupposes a category-based view. In successive chapters, I
will argue at length that a category-based view is an insufficient framework to explain the
normative power of gender norms and their role in enabling and justifying oppression. However,
thin ascriptivism is an important and valuable commitment for feminist purposes. My goal here,
then, is to distinguish between the two commitments.
In 1.1, I identify social constructionism about gender norms as a central commitment of
feminist theory. I define this term with reference to the literature in feminist analytic philosophy.
I then discuss the connection between social constructionism and gender norms, primarily
drawing from the work of Witt (2011). I show that Witt’s arguments in favor of her view, which
she calls ascriptivism, do not support the substantive view she proposes; however, they do
support a much thinner view, which I accordantly call thin ascriptivism. In 1.2, I defend thin
ascriptivism as a theoretically and politically powerful commitment for feminist purposes.
Concordantly, I show how many prominent analytic feminist philosophers either defend or
assume this commitment. In 1.3, I argue that, within the tradition I am discussing, thin
ascriptivism is often conflated with what I call the category-based view. I briefly raise two
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objections to the category-based view, in order to demonstrate that it is problematic; I note that I
will defend these objections at length in successive chapters. In 1.4, I conclude with a brief
summary and preview of the next step.

1.1. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM IN FEMINIST ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
It is an important baseline commitment of feminist theory that gender is socially
constructed. However, “social construction” is used in many different ways, and is often
misunderstood, which can cause miscommunication. Of particular relevance here is such
miscommunication between feminist theory and trans theory (Salamon 2010). Among the
clearest and most theoretically elaborate articulations of the social construction of gender comes
from the “debunking” tradition in analytic feminist philosophy. In this section, I will articulate
some of the core commitments of this family of views. This literature has typically treated
gender categories as theoretically primary, and discussions of other gender phenomena, such as
gender norms, have been secondary. Since gender norms are the target of this inquiry, I will
investigate the relationship between gender categories and gender norms as it is theorized in the
target tradition. I examine prominent views in analytic feminist metaphysics, as defended by
Witt (2011), Haslanger (2012), Ásta (2018), and Dembroff (2018b, 2020). This family of views
shares three commitments about gender norms: (1) social constructionism, (2) thin ascriptivism,
and (3) the category-based view. (1) is taken to lead to (2), and (2) is conflated with (3). (1) is
well-established and plausible; I touch on it only briefly here, primarily to articulate its core
commitments and defend its relationship to (2). In successive sections, I will defend the
plausibility of (2) and argue that it can come apart from (3), which is less plausible.
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Broadly, social constructionism in feminist philosophy holds that gender is not a natural
or fixed part of human life. Rather, gender arises out of contingent historical practices of
assigning social significance to certain features. Those features themselves may be natural or
fixed parts of human life, such as reproductive capacities (Witt 2011, 27-29; Ásta 2018, 3);
however, the associated social significance is contingent, and varies across cultures and contexts.
Over time, socially constructed gender phenomena take on a life of their own. A gender
category’s historical roots in, say, a particular role in sexual reproduction might in principle bear
remarkably little resemblance to its modern iterations (Haslanger 2012, 44; Briggs & George
forthcoming). Social constructionism is positioned in opposition to biological essentialism about
gender. According to biological essentialism, gender categories have an intrinsic essence
determined by biological features such as chromosomes and hormones. On this view, most
phenotypic gendered features, such as appearance and behavior, are causally determined by this
intrinsic essence (Bach 2012, 233). The social constructionist argues that biological essentialists
“mistake what is social and variable for what is natural and fixed” (Witt 2011, 7-8); that is,
biological essentialism mistakes the contingent social significance of certain human features for
an inevitable result of natural features, and thus mistakes gender for an inevitable, natural, and
thus “normal” part of human existence (Ásta 2018, 46).
Feminist social constructionism is often engaged in the anti-biological-essentialist
debunking project about gender. A debunking project undertakes to expose hidden mechanisms
of social construction in practices that are widely believed to be naturalistic (Haslanger 2012,
Ásta 2018). Debunking is deployed against social phenomena which are constructed and unjust,
but which, in masquerading as natural, falsely appear natural and thus inevitable (Haslanger
2012, 127). Social constructionist feminist philosophers dating back to Beauvoir (1948) have
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made the normative claim that gender is unjust, coupled with the descriptive claim that it is
socially constructed and contingent. This contingency is sometimes understood to open up
possibilities for gender liberation; what is constructed and contingent may be resisted where
what is natural and inevitable may not (Haslanger 2012, 132; Ásta 2018, 56).
Gender norms are the spoken and unspoken standards of behavior, appearance, and
comportment which apply to those who exist in gendered social space in virtue of how they are
positioned and interpreted in that gendered social space. That is, gender norms are social norms
which vary according to who you are and how others understand you within a system of
gendering. Moreover, because gender norms are created and enforced by contingent social
practices, they are culturally specific and contextual; the norms for a person in one context are
different than they would be for that same person in another context, even if we hold fixed their
body, behavior, clothing, and so forth. In dominant colonial gendering practices, gender norms
typically come in two varieties: masculinity, or the standards typically associated with maleness
and men, and femininity, or the standards typically associated with femaleness and women. In
what follows, I discuss how analytic philosophers have theorized the nature of this association
between category and normative standard.
Ascriptivism, as defined by Witt (2011), is a metaphysical account of how social
normativity works. According to Witt’s view, social norms apply to a person because of the
social position the person occupies. For example, the norms of femininity apply to a person
because she is socially positioned as a woman (Witt 2011, 44-45). On this view, a person is
positioned as a woman because she is socially recognized as a woman. “Social recognition” here
is “a complex, holistic status comprised of both public, institutional recognition and interpersonal
acknowledgment” (45). If someone is socially recognized as a woman, she is then “ascribed” the
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corresponding normative role and evaluated according to its norms. We can define Witt’s
ascriptivism about gender norms as follows:
Witt’s Ascriptivism: Some gender norms apply to subject S because S is socially
recognized as belonging to the gendered social position G, rather than because of S’s
voluntary self-identification, choice, or preference.
According to Witt, ascriptivism explains why people feel the “normative pull” of social norms;
that is, it explains why individuals are psychologically responsive to particular social norms,
such that they calibrate their behavior accordingly. According to Witt, a person who has
occupied the social position of “woman” for a significant amount of time will become used to
responding as if she were under evaluation as a woman. That is, she will be habituated, in an
Aristotelean sense, to respond to feminine norms, and will therefore experience those norms as
relevant to her decisions—even if she rejects those norms and refuses to follow them (Witt 47).
Witt’s position here mirrors the internalization hypothesis in social science, where individuals
come to behave according to social norms as a result of social learning and training (Scott 1971,
Sripada & Stich 2007). Witt also notes that because of habituation, most people who are ascribed
a particular gendered social position also identify with it. Despite this correlation, Witt argues
that we shouldn’t be misled into thinking that this identification grounds gender’s normative
power. The ascription of a gendered social position is what “brings [a person] under its
normative umbrella”—that is, what leads to their being evaluable by others under the norms
associated with that position, as well as feeling the pull of its norms (44).
Witt contrasts ascriptivism with voluntarism about social norms. On voluntarism,
according to Witt, “the normative pull originates in the agent’s decision to adopt a given [social
position], thereby accepting that her behavior is subject to certain norms or reasons for acting”
(43). On this view, social norms apply to someone because she prefers, endorses, or identifies
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with those norms (Witt 2019, 5). The norms are, in this sense, voluntary; they apply based on the
individual’s choice. Witt think this is clearly wrong, because it cannot explain why people are
evaluated according to and moved by norms with which they do not identify. For example, if a
mother ceases to identify as a mother, that may not change whether she feels that the norms of
motherhood are relevant to her conduct, and it certainly won’t change whether others hold her
accountable to them (Witt 2011, 44). Moreover, we are evaluated under and responsive to most
social norms, including gender norms, long before we are capable of identifying with them (45).
According to Witt, ascriptivism can capture these facts and voluntarism can’t.
Witt attributes the voluntarist view primarily to Korsgaard (1996, 2009). On Korsgaard’s
voluntarism, norms can genuinely guide us only if and because we willingly adopt a practical
identity which requires us to follow them; the norms of femininity will bind one’s behavior only
if one voluntarily adopts or takes up that practical identity of “woman”. But I think Witt’s
critique doesn’t capture Korsgaard’s aim. Korsgaard is concerned with robust or authoritative
normativity; that is, she is interested in the genuinely authoritative reasons we have for acting.
She argues that adoption of a practical identity is what determines whether a person is genuinely
bound by a norm—whether one really ought, in a deep sense, to follow it. Witt, by contrast, is
interested in whether a person is “responsive to and evaluable under” a norm (42). This is
relatively thin, normatively speaking; it only captures the way norms operate at the social and
psychological level, and not any real normative authority they might have. Korsgaard’s target
concept is therefore more substantive than Witt makes it out to be.
However, this divergence can help us understand Witt’s view more clearly. Witt is not
invested in understanding robust normativity; that is, she isn’t describing gender norms as a part
of what anyone really ought to do, in the sense that we really ought to save a child from
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drowning, or believe things for which we have a preponderance of evidence. Rather, she is
describing the non-ideal norms that in fact operate in the social world; what people are in fact
expected to do, and the expectations to which they in fact respond. Our metanormative
discussions about this can be purely descriptive. That is, we can theorize about these norms
without ever discussing substantive normative facts about what the people involved really ought
to do. Ascriptivism is a view about how, descriptively speaking, gender as a general social
phenomenon can exert power over people’s behavior, not about whether that power is
normatively robust. I discuss robust gender norms in Chapter 4.
Witt sets up voluntarism and ascriptivism as the only possible views for how gender
norms apply to individuals, although she doesn’t say why. We might read her here as trying to
map the available logical space with respect to the kinds of views that a social constructionist
might have about gender norms. If the norms in question depend on social practices, then facts
about how they apply must also depend on those social practices. Norms that do not depend on
social practices may have other conditions for application. A naturalist moral realist, for
example, will hold that moral norms are just natural properties of the world, and therefore apply
to people because of some natural facts about the kind of beings that they are. However, this type
of explanation is not available for norms that are social in origin, such as gender norms. A social
constructionist is therefore already committed to the claim that the application of gender norms
must be explained at the social level. With respect to the question of how social norms apply to a
person, we can divide social practices into two rough categories: (1) the practices of others with
respect to that person (e.g. assignment, training), (2) the practices of that person with respect to
themself (e.g. choice, preference, identification). Broadly, Witt uses voluntarism here to describe
any view which holds that gender norms apply in virtue of (2). She rejects all such views on the
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grounds that self-directed practices do not seem to affect whether gender norms apply to us.
Ascriptivism, on the other hand, holds that gender norms apply in virtue of (1)—specifically,
according to the assignment of a social position and the associated norms.
Notice, however, that accepting Witt’s argument against voluntarism merely commits us
to the claim that gender norm application depends in some way on the social practices of others
with respect to the individual. That is: If we are social constructionists, and we reject
voluntarism, we are only committed to a relatively thin position which can be cashed out in a
variety of ways. Witt’s version of ascriptivism is more substantive than this. She argues that
gender norms apply to an individual because the individual is socially recognized as belonging
to a gendered social position. This part of Witt’s ascriptivism may be evaluated independently of
her rejection of voluntarism.
I suggest, then, that there are two broad kinds of views that a social constructionist might
have about gender norm assignment: voluntarism, on which gender norms apply to an individual
based on their own self-regarding practices; and an alternative view on which gender norms
apply to an individual based on the practices of others. To distinguish the latter from Witt’s
original substantive or “thick” view while still paying homage to her important work, I will call
it thin ascriptivism. That is:
Thin ascriptivism: Some gender norms apply to subject S because of the practices of
others with respect to S, rather than because of S’s voluntary self-identification, choice,
or preference.
Together, voluntarism and thin ascriptivism exhaust the theoretical possibilities for a social
constructionist with respect to gender norm assignment. Both are relatively basic; either may be
cashed out in a variety of ways. For example, either voluntarism or ascriptivism will end up
being compatible with Witt’s more substantive commitment about gendered social positions. It
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can be true that gender norms apply to individuals on the basis of the gendered social position
that they occupy, even if that social position is voluntaristically adopted.
Let me bookmark this discussion for now; I will return to it in 1.3. In the next section,
drawing from the work of Witt and others in the analytic tradition, I will defend thin ascriptivism
as an important view for feminist purposes.

1.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING (THINLY) ASCRIPTIVIST
In this section, I will argue that thin ascriptivism is an important theoretical commitment
for a feminist explanation of the harms of gender norms in dominant contexts. I show that
several prominent feminist metaphysicians are (thick or thin) ascriptivists about gender norms.
As noted above, I am here primarily discussing the harms of dominant gender norms. This is not
to say that there are not important, rich, and legitimate domains of gender norms that operate
otherwise; for example, we might think that gender norms in subaltern queer and trans contexts
work quite differently. Perhaps such norms are not oppressive or harmful; perhaps one reason for
this is that these domains are voluntarist, rather than ascriptivist. However, since the dominant
context is dominant, and tends to affect most or all of us, it is important to capture the way in
which those gender norms work in order to explain how oppression is perpetuated.
In her discussion of ascriptivism and voluntarism, Witt gives two reasons for thinking
that ascriptivism is particularly important for feminist political purposes (2011, 47). I argued in
1.1 that we should understand Witt’s arguments in favor of ascriptivism as supporting thin
ascriptivism, rather than the more substantive version Witt proposes; I therefore take the
following arguments to support that view. First, (thin) ascriptivism adds to the richness of our
understanding of the grip of oppressive social norms by explaining why an individual might feel
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drawn under the normative umbrella of a social role of which she is also critical. Second, a (thin)
ascriptivist explanation of gender norms suggests that feminist politics should focus on how the
social world is normatively structured and criticize those norms that are oppressive, rather than
getting bogged down in explanations that appeal to individual psychology.
This case is compelling. I will here elaborate on both points, and strengthen the second.
To the first point: Feminist theory has at times been divided on the matter of self-described
feminists who embrace feminine aesthetic norms (Serano 2007, 320; hooks et al. 2014). For
example, in conversation about this phenomenon, a feminist friend said this to me: “I hate gender
norms, but I love high heels.” On a voluntarist account, it is difficult to make sense of this
position, at least without casting my friend as deeply confused. Wearing high heels is a paradigm
of feminine expectation in my friend’s cultural context. Moreover, high heels have at times been
a focal point of feminist criticism for the physical stress they place on the body. If my friend
hates gender norms—that is, if she does not endorse, prefer, or identify with them—her
preference for this earmark of normative femininity seems, on a voluntarist account, mystifying.
One might make a case about adaptive preferences and the shaping of feminine socialization;
perhaps some women are so warped by their societies that they believe they do not endorse
gender norms, but really, unbeknownst to them, they do. However, a simpler explanation is
available that also has the advantage of respecting my friend’s full agency. She has become
habituated to following feminine norms, and is responsive to them in practice, despite a
theoretical distaste for them.
This is a familiar struggle for many of us, and thus points to the intuitive appeal of thin
ascriptivism. Simply refusing to identify with some gender norm is not enough to shake its
power over us, either externally (as social enforcement) or internally (as felt normative pull).
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Importantly, understanding the assignment of gender norms as involuntary or nonconsensual is
crucial to understanding the particularly pernicious way in which they harm and oppress. Gender
norms license censure, punishment, and violence against those who do not conform to them
(Butler 1990); moreover, feminine norms create psychological trauma and a loss of autonomy for
women who are subject to them (Bartky 1979, Young 1980). If gender norms attached to us
because of voluntary adoption, avoiding these consequences would be simple; we could just
refuse to adopt the norms as our own. But this is not sufficient. On the contrary, those who refuse
to adopt gender norms are often at greater risk of harm and punishment as a result. As Witt
points out, this is key to our understanding of various gendered harms.
The second point is also strong. Witt argues that thin ascriptivism can help feminist
politics focus on “changing restrictive social positions and oppressive social norms”—which, she
claims, is more important than individual psychology or personal choice. Witt is drawing here
from a structuralist approach to explaining oppression. The idea here is that we should look to
social structures, not individual bad actors, to explain the causes and perpetuation of oppression.
As Dembroff puts it, “social kinds are not in the head. If we want to analyze the metaphysics of a
social kind, or see whether a certain kind operates in a social context, we must look to the
relevant structures and practices in that context” (2018b, 4). For example, according to a
structuralist approach, sexism is thought to be perpetuated by norms, habits, symbols, and
institutional forces, rather than by individual people who have sexist attitudes and behaviors;
thus, it would be possible to weed out all of the active sexists in the world and still grapple with
sexism (Young 1990, 56). We therefore ought to undermine gender norm oppression at the
structural level. Put differently, it should not be a feminist goal to try to change my friend’s mind
about high heels. In fact this would seem both unforgivably paternalistic and somewhat fruitless.
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What we ought to change is the normative structure of the social world which makes it the case
that certain women in certain contexts are expected or required to wear high heels. A thin
ascriptivist perspective can help us do this, as it places our focus on the norms themselves and
the social practices involved in their assignment and enforcement, rather than on the individual
attitudes of people responsive to them.
Importantly, however, individual responses to gender norms are still relevant to a
structuralist position, insofar as they tell us how individuals come to perpetuate structural
oppression habitually or subconsciously as a response to normative motivation. That is, norms
play a key role in our cognition and behavior. They tell us what we ought to do, which in turn
shapes what we do. Gender norms therefore shape what we (individually and collectively) do;
importantly, they do this in a way that perpetuates gender, and thus gendered oppression. It’s a
key insight of Witt’s view that individuals are shaped by and calibrate their behavior according
to gender norms, even when they may prefer not to. Understanding how gender norms “get
inside” us in this way will be important to understanding the individual element in a structuralist
explanation. Nevertheless, a structuralist explanation will take the structure as explanatorily
primary to the individual’s cognition and behavior; that is, it will hold that the individual’s
behavior is explained by the norms as they exist at the level of social structure, rather than the
other way around. This will be important to remember in successive chapters.
Feminist metaphysicians have tended to treat gender norms as evidence for views about
gender classifications or kinds, rather than as objects of study in their own right. As a result,
there are few enough discussions of gender norms in their own right within this literature.
However, in the discussions that do exist, recent prominent theorists in analytic feminist
philosophy have adopted ascriptivist commitments, although not always under that name. Witt’s
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view gives the most theoretical elaboration here (hence the naming rights). However, Haslanger
(2012), Ásta (2018), and Dembroff (2018b, 2020)--three of the most prominent gender
metaphysicians in the recent literature--share remarkably similar commitments.
Haslanger (2012) talks of gender norms in terms of prescriptions. According to this view,
“gendered ideals [depend] on social arrangements” (46). She writes that gender norms “function
prescriptively: not only do they serve as the basis for judgments about how people ought to be
(act, and so on), but also we decide how to act, what to strive for, what to resist, in light of such
norms” (44). The “prescriptive force” of gender norms is “backed by social sanctions” (44) such
that “in internalizing the relevant gender-norms, we develop “gender identities”; these gender
identities represent reality—self and world—in a form that motivates our participation in the
assigned gender role” (45, fn21). She also notes that “although I don’t aspire to satisfying this
ideal [of femininity], this doesn’t prevent others from judging me in its terms” (43). I take it as
clear from this discussion that Haslanger is committed to at least thin ascriptivism.
Ásta’s (2018) account of gender norm assignment is a bit more complicated. On her
view, conferralism, observers assign a conferred property of “being of gender G” to a subject on
the basis of some observed or imagined base property, such as “role in biological
reproduction…role in societal organization of various kinds, sexual engagement, bodily
presentation, preparation of food at family gatherings, self-identification, and so on” (74-75).
The conferred property has social significance over and above the significance of the base
property alone. In particular, it comes with certain constraints and enablements (75). For
example, someone might have the property being a woman conferred on them in virtue of being
believed to possess the base property having a uterus. Having a uterus comes with certain
physical constraints and enablements; one may be able to bear children, but is generally
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incapable of begetting them, for example. But those upon whom the property being a woman is
conferred are thereby subject to further constraints and enablements that are not conceptually
connected to the possession of a uterus. For example, in the context of my childhood church,
women were uniquely permitted to wear dresses, but forbidden from dating other women; neither
of these things is importantly related to one’s uterine status.
Ásta does not here say much about the relationship between gender conferral and gender
norms. Elsewhere, however, in a discussion of social identity, she defines a social identity as a
“location on the social map” that “consists in constraints and enablements to one’s behavior, and
accompanying it are social norms for behavior befitting that social location” (122). Let me try to
draw out the “accompaniment” relation here, as it appears to be how norms are assigned to an
identity on this view. In her discussion of gender conferral, Ásta argues that individuals confer
gender in contexts, and enforce associated constraints and enablements, based on their
understanding of social arrangements that “exist outside of the context” and are brought in by
means of individuals’ “gender maps” which develop throughout situations; contextual gender
kinds are therefore interconnected across contexts in a “systematic, structural” way (75).
Assuming a gender map is a kind of social map, a gendered social identity must be a more stable
version of the contextual gender conferrals that come and go. Moreover, drawing from Jenkins’
(2016) account of a “gender map,” I assume that we need some relatively stable heuristics to
help us navigate the gendered world--particularly if, as Ásta argues, it is constituted by a nearinfinity of deeply contextual and constantly shifting constraints and enablements.
I suggest, then, that for Ásta, a gendered social identity is a broad accrual, aggregation,
or average of the various and fleeting gender conferrals we experience across contexts-specifically, one that can tell us what to do when gender is conferred on us in a context. Because
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identity is relatively stable, where gender conferrals are always contextual, identity can provide
us with a normative conception of guidelines for good behavior that can actually shape that
behavior. That is, where a contextual gender conferral passes with the context, a social identity
can persist across contexts, and therefore can stick around long enough that we can start to
become habituated to notions of what we ought to do based on commonalities among the
constraints and enablements assigned to us. Gender norms are the operative bridge between
contextually conferred gendered rules and our behavior. Constraints and enablements say what
we can and can’t do in a context, but they don’t shape our normative deliberations; they are too
fleeting for that. Only norms, which are connected to our more stable and consistent social
identities, can do that.
Ásta further distinguishes between objective and subjective social identities. An objective
identity is “the location on a social map that we occupy stably”, and which we can have without
being aware of it; a subjective identity is “the location on the social map in the context that we
identify with” and for which we “take [the associated] norms as applying to us” (122). Notice,
however, that both kinds of social identities are defined with respect to “locations” on a social
map. Since locations on a social map “consist in constraints on and enablements to one’s
behavior” (122)--which has consistently been the description of a socially conferred property-that suggests the locations themselves, and thus the identities, are assigned to us whether we
want them or not. What changes between objective and subjective social identity is whether or
not we happen to identify with our map location and take up the associated norms. This, as it
turns out, is remarkably similar to Witt’s view. We can voluntarily identify with our assigned
gender norms and try to live by them, or not; that doesn’t change the fact that they are already
there, packed into the gender classifications that others are always already conferring on us.
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Ásta does explicitly allow that individuals can be involved in their own gender
ascriptions. In some contexts, for example, the “base property” that others are trying to track in
gender conferral might be self-identification (76). However, gender conferral and the assignment
of constraints and enablements still follows the same pattern in these contexts. It seems clear,
then, that Ásta is at the very least a thin ascriptivist about gender norms.
Finally, Dembroff (2018b, 2020) has perhaps the least to say about how gender norms are
assigned. However, what they do say clearly assumes an ascriptivist position. For example, they
write that “[s]ocial roles, expectations, norms, and practices, not to mention self-conceptions, are
imposed on people based on their gender classification” (2018, 3, emphasis added); and,
similarly, that “trans persons unwillingly are understood by others in terms of dominant gender
kinds, and the unwanted roles, norms, and expectations that accompany them” (2018, 19,
emphasis added). This language of the imposition of norms and of unwillingness with respect to
that imposition points to an underlying ascriptivist metaphysics; individuals do not choose or
prefer the gender norms that apply to them, they are assigned those norms by others.
As we can see, prominent gender metaphysicians have explicitly or implicitly adopted an
ascriptivist view about gender norms—even those who hold that elements of gender identity can
be voluntary or subjective. This is for good reason. Thin ascriptivism is a theoretically and
politically powerful view for explaining how gender norms can oppress. Moreover, in many
ways it seems intuitively right. The gender standard does feel mandatory and externally applied.
Identification with a set of norms does not affect whether one is held accountable to them by
others or whether one feels their normative pull. For example, as both Witt (2011) and Jenkins
(2016) point out, a person who rejects feminine norms may still feel that they ought to, e.g.,
shave their legs, even if they don’t endorse that feeling. As Witt puts it, “individuals who do not
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practically identify with their socially ascribed gender are nonetheless responsive to those norms
and evaluable under them” (2011, 45). Ascriptivism can capture this where voluntarism cannot.
However, all of the views outlined so far come with baggage. In particular, they share a
(weaker or stronger) commitment to what I call the category-based view about gender norms. In
the next section, I define the category-based view and argue that it can come apart from thin
ascriptivism. This is fortunate, as I will also briefly raise serious objections to the category-based
view. I’ll conclude that it is not only possible for us to distinguish between these commitments, it
is desirable to do so.

1.3. THE CATEGORY-BASED VIEW
In 1.1 and 1.2, I gave various defenses for a thin ascriptivist view, drawn in part from the
work of Witt (2011). I will now return to Witt’s original version of ascriptivism, to discuss the
way in which her thickly ascriptivist view is shared to a greater or lesser extent by other theorists
in this tradition. In this section, I will articulate a common commitment of these views; the idea
that gender norms apply to individuals on the basis of their gender categories. I call this the
category-based view, and argue that it is specifically not licensed by the arguments in favor of
thin ascriptivism.
Recall that Witt defines ascriptivism as the view that “[a] social role is normative for an
individual if she or he occupies a given social position…whether or not that individual
consciously identifies with or chooses that social position” (43). That is, for Witt, ascriptivism is
about the connection between some social position and the associated norms of conduct. Witt’s
“thick” ascriptivism is true if the norms associated with a particular category apply only to those
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who occupy the social position, because they occupy the social position. Put plainly, “the
normativity attaches to the social position occupancy itself” (Witt 43).
I have argued that this latter claim is a substantive commitment in its own right, one that
comes apart from, and is not supported by the arguments in favor of, thin ascriptivism. I will now
draw out this commitment and demonstrate its role in the views of other prominent theorists, in
order to investigate it on its own merits. Let me begin by articulating what I take to be the
“substantive commitment” in question:
The category-based view (CBV): Gender norms apply to individuals only if and
because those individuals belong to the associated gender categories.
I understand ‘gender categories’ to be quite broad, encompassing a variety of phenomena which
might be understood differently. For example, Witt (2011) describes “gendered social positions”;
Dembroff (2020) is alternately interested in what they call “gender kinds” or “gender
classifications”; Haslanger (2012) talks about “social classifications”; and Ásta (2018) talks
about “identities”. I do not mean to blur important distinctions between these views, or argue that
there are not important metaphysical differences between kinds, classifications, positions,
identities, and so on. Rather, I am targeting what I take to be the following commonalities among
these views: (1) the idea that individuals are divided, classified, or categorized according to
gender in some way; (2) the idea that the resultant categories have associated norms; and (3) the
idea that this categorization explains why the individuals in question are subject to the relevant
gender norms. In its broadest formulation, the category-based view is a commitment to the claim
that, however we divide, classify, or categorize individuals according to gender, that division,
classification, or categorization—that is, the ontological status of being sorted, classified, or
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categorized—is what explains the norms to which those individuals are responsive and under
which they are evaluable.
As discussed, Witt explicitly states that gender norms attach to social position occupancy,
and thus only apply to those who are ascribed a gender category (2011, 43). This is clearly a
category-based view. Haslanger (2012) takes a similar position: “Particular traits, norms, and
identities, considered in abstraction from social context, have no claim to be classified as
masculine or feminine. The classification of features as masculine or feminine is derivative, and
in particular, depends on prior social classifications” (46, emphasis in original). For Haslanger,
gender categories are inherently normative, in that it is partly constitutive of those categories that
they give rise to a normative standard for members of the category. Since the function of these
normative standards is to delimit appropriate or “ideal” behaviors for category members, only
category members can be held to those standards (45-46).
Ásta holds that social norms are associated with a social identity. The norms
“accompany” one’s location on a social map (2018, 122). She notes that one can identify with
this location or not, and thus one’s objective and subjective social identities can come apart. In
either case, however, the location itself is constituted by the constraints and enablements that are
‘conferred’ by others. I argued in 1.2 that constraints and enablements in particular contexts have
broader, normative correlates, or simply norms, which serve as a “bridge” between what is
allowed to do and not do in and across contexts, and one’s normative cognition or
motivation. For Ásta, then, social norms are dependent on social identity, and one is subject to
social norms because one occupies the relevant location on the social map and thus has the
associated identity.
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Finally, Dembroff (2018b, 2020) again says relatively little about the assignment of
gender norms to individuals. Even in their brevity, however, we can find clear commitments to a
category-based view. Recall: “norms...are imposed on people based on their gender
classification” (2018b, 3, emphasis added). We could not ask for a more straightforward
endorsement of category-based ascriptivism.
In short, although opinions differ on the exact relationship between gender categories and
gender norms, we can see in each of these views, implicitly or explicitly, a shared commitment
to what I have called the category-based view: gender norms apply to individuals only if and
because those individuals belong to the associated gender categories.
I will begin by raising two points about the category-based view. First, there is relatively
little explicit defense given of it in any of these views. Witt (2011) argues in favor of thin
ascriptivism, but, as discussed, those arguments leave it open as to whether the further
commitment is justified. Haslanger (2012) comes the closest to defending a category-based view.
She argues that gender norms are causally related to gender categories, because without gender
categories we would not have gender norms. However, this in itself is not a defense of the view
that gender norms only apply to those who occupy the relevant categories. In fact, Haslanger
herself notes that “norms and roles can also fall desperately out of sync when the norms remain
rigid while social roles change; gender-norms ‘often take on complex lives and histories of their
own, which often bear little resemblance to their functional roots’” (44, quoting DiStefano 70). I
will investigate Haslanger’s interesting and rich functionalist picture of gender norms at length in
Chapter 2. For now, let me just say that the category-based view as I have defined it here is far
more often assumed to be true as a feature of ascriptivism than it is defended on its own merits.

38

This leads me to the second point: There is no principled reason to think that the
category-based view is a necessary feature of ascriptivism. The two quite clearly come apart.
Why, then, have they been treated as coextensive within this literature? I suggest
a potential explanatory reason: Analytic gender metaphysics has, on the whole, adopted
category-based analysis about gender. That is, it has tended to treat all gender phenomena as if
they proceed from gender categories. When analytic philosophers ask what gender is like, they
often end up asking what gender categories are like: What makes something a gender category?
What is it to be a woman, a man, or neither? Who counts as a member of this kind or that kind,
and why? The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains this thusly:
The aim of feminism is, in the most general terms, to end the oppression of women. The
goal of feminist theory is, therefore, to theorize how women are oppressed and how we
can work towards ending it. But what is this group women? Whose oppression is the
movement aiming to end? For articulating the various ways in which women are
oppressed, there is a need for a working definition of what it is to be a woman”
(Haslanger and Ásta 2017: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-metaphysics/ ]
In this context, as noted above, gender norms are often treated as data points providing evidence
for a further view, rather than an object of inquiry in their own right. A category-based view
allows gender norms to do this theoretical work.
However, recent work in analytic philosophy has begun to question the assumption that
gender categories are explanatorily primary in understanding gender as a social structure. Rather,
some philosophers have begun to argue that we should understand gender as a complex and
multifaceted phenomenon involving many different kinds of practices and features; gender
categories are merely one iteration of this beast. For example, Mikkola (2016) has argued that
feminist philosophy ought to move away from its laser-focus on the “woman question.” Such a
focus, she argues, has bogged us down in complex semantic and ontological puzzles. However,
39

such puzzles are not necessary to doing good feminist theory. We are perfectly capable of talking
about “women” as a group without elucidating a thick concept of “woman.” Mikkola suggests
we move towards a humanist feminism on which the harms we seek to ameliorate are harms to
the humanity of women, rather than their womanhood.
Similarly, Antony (2020) defends a deflationary concept of “woman”, one that will allow
us to assert generic claims about women without giving a substantive metaphysics of gender
categories. She writes that “whatever the inherent philosophical interest of such questions as
‘what is it to be a woman,’ there is no practical or political need to answer them” because our
“most pressing political needs, as feminists, are to challenge injustices and harms” (Antony
2020, 531). Barnes (2020) argues that we ought to separate our analyses of gender as a social
system from our analyses of gender terms and their extensions. And Dembroff (forthcoming)
argues that patriarchy does not depend on gender kinds alone, but rather is a kind of selfsustaining social ecosystem which serves to privilege “real men.” This is not a gender category
but is rather a purely normative distinction: “real men” are men who perform masculinity
“correctly,” a task which involves having the right kind of body, sexuality, economic position,
etc.—and which in fact leaves out most members of the category “man.”
These theorists are moving away from treating gender kinds, categories, and roles as the
focal point of inquiry. The thought is that, while the infamous “woman question” may be
important for questions about identity and inclusion in one’s preferred category (cf. Watson
2014, Jenkins 2016), it can come apart from, and moreover, is not more theoretically important
than, other questions about gender—such as who is socially dominant and subordinate, who is
subject to which sanctions, how we go about gendering and policing one another, and how all of
this is naturalized and thereby justified.
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This insight is far from unique to feminist analytic philosophy. Feminists in other
traditions, in particular feminists of color and intersectional feminists, have for a long time
understood gender as a multifaceted and complex phenomenon that goes beyond univocal gender
categories (see, for example, Crenshaw 1989; Lugones 2007, 2010). This is, I suggest, all the
more reason for feminist metaphysics to develop views which focus on other phenomena, such
as gender norms.
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the question of how gender norms apply to
individuals is distinct from the question of how individuals come to be members of gender
categories. Notice also that a category-based view about gender norms is compatible with
various views about the latter, including: an ascriptivist view, on which gender categories are
assigned to individuals by others; a voluntarist view, on which gender categories are adopted by
the individual; or even various essentialist views, such as one on which gender categories are
essential properties of individuals which partially constitute their fundamental being.
In 1.2 I argued that it is important for feminist purposes to maintain commitment to thin
ascriptivism, or the view that gender norms are assigned to individuals by others rather than
adopted by those individuals. However, this alone does not justify the thicker view on which
gender norms are assigned on the basis of gender category. We should evaluate the categorybased view on its own merits, rather than as a necessary commitment of ascriptivism.
Those merits, as it turns out, are questionable. The category-based view faces important
objections from the experiences of marginalized people. First, the category-based view does not
capture the way individuals experience themselves as responsive to gender norms. Second, the
category-based view does not capture the way individuals and other entities are evaluable under
gender norms. Although these objections are key to my overall argument in this dissertation, I
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will sketch them here only in brief, in order to provide a preview for how that overall argument
will go. Chapter 2 will be devoted to motivating objections against the category-based view.
My first objection to the category-based view is drawn from the experiences of trans and
GNC people. As noted in 1.2, one advantage of Witt’s “thick” ascriptivism is that it can explain
involuntary gender norm responsiveness, or why individuals feel the normative pull of gender
norms which are assigned to them but with which they don’t identify. However, a category-based
view does not explain what I call cross-category norm responsiveness. Some individuals, in
particular some trans and GNC people, are responsive to gender norms which are associated with
a gender category that was not assigned to them. For example, some people have not been
assigned the category “woman,” but nevertheless feel the pull of feminine norms—which they
have not been expected to follow, and, moreover, which they may be punished for following. In
a culture where it is a feminine norm to shave one’s legs, for example, some transfeminine
people and gender-nonconforming cis men feel that they ought to shave their legs. This is a
problem for all category-based views, including voluntaristic ones. Cross-category normative
force often occurs at a time when the person in question also does not identify with the gender
category associated with the norms, such as in childhood. Rather the opposite; cross-category
normative experiences are often the impetus for adopting a gender identity, rather than the result
of this adoption (see Jenkins 2016). Cross-category norm responsiveness may also be felt by
people whose gender categorization never matches the norms to which they are responsive;
consider, for example, the rich history of butch women in queer culture, who identify and are
categorized by others as women, but nevertheless may feel responsive to norms of masculinity.
My second objection concerns the way that marginalized people, groups, and societies
are evaluated under gender norms. Often, those who are not included in a particular gender
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category are nevertheless treated as evaluable under associated norms. For example, María
Lugones (2010) has pointed out that Black and Brown colonized peoples have historically been
denied assignment to a binary gender category. Colonialist efforts to control and ‘civilize’ Black
and Brown people “used the hierarchical gender dichotomy as a judgment, though the attainment
of dichotomous gendering for the colonized was not the point of the normative judgment” (744).
Moreover, Spillers (1987) argues that Black enslaved people were “ungendered” and thereby
dehumanized and brutalized. And Wilchins (1997) chronicles the way that many trans and GNC
people are treated as “gendertrash” relative to rigid binary gender classifications; they are
“thrown out” of those categories, as it were.
Not being afforded a particular gender category, however, does not excuse marginalized
people from evaluability under the associated gender norms. Rather the opposite. In many such
cases, the people excluded from the gender categories are marked as inferior on the associated
gender standard because they are not afforded gender classification; they are “set up to fail” on
standards of masculinity and femininity. In the case of colonized people, for example, this
justifies “unimaginable exploitation, violent sexual violation, control of reproduction, and
systematic terror” against their bodies (Lugones 2010, 744). And Spillers (1987) writes of how,
in the case of Black enslaved people, “the captive body becomes the source of an irresistible,
destructive sensuality” while “at the same time—in stunning contradiction—the captive body
reduces to a thing, becoming being for the captor” (67). A feminist account of gender norms
ought to be able to explain the ways in which they enable harm and oppression. If the categorybased view cannot explain these distinctive harms, then it fails to do the work we need it to do.
Again, I say more about these objections in Chapter 2. I include them here to make this
preliminary point: There are good reasons, drawn from the experiences of marginalized people,
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to think that gender categorization does not tell the whole story about gender norm assignment.
In particular, a category-based view does not capture either the way gender norms exert
normative force over those who are most directly harmed by them. This is an unacceptable
theoretical oversight. Insofar as feminists understand ascriptivism to be an important theoretical
commitment, we should question its association with the category-based view.
1.4. CONCLUSION
To recap: I have distinguished the arguments for (thin) ascriptivism from the arguments
for the category-based view, and argued that (thin) ascriptivism is important to a feminist
perspective, while the category-based view faces serious problems. Under these conditions, we
should consider how a feminist account of gender norm assignment might proceed without
presupposing a category-based view.
I have identified a persistent conflation in predominant views in analytic feminist
philosophy: a commitment to thin ascriptivism, or the view that gender norms are assigned to
individuals without their participation or consent, is run together with a commitment to the
category-based view, or the view that gender norms apply to individuals on the basis of the
gender categories that they occupy. Analytic feminist philosophers have often focused on the
importance of gender categories as explanatory for various kinds of gender phenomena. The
category-based view reflects this focus; it prioritizes gender categories in explaining how gender
norms attach to individuals. However, this view leaves out the experiences of those who are
marginalized or excluded according to dominant gender categories. Often, these are the people
who are most harmed by gender norms, because they are marginalized within or excluded from
those dominant categories. A feminist account of gender norms ought to capture the experiences
of those who are most harmed by them.
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The theoretical work here is just beginning. Without a category-based view, we lack an
account of the way that gender norms are assigned, and thereby come to hold sway over
individuals. This is the project I will undertake in the remainder of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: AGAINST THE CATEGORY-BASED VIEW
2.0. INTRODUCTION
Many prominent accounts within analytic gender metaphysics proceed from the
assumption that gender norms apply on the basis of individual gender categories. I have called
this the category-based view. On a view like this, norms of femininity function to constrain the
behavior of those who occupy the category woman, and thus apply to individuals because they
occupy that category. In Chapter 1, I articulated the category-based view as a substantive
commitment shared by many such theorists, in particular Witt (2011), Haslanger (2012), Ásta
(2018), and Dembroff (2018b, 2020). We can see the impact of the category-based view
throughout the recent literature in analytic gender metaphysics.
In her defense of the category-based view, Witt points to a central question about social
norms more generally: “Why are individuals responsive to and evaluable under social norms?”
(2011, 44). Witt’s question is aimed at understanding the normative power of social norms. From
this way of framing the question, we can understand this normativity to have two related prongs,
corresponding to “responsive to” and “evaluable under.” Roughly speaking, responsiveness is
the way that agents calibrate their own behavior and normative deliberations according to the
norms, and evaluability is the way that entities are candidates for criticism and enforcement (that
is, reward and punishment) on the basis of their compliance or noncompliance with a norm. On
this view, then, an account of the normative power of gender norms should be able to explain
two things: 1) Why do agents respond to certain gender norms (but not others)? 2) Why are
agents evaluable under certain gender norms (but not others)? Both of these are key elements of
gender’s normativity. If we want to understand how gender norms function to reify oppression,
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we need to understand their role in sustaining inequality, which in part requires understanding
their differential impact.
At first blush, the category-based view has plausible answers. Casual observation of the
gender norms at work in many, or most, dominant contexts will return the following analysis:
People are sorted into gender categories according to how others interpret their sexed bodies.
People are also held to different normative standards according to how others interpret their
sexed bodies. The normative standards applied and the gender categories assigned tend to match
up. We might reasonably conclude that the two are importantly related. Those who have certain
kinds of sexed bodies are assigned particular gender categories, and the associated normative
standards are enforced on them accordingly. Moreover, people tend to act in ways that match
these normative standards; those classed as women tend to follow feminine norms, while those
classed as men tend to follow masculine norms. As Simone de Beauvoir famously observed,
“anyone can clearly see that humanity is split into two categories of individuals, with manifestly
different clothes, faces, bodies, smiles, movements, interests, and occupations” (2011, 4). Like
Beauvoir, we should reject gender essentialism as an explanation of these phenomena. It’s not
the case that humans have deep and fundamental gendered parts of themselves that make them
masculine or feminine. Why, then, is gendered behavior reproduced by individuals who may or
may not endorse, or even be consciously aware of, the norms that guide it? Gender categories
seem capable of doing a lot of explanatory work here. They are, by and large, conferred on
individuals without consent, and they come with a set of norms, which are then enforced so
ubiquitously that individuals may find themselves behaving in accordance with those norms as a
matter of lifelong habit--whether they would prefer this or not.
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But this analysis is incomplete. It presumes, first, that the individuals in question are
permanently and unambiguously placed in fixed gender categories; that membership within those
categories explains the way gender norms are enforced; and that, as a result, the norms
associated with those categories straightforwardly guide behavior. These can be useful heuristics
for understanding the experience of those who have significant embodied privilege--i.e. whose
experience of gender norms is mediated by the fact that they are also white, cisgender, nondisabled, heterosexual, thin, and so on. Those without this privilege, however, have quite a
different experience.
In this chapter, I will draw from the experience of marginalized people to show how a
category-based view faces two major objections in terms of explaining gender’s normative
power. First, it cannot explain responsiveness to gender norms in the case of what I call crosscategory norm responsiveness. Many people, particularly transgender (trans) and gendernonconforming (GNC) people, experience themselves as responsive to gender norms which do
not match any gender category that they appear to occupy. A category-based view cannot explain
this. Call this the responsiveness objection. Second, a category-based view cannot explain
evaluability under gender norms, specifically in cases where marginalized people are actively
excluded, ejected, or otherwise constructed as outside of particular gender categories, but are
nevertheless evaluated (and often brutally punished) according to the associated norms.
Relatedly, the view cannot explain how groups, cultures, and other big-picture social entities-what I’m calling macro-level social entities--are treated as evaluable under gender norms. Call
this the evaluability objection. There are many versions of the evaluability objection. In this
chapter I focus on three: Lugones’ account of the enforcement of colonial gender norms on
Black and Brown colonized people and societies, Spillers’ account of the “ungendering” of
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Black enslaved women through the legacy of chattel slavery, and Wilchins’ account of trans and
gender-nonconforming people as “gendertrash.”
All together, this suggests that a category-based analysis is only useful for explaining a
narrow phenomenon: the individual experiences of those who have unambiguous membership in
dominant gender categories, in virtue of their significant privilege along various dimensions. The
experiences of those who are marginalized within or excluded from those categories, and the
ways in which gender norms operate at the macro-level to shape groups and societies, are
ignored by a category-based view. This suggests that the view is not sensitive to the deep
systemic co-construction of gendered and racialized norms through the legacy of coloniality,
chattel slavery, and white supremacy. I argue that this is reason to reject it.
I proceed as follows. In 2.1, I describe the phenomenon of cross-category norm
responsiveness and distinguish it from other closely related phenomena. In 2.2, I draw from the
previous section to motivate the responsiveness objection to a category-based view. I argue that
cross-category norm responsiveness demonstrates that gender categories can’t explain how
agents become responsive to gender norms. In 2.3, I discuss the ways in which gender categories
as a frame of analysis have failed to capture the experiences of those who are excluded from
membership in those categories. In 2.4, I draw from the previous section to motivate the
evaluability objection to a category-based view. I argue that these examples show that gender
categories can’t explain how entities are evaluable under gender norms. Rather the opposite:
gender norm enforcement is particularly brutal for those who are excluded from dominant
categories. Moreover, I argue that a category-based view is fundamentally ill-prepared to explain
the effects of gender norms at what I call the macro-level. In 2.5, I conclude by drawing together
previous suggestions to argue that a category-based view focuses on the experiences of gender49

conforming white people, and as such, is insufficient to explain how gender norms exert
normative force in the world.

2.1: CROSS-CATEGORY NORM RESPONSIVENESS
In this section, I will motivate the objection from cross-category norm responsiveness.
This objection will draw from the experience of trans and GNC people to argue that the
category-based view does not explain the way agents actually calibrate their behavior relative to
gender norms. I will begin by articulating the phenomenon of norm responsiveness. I draw here
from Witt’s work on Aristotelean habituation (2011, 2020) and Jenkins’ work on gender identity
(2016, 2018). I then articulate and describe a common (though in no way universal) experience
among trans and GNC people: a sense of responsiveness to some gender norm or norms which
have not been assigned and which do not correspond with one’s assigned gender category. I
argue the category-based view cannot explain this phenomenon. As such, it misses a key feature
of the way that gender norms are experienced as normative.
According to Witt’s ascriptivism, individuals experience themselves as “responsive to
and evaluable under” various kinds of social norms (2011, 42). One is evaluable under a social
norm when “the individual is a candidate for evaluation by others in relation to that norm” (33)-that is, others expect one to adhere to it, and perhaps engage in punishment or censure when one
does not (or, at the very least, would consider themselves justified if they did). One is responsive
to a social norm when one experiences the norm as guiding one’s behavior. This could mean that
one experiences any of a “full range of possible reactions to a norm....from compliance to
critique” (33). One might, for example, unthinkingly accept the norm as binding and comply
with it; actively reject it and rebel against it; or carefully consider its relationship to one’s values
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and motivations, and ultimately decide to comply. Each of these behaviors is a way of being
responsive to a norm. That is, responsiveness to a norm is not merely behavioral. There is a
phenomenological component; one feels evaluable under or experiences oneself as guided by the
norm, and one has a sense of doing something wrong, on the relevant normative standard, when
one does not comply.
Norm responsiveness plays an important role in Jenkins’ (2016, 2018) influential account
of gender identity. She compares the following two cases:
Consider a woman who feels that having visible body hair on her legs is unattractive,
embarrassing, and unacceptable. In a visceral way, having hairy legs feels wrong for
her.... Contrast this with the experience of another woman who does not remove hair
from her legs. Her awareness of her body includes the awareness that in having hairy legs
she is contravening dominant norms of feminine appearance--on some level she knows
that people like her are not meant to look like that, according to dominant ideology. This
may be so despite the fact that she is perfectly content to have hairy legs and for them to
be seen by others. Her experience of social and material reality includes navigating the
norm that women should have hairless legs, even though she is not complying with it.
(2016, 411)
Jenkins draws from these examples to argue that one’s gender identity is grounded in a sense of
experiencing some gender norm or sent of norms as relevant to you. On this account, these
women share a gender identity because they share this sense that the feminine norm is relevant to
their conduct; as Witt puts it, their “behavior is calibrated in relation to the norm” (2011, 32).
Where Jenkins’ two women differ is in how much they care about that fact.

This passage evokes precisely the phenomenon I am trying to capture. Both women are
described by Jenkins as being intimately connected to “a norm of feminine appearance” (412)
which recommends having hairless legs. However, their subsequent relationship to this norm is
not merely cognitive. The women do not simply think or believe they are subject to the norm.
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Similarly, it’s not clear that these women undertake any active voluntaristic process such as
adopting or taking up the norm. In fact, let us stipulate that neither woman has reflected on their
relationship to femininity or gender norms at all; both are simply moving through the world as
seems right to them, without any particular beliefs or intentions relative to gender. Nevertheless,
both women experience an embodied awareness where “on some level” they understand that the
norm of feminine appearance applies to them--that “people like [them] are not meant to look like
that” (411), and having hairy legs means that each of them is doing something wrong according
to the norm.
I am not interested in defining gender identity. Thus, Jenkins’ further argument that norm
responsiveness constitutes gender identity is irrelevant to my discussion here. The phenomenon
of norm responsiveness as she identifies it is nevertheless important. If we want to understand
how individuals come to calibrate their behavior relative to gendered standards of behavior, we
must pay special attention to the ways in which that behavior is in fact shaped by those
standards. Moreover, I take norm responsiveness in itself to be a bare psychological fact. I want
to recuse myself from the discussion on how individuals come to acquire norm responsiveness. I
am not in the business of explaining the psychological mechanisms by which individuals
internalize the social norms that are presented to them. My claim is just this: individuals tend to
calibrate their behavior relative to gender norms, and that this calibration often does not involve
any particular cognitive state or voluntary adoption.
Why might this be the case? How do paradigmatically social norms, such as gender
norms, come to guide our behavior without our participation or consent? One answer comes
from Witt (2011, 2020). In brief, individuals become habituated to the norms that are assigned to
them. As others expect certain behaviors from us and thereby train us to inhabit certain
52

normative roles, we come to perform those behaviors regularly and often. Over time, we learn to
do them without thinking about it, or by habit. This elegant and simple account is grounded in
the Aristotelean idea of excellence, and has much to offer in terms of understanding gender norm
responsiveness. Moreover, it dovetails nicely with a central insight from the social sciences: the
internalization hypothesis, or the view that individuals become motivated to follow social norms
because, over time, they internalize the expectations of others. I will expand on habituation and
internalization in Chapter 3.
One major advantage of the habituation account is that it explains how individuals who
don’t identify with or prefer their assigned gender categories can nevertheless feel responsive to
them. For example, as Witt points out, someone assigned the gender category of “woman” who
does not prefer or identify with the associated norms, such as someone who rejects gender’s
normative power on political grounds, might nevertheless feel responsive to norms of femininity
against their will. A feminist account of gender norms needs an explanation for this
phenomenon. Recall from Chapter 1: according to Witt, this is the primary reason that
voluntarism does not succeed. Ascriptivism and the habituation account, however, capture this
easily and by design.1 Individuals are assigned a gender category and an associated set of norms,
and over time acquire the disposition to habitually and unthinkingly exemplify the behaviors
recommended by those norms.
However, Witt’s focus on the phenomenon of responsiveness to a gender norm
illuminates a problem for the category-based view. In some cases, individuals experience
themselves as responsive to norms which do not match their gender category; that is, they

A brief reminder: Voluntarism is the view that individuals are subject to a set of norms because they
adopt or take up the norms. Ascriptivism is the view that individuals are subject to a set of norms because
those norms are assigned to them by others.
1
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experience what I call cross-category norm responsiveness. In what follows, I will explain crosscategory norm responsiveness, distinguish it from other closely related normative phenomena,
and argue that it presents a significant challenge against the category-based view.
Recall the central claim of the category-based view:
The category-based view: Gender norms apply to individuals only if and because those
individuals belong to the associated gender categories.
The category-based view, together with habituation, suggests the following: Only those
individuals who belong to a particular gender category will be trained to follow the relevant
norms, and so only individuals in a gender category will develop responsiveness to those norms.
But this isn’t always how gender norm responsiveness works. Some people find themselves
responsive to norms associated with a category which has not been assigned to them. For
example, some people who have not been assigned the category “man” might nevertheless find
themselves responsive to masculine norms--such as trans men and transmasculine people, nonbinary people who aren’t assumed to be men, and butch or gender-nonconforming women. The
analogous is true for many people who haven’t been assigned the category “woman” but
nevertheless find themselves responsive to feminine norms. Since this norm responsiveness
occurs “across” gender categories, I call this cross-category norm responsiveness.
Accounts of cross-category norm responsiveness are quite common in the self-reports of
trans and GNC people.2 For example, Julia Serano describes her childhood experiences of

I purposefully understand “gender-nonconforming” or GNC to be a very broad category, covering the
lived experience of anyone who, for whatever reason, is perceived as non-normative on some dominant
gender standard. This is not meant to be a natural kind or to suggest that there are not many importantly
distinct categories under the GNC umbrella. GNC terminology exists in relation to a deeply problematic
system of gender classification—dare I say an unnatural kind—and is only meant to play a role in
arguments about that system. Notice also that on some understandings, racialization, disability, body size,
etc. will entail that one is gender-nonconforming. For example, Bey (2017) holds that Blackness is
fundamentally at odds with dominant gendering, and thus “Black is trans”. In 2.4 I discuss the differential
2
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feeling responsive to norms that did not match the gender category that she and everyone else
believed she occupied:

I had an unexplainable feeling that I was doing something wrong every time I walked
into the boys’ restroom at school; and whenever our class split into groups of boys and
girls, I always had a sneaking suspicion that at any moment someone might tap me on the
shoulder and say, “Hey, what are you doing here?” (2007, 78, emphasis added)
Serano’s normative phrasing here is telling. She experienced herself as doing something wrong
when she violated a feminine norm--even though she and everyone else believed that those
norms did not apply to her. These experiences can’t be explained in terms of category-based
habituation. Serano clearly knew that the boys’ bathroom was the one others expected her to
occupy, just as she knew that others placed her on the “boy” side of the gender division.
According to the category-based view, she should not have internalized any norms that would
explain her felt responsiveness. But clearly she did. Moreover, the situations she gives in this
example are paradigmatically, and perhaps uniquely, gendered. That is, the primary, perhaps the
only, norms in play in determining whether one goes into the boys’ or girls’ bathroom, or joins
the boys’ or girls’ side of the classroom, are gender norms.
For Serano, this wrongness for violating feminine norms was matched with a rightness
when she began to follow them:
It became obvious to me that I wanted to be a girl and that, on some level, it felt right...
Saying that I “wished” or “wanted” to be a girl erases how much being female made
sense to me, how it felt right on the deepest, most profound level of my being (80,
emphasis added).

enforcement of gender norms on those who do not comfortably fit into dominant gender categories. For
now, understand “gender-nonconforming” as broadly as possible.
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Although Serano is talking in terms of category here, I suggest that we can understand her
description of “being” here in an active voice. Being a girl felt right for her, just as doing
masculine-coded gendered behaviors felt wrong for her. This is illuminated by the following
recollection:
I found myself inexplicably compelled to remove a set of white, lacy curtains from the
window and wrap them around my body like a dress. I walked toward the mirror. Since I
was a prepubescent boy with one of those longish boy haircuts that were popular in the
late ‘70s, the curtains alone were sufficient to complete my transformation: I looked like
a girl. I stared at my reflection for over an hour, stunned. It felt like an epiphany because,
for some unexplainable reason, seeing myself as a girl made absolutely perfect sense to
me. (2007, 79, emphasis added)
Experiences like Serano’s are fairly common among trans and GNC people, as is the use of
normative terminology to describe them. This sense of rightness/wrongness or making sense here
is key. Cross-category norm responsiveness is a distinctive and theoretically interesting
phenomenon because it manifests, not merely as a want or a wish to follow some norms or
occupy some category, but as a felt sense that one already is responsive to some norms
associated with that category. To feel responsive to some norm is to feel as if one should
exemplify the properties and behaviors recommended by that norm, and that failing to exemplify
those properties and behaviors is violating that norm. But, as noted by both Witt (2011) and
Jenkins (2016), a person cannot violate a norm unless it applies to them. And, according to the
category-based view, the norms of femininity did not apply to Serano as a child; she was not
initially assigned the category of “girl” or “woman” by others, nor did she identify that way for
many years thereafter.
In her memoir Redefining Realness, Janet Mock describes a similar pattern in her
interactions with the norms of femininity:
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Like most teen girls (whether they’re trans or cis), I had a vision board of my ideal,
pulled mostly from the pop-culture images that MTV fed me. I wanted Halle Berry’s or
Tyra Banks’s breasts, Britney Spears’s midsection, Beyonce’s curvy silhouette and long
hair, and I prayed that I wouldn’t grow any taller so I didn’t tower over the petite Asian
girls who were the barometer of beauty in the [Hawaiian] islands. (122-123)
Mock fully understood that others were holding her to standards of masculinity. Earlier in the
book, she recounts a childhood experience of being “certain I was a boy.... It was the first thing
I’d learned about myself as I grew aware that I existed” (15). As a child in her kindergarten
classroom, she understood, for example, that boys used blue cubbyholes and girls used red
cubbyholes (15). Nevertheless, even as a small child, she experienced a “faint desire, whose
origins I can’t pinpoint to a pivotal aha! moment” to “step across the chasm that separated me
from the girls--the one who put their sandals in the red cubbyholes” (16).

Mock’s account sheds light on the distinction between two closely related phenomena:
the desire to do something, and the sense that one ought to do it. She wanted to behave and look
feminine, but she also experienced herself as already responsive to normative standards of
femininity, as we can see from her interactions with the “vision board of her ideal.” This
distinction is drawn out better by Serano, who sometimes experienced herself as responsive to
feminine norms even though she didn’t particularly want to engage in the associated behaviors:
for example, she writes “I never really wanted to take part in girlish activities, such as playing
house” (2007, 79, emphasis added). Contrast this with her experiences of rightness and
wrongness relative to certain gendered behaviors.
This discussion points to the need to distinguish between cross-category norm
responsiveness and some closely related phenomena, each of which falls under the category of
desire. The broad point here is that cross-category norm responsiveness is not simply a desire or
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a wish. It is something more normatively substantive. Philosophers sometimes speak of the
normative pull of certain norms, where a norm tells us what we ought to be doing--often
understood in contrast to our desiderative states. One way to understand this is in terms of the
kinds of reasons we have to act. I will discuss this further in Chapter 4. For now, I will make the
preliminary claim that norm responsiveness is not a mere desire. To draw out this point, I will
investigate the difference between cross-category norm responsiveness and three distinctive
kinds of desires relative to gender norms: (1) the desire to occupy a category that one does not
currently occupy; (2) the desire to engage in some behavior for the sake of that behavior in itself,
rather than because of its relationship to some norm; and (3) the desire to violate or rebel against
a norm to which one is subject. Cross-category norm responsiveness is none of these things,
although it often coincides with all three.
Consider the following analogy. Suppose that I want to be a professional rock climber. I
have a strong desire to perform that function, be subject to the associated norms, and engage in
the behaviors characteristic of professional rock climbers. I want to be able to climb challenging
rock faces like El Capitan in Yosemite National Park; to make a living solely on athletic
sponsorships and prize money; to compete in world-class rock climbing competitions; and so on.
There are norms for behavior on the part of those who occupy the category “professional rock
climber”. Professional rock climbers should train their bodies to peak rock climbing
performance, prioritize rock climbing over other kinds of activity, consume certain kinds and
quantities of food and drink and avoid others, and so on.
However, suppose that, although I want or wish that I were a professional rock climber, I
don’t have any important relationship to the norms that apply to professional rock climbers. It
doesn’t seem to me that I ought to follow these norms. When I take a few weeks off from
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training for rock climbing to focus on writing my dissertation, I don’t feel as if I’ve done
something wrong. When I am not invited to compete in a rock climbing championship, I don’t
feel as if I’ve been passed over. Even though I wish that I occupied this category, the associated
norms just don’t apply to me, and not following them doesn’t feel like a norm violation. In this
case, I want to occupy a particular social role that I currently don’t occupy, but I do not feel the
normative pull of the associated norms. Cross-category norm responsiveness is the experience of
feeling already responsive to a particular norm or set of norms that don’t appear to apply to you.
My desire to be a professional rock climber may involve a desire to be responsive to and
evaluable under a particular set of norms, but it does not involve the felt sense that I already am.
Cross-category norm responsiveness therefore comes apart from the desire to occupy a social
category that one does not currently occupy.
Moreover, and similarly: suppose that I want to engage in the behaviors that are
characteristic of professional rock-climbing for reasons that have nothing to do with the norms of
being a professional rock-climber. Perhaps I want to climb El Capitan in Yosemite National Park
because it is challenging and beautiful and I value the associated sense of accomplishment and
bragging rights. Perhaps I want to have a professional athletic sponsorship because it is
prestigious and the income is good, and perhaps I want to be invited to rock-climbing
championships because I like to travel. However, suppose that I do not feel as if the norms of
professional rock-climbing have anything to do with my desires. That is, I don’t feel like I should
act like this; I simply want to. In this case, I want to engage in many of the behaviors associated
with professional rock climbing, even though I don’t feel responsive to associated norms. Crosscategory norm responsiveness therefore comes apart from the desire to engage in certain
behaviors associated with a particular social category for their own sake.
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Finally, suppose that I achieve my dream and I become a professional rock climber.
However, once I belong to this category, I learn that professional rock climbers are expected to
enter into partnerships with companies who are responsible for massive amounts of
environmental damage, in order to improve the reputations of these companies. This norm now
applies to me as a professional rock climber; suppose that I feel that I ought to comply.
Nevertheless, I don’t want to partner with these companies. I want to violate this norm. I
understand that it applies to me; I am responsive to it; and I nevertheless prefer not to comply
with it. I am responsive to a norm that corresponds to my social category, but I have other
motivational states that pull against it, even in the face of my responsiveness to it. Call this the
“phenomenology of rebellion.” To have the phenomenology of rebellion, I must both experience
myself as responsive to a norm, and desire not to comply. This is different from, but not
incompatible with, experiencing cross-category norm responsiveness. If I am responsive to a
norm which corresponds to a category to which I don’t belong, I can have any number of other
attitudes about that responsiveness. I might prefer to comply straightforwardly with the norm, to
creatively reinterpret it, to rebel against it, and so forth. But norm responsiveness in itself is
distinct from any of these preferences about one’s norm responsiveness. Cross-category norm
responsiveness therefore comes apart from the phenomenology of rebellion.
Let’s apply these distinctions to the case of gender norms. First, individuals may
experience a desire to occupy a gender category without feeling cross-category norm
responsiveness. For example, a person who occupies the gender category of “woman” may wish
or want to occupy the gender category of “man” without in fact being moved by its norms. In
deeply misogynistic societies, for example, women may want or wish to be men because of the
social privileges afforded to men. Consider pop songs like Beyoncé’s “If I Were A Boy” or
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Taylor Swift’s “The Man” as examples. In both songs, the protagonist fantasizes about how
much easier life would be for her if she were a boy or a man instead of a woman. In both songs,
the protagonist seems interested in being subject to masculine norms rather than feminine ones;
but in neither case are we led to believe that she does feel as if she’s subject to them. These are
not cases of cross-category norm responsiveness, but rather the desire or wish to occupy a
different category than one currently occupies because of facts about that category. This need not
involve any particular norm responsiveness. Moreover, desire to occupy a particular gender
category can, and often does, happen in the case of those who experience cross-category norm
responsiveness. For example, a transfeminine person who is responsive to norms of femininity
might nevertheless desire very strongly to be a man, because life would be very much easier for
her if she were to comfortably occupy the category of man.
Second, individuals may want to engage in gender-coded behaviors for reasons that have
nothing to do with their felt responsiveness to gender norms. For example, in a context where
skirts are coded feminine, a man may want to wear a skirt for any number of reasons, including
pragmatic (because it is hot outside and skirts are less efficient at trapping body heat than pants),
aesthetic (because a particular skirt looks good and accentuates his figure), political (because he
wants to push back on gender norms), or hedonistic (because skirts are fun and twirly). He can
easily feel this way and engage in this behavior without feeling like he should be wearing a
skirt. There are many reasons to engage in behavior that happens to be recommended by some
gender norm, and many or most of them are unrelated to one’s felt responsiveness to that gender
norm.
Engaging in behavior that specifically contradicts the norms assigned to you will
typically involve a sense that one is flouting or rebelling against gender norms; that is, it will
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involve what I have called the phenomenology of rebellion. Importantly, this can occur
concurrently with the sense that one is obeying an incompatible gender norm. A person may feel
responsive to both masculine and feminine norms at the same time. In wearing a skirt, for
example, someone may feel that they are complying with a feminine norm to which they are
responsive while also flouting a masculine norm to which they are (perhaps differently)
responsive. Given the power of habituation and gendered training, many people who experience
cross-category norm responsiveness will also experience an incompatible in-category norm
responsiveness; however, they may experience one set of gender norms as more authoritative
over their conduct. I expand on this in Chapters 3 and 4.
Third, and relatedly, individuals may want to rebel against the gender norms that others
expect them to follow. Recall Jenkins’ (2016, 411) example of a woman who feels responsive to
the norm that women ought to shave their legs, but nevertheless does not shave her legs. This
woman knows (“on some level”) that she is subject to the feminine norm that recommends legshaving. However, she doesn’t really want to shave her legs, and so she doesn’t—even though
she feels as if she ought. This woman experiences what I will call the “phenomenology of
rebellion”; she feels responsive to a norm that she refuses to follow. Jenkins uses the example to
explain how responsiveness to a norm comes apart from other kinds of desires and resultant
behaviors. As Witt points out, “it is not possible to flout a norm that does not apply to oneself”
(2011, 45).
These three desiderative phenomena about gender norms can, and often do, occur
together with cross-category norm responsiveness. Many trans and gender-nonconforming
people express or experience some combination of all of these phenomena when it comes to
gender norms. Since I am not giving an account of what it is to be trans or gender62

nonconforming, I will not discuss whether any or all of these is necessary or sufficient for
belonging to those categories. My aim in this chapter is to argue that the category-based view
cannot explain cross-category norm responsiveness. The category-based view, however,
can explain the three desiderative phenomena described above. One can want or wish to occupy
a different gender category (and want or wish to be subject to different norms), want to engage in
a behavior that is gender-coded irrespective of the categories with which it is associated, or want
to reject or rebel against a norm which is associated with one’s gender category, all while being
all and only responsive to the norms which are associated with one’s assigned gender category.
As I have noted, each of these phenomena is also associated with cross-category norm
responsiveness. The key point is that desiderative states and norm responsiveness come apart.
To recap: According to the category-based view, individuals are subject to gender norms
because they occupy a particular gender category. On this view, then, a person’s gender category
membership determines which gender norms apply to them. The category-based view as
defended by Witt (2011) can explain felt norm responsiveness in terms of habituation; since
norms apply to an individual on the basis of their gender category, that person internalizes those
norms and comes to follow the norms by habit. This view entails that individuals will be
responsive only to those norms which are associated with their gender category, since only those
norms can apply to them. Those who belong to the category man will be responsive to only
masculine norms, those who belong to the category woman will be responsive to only feminine
norms, and so forth.
Having identified the phenomenon of cross-category norm responsiveness, I will now
show that it presents an objection to the category-based view.
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2.2. THE RESPONSIVENESS OBJECTION
There are, I have suggested, two broad desiderata for explaining gender’s normative
power over us. One is to explain the way agents are responsive to gender norms. The other is to
explain the way that entities are evaluable under gender norms. In this section I will argue that
the phenomenon of cross-category norm responsiveness reveals that the category-based view
cannot meet the first desideratum.
Many dominant systems of oppression work in part by representing themselves as natural
or normal. That is, it is a key feature of the perpetuation of harmful and hierarchical social
practices such as gender and race that they do not appear to be perpetuated at all, but rather
appear to arise naturally, or at the very least proceed unproblematically from natural features (see
Collins 2000, Haslanger 2012, Ásta 2018). In the case of gender, this is achieved in part through
the normative power of gender norms. The dominant gender categories of “man” and “woman”
are taken to be natural kinds, and therefore the associated standards of femininity and
masculinity are understood to be, at weakest, unproblematic trackers of essential features that
naturally occur in sexually dimorphic human animals, and, at strongest, helpful normative guides
for good behavior corresponding to the proper functioning of the two natural categories of
human being. On either understanding, the pressure to be “normal” gender-wise affects
individual agency and practical deliberations. Non-conformity is strictly punished, so, in general,
individuals learn to calibrate their behavior relative to gender norms. As Witt argues, over time,
individuals become habituated to this behavior, and do it without thinking.
This habituation, in turn, contributes to the appearance that gender is natural. A casual
look at a world where many or most of the people visible in public life “do gender” habitually or
without thinking will produce the observation that gender is intrinsic to many or most
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individuals. Add to this the systematic destruction and often total erasure of gender-variant
people and communities, and we get the following common pre-theoretical belief: binary,
gender-conforming behavior is in some sense a natural or unavoidable element of human
behavior. The normative pressure to conform to gendered standards creates gendered behavior
and then makes itself invisible, such that the gendered behavior appears to arise without
prompting. Pre-theoretical evaluations of gendered behavior tend to ignore this normative
pressure, and instead see gendered behavior as itself innate or natural, obscuring the mechanisms
which make it so.
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are two ways for socially grounded norms to apply to the
individual: thin ascriptivism and voluntarism. For brevity, I will henceforth refer to thin
ascriptivism as simply ascriptivism. Put briefly, ascriptivism is the view that norms apply to
individuals because of the social practices of others, while voluntarism is the view that norms
apply to individuals because of their own self-regarding attitudes or practices (e.g. choice,
preference, self-identification, adoption, etc.). I will argue that, on either understanding, the
category-based view cannot explain cross-category norm responsiveness.
First, an ascriptivist category-based view cannot explain cross-category norm
responsiveness. On an ascriptivist category-based view, individuals will be only responsive to
the norms corresponding to the category assigned to them by others. But this is obviously false.
When a child whom everyone believes is a boy feels that they ought not be using the boys’ room,
or when they feel that they should look like the girls, they are demonstrating responsiveness to
feminine norms which do not correlate with their assigned category. The category-based view
cannot explain this. Cross-category norm responsiveness therefore represents a challenge to the
category-based view’s ability to explain responsiveness.
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Importantly, however, a voluntarist category-based view does not fare better. Gender
norm responsiveness does not consistently track self-identification, choice, or preference, but
rather seems wholly distinct from it. Consider, for example, a case where voluntarism appears to
have the advantage. A transgender man is classed as a woman in certain contexts, but
nevertheless feels responsive to norms of masculinity. He experiences himself as responsive to
norms that correlate with the gender category with which he has identified, rather than the
category which others ascribe to him. However, as demonstrated by the experiences of Mock and
Serano, many people experience a cross-category normative pull very early in life, long before
they identify with or adopt any gender category other than the one they were assigned. A closer
look at the case above, then, shows that does not so straightforwardly support voluntarism. For
example, consider the following account by P. Carl:
I had been scrutinizing masculinity my whole life, trying to perfectly replicate it in my
gestures and clothes and physiques. I stayed very trim, wore only men’s clothes, studied
the latest short-hair styles, tried to keep the tenor of my voice low, and always played the
roles that I thought men played. I earned. I mowed the lawn. I kept track of the finances. I
filed the taxes. I shoveled the snow. I lugged the air conditioners from the basement to
the bedroom windows every summer. I always drove. I was grossly deficient at
housecleaning. I owned only one bathroom towel when my wife, Lynette, first moved
into my bachelor pad. But I insisted that I was not a man. (Carl 2020b, 10)
Carl’s responsiveness to norms of masculinity did not come as a result of his self-identification
as a man. Rather the opposite: they were the impetus for it. After decades of experiencing norms
of masculinity as guiding his behavior, Carl finally found himself unable to avoid the conclusion
that he was a man. “And as much as I had done every single thing to look like a man and live
like one,” he writes, “I denied wanting to become one because I didn’t want to become my father
or lose my lesbian lover or be a failed feminist and intellectual” (2020a). For an experience like
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Carl’s, the voluntarist view gets the explanation the wrong way around. It is the normresponsiveness that leads to the self-regarding gender practices, rather than the reverse.
Moreover, a voluntarist view fares worse with respect to explaining other kinds of gender
norm responsiveness. As we saw in Chapter 1, a key advantage of ascriptivism is that it can
explain the experience of feeling responsive to a norm with which one does not identify. It is
demonstrable, for example, that people who reject gender categories and their associated norms
on political grounds nevertheless sometimes feel as if they ought to follow certain associated
norms. Voluntarism cannot explain this, as it grounds gender norm responsiveness in one’s
voluntary self-identification with or adoption of a gender category.
Furthermore, not everyone who experiences cross-category norm responsiveness
identifies or comes to identify with the normative role associated with the norms to which they
are responsive. Many gender-nonconforming people who intentionally and voluntarily take
themselves to occupy a particular gender category may feel responsive to norms not associated
with that category. Consider, for example, the rich history of butch women within queer cultures.
Many butch women consider themselves to be women, and, moreover, are classed as women by
the others in their social contexts. However, many butch women experience themselves as
responsive to norms of masculinity, irrespective of their category membership or self-regarding
practices.
In general, then, whether it is understood as voluntarist or ascriptivist, the category-based
view about gender norms is ill-equipped to explain cross-category norm responsiveness. This is
problematic for two reasons. First, trans and GNC people have a distinctive perspective on the
domain of gender norms. This gives us an epistemic authority which is indispensable to
constructing a theory of gender norms that meaningfully captures the way that they shape
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agency. Many trans and GNC people have experiences of being subject to a variety of different
normative gender standards at various times or in various contexts. Many of us also have the
experience of failing to meet the minimum conditions for inclusion in any of the normative
gender standards, by being excluded from gender intelligibility altogether. (I’ll say more about
this in 2.3.) Trans and GNC people as an epistemic community therefore experience gender
norms “from all sides”, as it were. If we are committed to understanding the distinctive ways in
which gender norms guide behavior, as well as the distinctive ways in which they can oppress
and harm, the perspectives of trans and GNC people must be centered.
Second, and relatedly: Attempts to understand gender phenomena within feminist
philosophy are largely undertaken with explicitly liberatory aims in mind. That is, such projects
are not merely descriptive; they are also normative, with the aim of identifying the distinctive
harms caused by gender oppression in order to change them. (This project, at least, is understood
thusly.) A feminist account of gender norms therefore must not exclude those who are most
marginalized according to gender norms. The goal is to theorize gender oppression in a way that
helps us to understand and undermine it. If our liberatory theories do not capture the experience
of those who are most at risk, they are failing to meet this key desideratum.
In light of this consideration, I claim that the category-based view falls short of
explaining gender’s normative power over our behavior, because it cannot capture the
phenomenon of cross-category norm responsiveness. Since this is a relatively common
experience among trans and GNC people, the category-based view is insufficient to explain the
way individuals actually respond to gender norms and incorporate them into their normative
deliberations. I call this the responsiveness objection to the category-based view.
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The second way in which the category-based view falls short is in its failure to capture
the way that gender norms are enforced. In the next two sections, I will articulate this as wha I
call the evaluability objection.

2.3. WHITE COLONIAL GENDER AND CATEGORY EXCLUSION
In the next two sections (2.3 and 2.4), I will give several reasons to think that the
category-based view does not explain evaluability under gender norms. If we want to understand
how entities in the social world come to be judged according to gender norms and punished for
failing to meet normative gender standards, a focus on gender categories will miss the
experiences of those who are often most targeted and harmed by these standards. In this section
(2.3), I make a relatively broad argument that gender categories as a focus of analysis do not
always help us explain gendered exercises of power, in part because this focus can easily ignore
the experiences of those who are specifically excluded from inclusion in dominant gender
categories. In the next section, I will draw on this broader analysis to specifically defend what I
am calling the evaluability objection to a category-based view.
In her work on gender and coloniality, Lugones (2007, 2010) argues that gender
categories are themselves a product of colonial thinking. The broadest version of the point is that
we should understand “categorical, dichotomous, hierarchical logic as central to modern,
colonial, capitalist thinking about race, gender, and sexuality” (2010, 742). That is, the claim is
not just that gender categories are insufficient as explanatory tools for understanding the variety
of gendered phenomena in the world, but rather that thinking of the social world primarily in
terms of categories is a distinctive framework that proceeds from coloniality, a way of
conceptualizing, structuring, and dividing the world that is fundamentally unequal, vicious, and
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destructive. Specifically, coloniality posits a series of hierarchical, dichotomous categories:
human/animal, white/non-white, man/woman, and so on. Categorization, according to Lugones,
is part of the conceptual framework that works to enable colonialism and capitalism, by positing
the world as something that is naturally measurable, quantifiable, and thus divisible (2007, 192).
Gender categories are one features of this approach. Lugones therefore calls on a project of
feminist resistance to specifically resist this Eurocentric epistemic framing, and instead to think
what she calls “non-modern” terms. Rather than beginning from gender categories and
hierarchies and attempting to theorize the different ways this has been done across history, she
suggests that we begin by looking at the way non-colonial cultural contexts have understood the
world, and their corresponding systems of social organization, most of which do not center or
even involve individual gender categories. Only then can we begin to see that the colonial
construction of gender is fundamentally a “disruption” of the self (2010, 749-50). This is central
to Lugones’ call for a “decolonial feminism” (2010).
We might be tempted to think, then, that a theoretical focus on gender categories aims to
understand some of the social problems endemic to a world shaped by the legacy of colonialism.
That is, taking seriously the claim that gender is a harmful colonial construction, we must
therefore understand the significant impact that this construction has had on our world. As
Lugones writes: “I am certainly not advocating not reading, or not ‘‘seeing’’ the imposition of
the human/non-human, man/woman, or male/female dichotomies in the construction of everyday
life, as if that were possible. To do so would be to hide the coloniality of gender” (2010, 750).
Theorizing about gender categories therefore has its uses, insofar as we understand that those
categories (and perhaps categorization itself) are not universal or trans-cultural, but rather are
culturally and historically contingent, and fundamentally pernicious.
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Indeed, most feminist metaphysicians have understood gender categories as both
contingent and pernicious. In a (perhaps the) foundational work of analytic feminist metaphysics,
Haslanger (2000) posits that gender is not just characterized, but rather constituted, by inequality.
That is, the gender categories of man and woman are positions within a hierarchical class system,
where those observed or imagined to have male bodies are classed as men and are thereby
dominant or privileged, while those observed or imagined to have female bodies are classed as
women and are thereby subordinated or oppressed. This approach is heavily influenced by the
work of Mackinnon (1989), who argued that gender is constituted by sexual dominance-specifically, the systematic sexual dominance of women by men. Thus, there is no such thing as
“gender equality”; gender is an inequality. This approach has been taken up by many other
prominent theorists in this tradition, such as Barnes (2019), Dembroff (2018b, 2020), and (with
some caveats) Jenkins (2016, 2018). That is, much feminist metaphysics is committed to the
basic view that dominant gender is unequal and harmful, and many such views hold that this
inequality and harm is not just a contingent feature of gender but rather exists at its root.
But this is not sufficient to meet Lugones’ challenge. By and large, feminist metaphysics
has focused on the ways in which dominant gender is binary, hierarchical, and patriarchal. That
is, it singles out and explores only one aspect of colonial gender: what Lugones calls the
man/woman dichotomy. While this is certainly a fundamentally hierarchical and harmful system,
it is not the only element of gender as a system of colonial power--nor is it the most basic.
Lugones sketches the ways in which this gender binary in turn rests on a more fundamental
division: the human/non-human dichotomy, where humans are white European colonizers, and
everyone else is denied this status. Lugones calls this the “central dichotomy of colonial
modernity” (2010, 743). As colonialism spread across the world, colonizers created a conceptual
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division between themselves--white, European, heterosexual, Christian, “rational,” subject/agent
males--and everyone else. To be sure, part of this story is the way in which white
European women are constructed as passive, weak, and fundamentally in service to white
European men. This is the core of the man/woman dichotomy, which Lugones acknowledges as
a real and harmful element of the gender system. However, and crucially, occupation of these
dichotomous categories is only available to those who are already sorted as humans--that is,
those who are white and European. Only colonizers count as men or women. Colonized people
are “bestial and thus non-gendered” (2010, 743); they are males or females, as in the
classification of non-human animals, but not men or women. She writes:
Beginning with the colonization of the Americas and the Caribbean, a hierarchical,
dichotomous distinction between human and non-human was imposed on the colonized
in the service of Western man. It was accompanied by other dichotomous hierarchical
distinctions, among them that between men and women. This distinction became a mark
of the human and a mark of civilization. Only the civilized are men or women. Indigenous
peoples of the Americas and enslaved Africans were classified as not human in species—
as animals, uncontrollably sexual and wild. (2010, 743, emphasis added)
And, even more bluntly:
The semantic consequence of the coloniality of gender is that ‘colonized woman’ is an
empty category: no women are colonized; no colonized females are women. Thus, the
colonial answer to Sojourner Truth is clearly, ‘no.’ (2010, 745)
According to Lugones, then, understanding gendered harms in terms of the harms specifically
done to those who occupy the dominant category woman is ignoring the majority, and the most
brutal, of the gendered harms that there are. These are visited upon those who are ejected from a
gender category altogether.
We can see a similar theme in the work of Spillers (1987), who articulates the ways in
which the Black enslaved body, particularly the female body, is ungendered through the legacy
of chattel slavery. Spillers understands gender here as a function of domesticity; the body
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becomes gendered through domestic roles and relations within the family and household.
Therefore, the disruption of familial bonds and the objectification and mutilation of the Black
body under chattel slavery “ungenders” Black people, in part by dehumanizing them and
reducing “body” as a coherent subjecthood to “flesh,” a physical object that can be manipulated
and abused (67-68). Thus, Spillers writes: “Under these conditions, we lose at least gender
difference in the outcome, and the female body and the male body become a territory of cultural
and political maneuver, not at all gender-related, gender-specific” (1987, 67). Here, again, we
see the following pattern: gender = humanity and humanity = whiteness.
For Spillers, those who are ungendered are still targeted in normatively gendered ways.
However, this plays out in ways that are not at all predicted by the gender categories we might
want to (perhaps wrongly) impose. She argues that feminist theorizing of the female body has
systematically forgotten that the “African female subject, under these historic conditions, is not
only the target of rape--in one sense, an interiorized violation of body and mind--but also the
topic of specifically externalized acts of torture and prostration that we imagine as the peculiar
province of male brutality and torture inflicted by other males” (68). That is, the female Black
enslaved “flesh” is subjected both to harms that the category system would code as feminine
(e.g. rape, forced impregnation, domestic servitude), and harms that it would code as masculine
(e.g. “externalized” physical violence, brutality, and torture).
Drawing from Spillers’ notion of ungendering, Pritchett (2019) discusses the way that
enslaved female bodies were ungendered through the commodification of their reproductive
capacity, in much the same way that humans commodify the reproductive capacities of animals.
At the same time, enslaved women were not permitted to marry--a distinctively human capacity.
Like Spillers, Pritchett points out that Black women were prohibited from taking part in the the
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domestic performativity of gender. “One of the fundamental markers of gender performance for
women was marrying a man and taking care of a home, especially in the Antebellum South, and
black women did not have the option to do so” (Pritchett 2019). The legacy of these practices is
far-reaching and persistent. Tellingly, Pritchett calls attention to a common Jim Crow-era
division of bathrooms into the following categories: “men,” “women,” and “colored.” These
examples starkly demonstrate the ways in which Black people are actively and materially
through the enforcement of law barred from taking part in the social practices and performative
acts that mark one as a member of a gender category.
The example of ungendered Jim Crow bathrooms is also noted by Gossett (2016). Gossett
points out that recent anti-trans bathroom legislation in the United States is intimately connected
with the history of bathroom policing against people of color. Various efforts to criminalize
transness cannot be understood apart from “how sexual difference itself has been weaponized as
an instrument of antiblack and colonial power and of white sovereign embodiment” and “how
the Lacanian ‘sexed body’ is always already a racialized body and a colonized body, and how
Black and/or indigenous peoples have always figured as sexual and gender outlaws to be
disciplined and punished” (Gossett 2016). This discussion points to a phenomenon articulated at
greater length by Bey (2017); transness and Blackness are conceptually intertwined, as both
represent disruption, disturbance, and displacement of the “purity” of full humanity, as
distinguished by white, binary, colonial gender categories.
In this context, Gossett’s language of “outlaws” is telling. It mirrors Bornstein’s (1994)’s
Gender Outlaw, an anti-essentialist (white) trans manifesto about transitioning and living at the
margins of gender categories. However, where Bornstein’s use of the term is triumphant-reflecting an identity of active and creative gender resistance to the binary, as one who initially
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occupied a position of significant privilege within it (that is, initially being read as a white man)-Gossett’s use describes a much more brutal status, one marked by discipline and
punishment while simultaneously being constituted by ejection from binary categorization. To be
a racialized “gender outlaw” is to be disciplined and punished specifically as an outsider to a
gender category, in order to demarcate the boundaries of the “normal”--i.e. the intelligibly
binarily-gendered and white. Thus, as Patricia Hill Collins writes,
Heterosexuality itself is constructed via binary thinking that juxtaposes male and female
sexuality, with male and female gender roles pivoting on perceptions of appropriate male
and female sexual expression. Men are active, and women should be passive. In the
context of U.S. society, these become racialized—White men are active, and White
women should be passive. Black people and other racialized groups simultaneously stand
outside these definitions of normality and mark their boundaries. (2000, 83)
The uses of “outlaw” here are potentially ambiguous. A more pointed term for the phenomenon
of trans and GNC exclusion from dominant gender categories can be found in Wilkins (1997).
Wilkins refers to themself, and other trans or GNC people who are not consistently and
comfortably categorized as men or women, as gendertrash. This terminology calls attention to
the ways in which many marginalized people are rejected or thrown out from the dominant
categories. According to Wilkins, gendertrash is consistently the target of gendered exercises of
power, by everyone from medical professionals to teenage boys on the street corner. Living in
the world as someone who is not intelligibly gendered as a member of a dominant, binary
category means being punishable under all of the gender norms at once; one is neither feminine
enough nor masculine enough, and thus one is failing on both standards. This leaves one open to
punishment from multiple fronts.
My point here is not to argue that there is no theoretical benefit to focusing on gender
categories. I recuse myself entirely from that question. Rather, I want to focus on the ways in
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which membership in a particular gender category is not necessary for being the target of a
gendered exercise of power. Broadly speaking, gender categorization itself reproduces a broader
legacy of injustice--not just by dividing people into binary categories of dominant and
subordinate, but by dividing people into those who occupy dominant gender categories because
they are treated as fully human, and those who don’t because they are not.
In what ways, then, does the focus on gender categories fail to explain the effects of
gender norms beyond the boundaries of those categories? In the next section, I will show how
the discussion here motivates what I am calling the evaluability objection. Entities are not held as
evaluable according to gender norms on the basis of gender categories, as the category-based
view entails. There are a variety of examples which can demonstrate this. I will focus on the
three examples named above: dehumanization, ungendering, and gendertrash.

2.4 THE EVALUABILITY OBJECTION
A brief recap: I have articulated the category-based view as a way of understanding how
the assignment and enforcement of gender norms translates into action. That is, it aims to explain
how, as Witt puts it, we are “responsive to and evaluable under” particular gender norms. In 2.1
and 2.2, I motivated the responsiveness objection. I argued that a category-based view cannot
explain how agents are responsive to particular gender norms, because it cannot explain crosscategory norm responsiveness. Drawing on the ideas discussed in 2.3, I will now motivate the
evaluability objection. I take this objection to show that a category-based view cannot explain
how entities are evaluable under particular gender norms.
It is certainly acknowledged within analytic feminist philosophy that gender norms apply
differently on the basis of other intersecting social factors, such as race, disability, and so forth.
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One way of making sense of this from within the category-based frame has been to hold that
binary gender categories are applied differently to different people on the basis of other social
categories. For example, Dembroff writes: “The construction of binary gender kinds
(men/women), the latitude individuals have within them, and how individuals are socialized into
them, vary dramatically across intersections with other social identities, such as race, class, and
disability” (2020, 17). In a footnote, they hint at a stronger version of this claim: “note that other,
intersecting social identities–such as race, class, sexuality, and disability—often disqualify or
prevent persons from attaining these so-called ‘natural’ features, rendering them ‘unnatural’ and
devalued (2020, 16). While this seems in spirit compatible with much of what was discussed in
2.3, note that it still proceeds from the assumption that gender is the baseline category, and
“other” social identities can intersect with gender and “disqualify” individuals from certain kinds
of normatively bounded (“natural”) gender presentations.
Similarly, Haslanger writes of the differential impact of gender norms based on the other
categories to which one belongs:

Imagine race, gender, and other social positions to be like gels on a stage light: the light
shines blue and a red gel is added, and the light shines purple; if a yellow gel is added
instead of the red, the light shines green. Similarly, gender is lived differently depending
on the racial (and other) positions in which one is situated. Just as a light may appear
different colors depending on which combination of gels it is filtered through, the gender
norms for Black women, Latinas, and White women differ tremendously, and even
among women of the same race, they differ depending on class, nationality, sexuality,
religion, historical period, and so on. (2012, 9)
On this kind of analysis, one is a member of various categories--gender, race, class, disability,
sexuality, and so on. As Haslanger’s metaphor demonstrates, these categories are understood to
overlap and affect how the others are experienced and interpreted. When we are trying to
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understand how norms work, then, we must understand this overlap as part of the story.
Bernstein (2019) understands this as a metaphor specifically intended to communicate the
intersectional nature of social categories, such that one cannot understand identities as added
together but rather as combined or mutually constitutive. That is, intersectionality suggests “a
complex, non-additive, intermingling metaphysical relationship between different aspects of
social identity” (Bernstein 2019, 324). Both Haslanger and Dembroff explicitly point to this kind
of understanding here.
First, notice that this way of thinking about things is grounded in the assumption that
individual gender categorization is a basic part of evaluability under gender norms. Other social
structures, such as race, are understood to interact with one’s gender category, such that one’s
evaluability under gender norms is mediated by one’s race (and perhaps vice versa--although
things are rarely put in those terms within this literature). In terms of gender norms, we might
infer the following: The gender norms that apply to someone, and their experience of being
responsive to and evaluable under these norms, will also be mediated by other intersecting
identities. A category-based view need not, of course, hold that the norms which apply cannot
vary; it is only committed to the claim that, whichever norms apply, they do so on the basis of
one’s gender category. There is plenty of room within this view for an intersectional approach to
the actual mechanics of gender norm enforcement, understood as a kind of “overlapping” of
different categories. On this view, if the norms associated with woman if one is Black, middleclass, non-disabled, and living in Seattle, are wildly different than those associated with woman
if one is white, poor, using a wheelchair, and living in Cairo, it is because the different categories
overlap and affect the normative impact of one another.
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In 2.3, I demonstrated that many marginalized people are excluded from membership in
dominant gender categories. Based on these examples, I argue that the category-based view faces
a real problem, even if it can accommodate intersectional “overlap.” Recall that, for a view to
explain evaluability, it must be able to capture the ways that agents are candidates for criticism
under and enforcement of gender norms. The category-based view holds that evaluability under
gender norms is grounded in the application of a gender category. But being excluded from
membership in a dominant gender category does not entail being excluded from evaluability
under the associated norms. Rather, as Lugones, Spillers, and Wilchins each point out, those
excluded from dominant categories are the targets of harsher evaluation and more brutal
enforcement according to those norms. I call this the evaluability objection to the category-based
view.
Let me spell out the three versions of this objection in a little more detail. First, Lugones
(2010) argues that the gender categories assigned to white colonizers are not assigned to the
colonized; colonizers are men or women, while the colonized are not. There is some unclarity
between Lugones’ view on this in her (2007) and the later (2010). In the former, Lugones may be
read as arguing that colonized people occupy subordinate racialized gender categories (e.g.
colonized male, colonized female). In the latter, Lugones seems to be claiming that the colonized
have no gender categories at all (analogous to Spillers’ account of the ungendering of Black
enslaved female “flesh”). In either case, however, the objection is the same: The norms under
which everyone, colonizer and colonized, is evaluated, are centered on the normative categories
assigned to the colonizers. That is, both those included in and those excluded from the dominant
categories assigned to white colonizers are judged by the standards associated with those
categories. Lugones writes:
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I propose to interpret the colonized, non-human males from the civilizing perspective as
judged from the normative understanding of ‘‘man,’’ the human being par excellence.
Females were judged from the normative understanding of ‘‘women,’’ the human
inversion of men. From this point of view, colonized people became males and females.
Males became not-human-as-not-men, and colonized females became not-human-as-notwomen. Consequently, colonized females were never understood as lacking because they
were not men-like, and were turned into viragos. Colonized men were not understood to
be lacking as not being women-like. What has been understood as the ‘‘feminization’’ of
colonized ‘‘men’’ seems rather a gesture of humiliation, attributing to them sexual
passivity under the threat of rape. (2010, 744)
Here again we see the relationship between gender and full humanity; only the fully human are
afforded the gender categories of “man” and “woman,” and only white Europeans are fully
human. (This also mirrors Mills’ (1997) argument that the European philosophical understanding
of the “social contract” only includes those classified as full humans--i.e. white men.) Note also
that the brief discussion of colonized men here further undermines the analysis of different social
categories “combining” to make different effects. We can’t understand the humiliation of
colonized men by combining race with gender, or even gender with colonialism. Rather,
colonized men are understood as outside the category “men” but nevertheless failing at standards
of masculinity, in part by having characteristics attributed to them that are incompatible with the
standards set out for dominant white men, such as sexual passivity. This is a far more nuanced
phenomenon than can be explained by simply mixing together different social categories. For
this reason, I argue that a category-based view simply does not have the resources to explain
Lugones’ account of how colonized people are evaluated under gender norms, because it does
not explain how gender norms can apply to someone in virtue of their failing to occupy the
associated category.
Spillers’ (1987) account of the ungendering of the Black enslaved body raises a similar
issue. Through the legacy of chattel slavery, enslaved people were violently removed from
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classification as gendered. Moreover, despite the legacy of ungendering, we can clearly see the
ways in which Black females were and are held to what Deliovsky (2008) has called “normative
white femininity.” As Collins (2000) has argued, Black women are historically judged as
unfeminine in virtue of being too “aggressive” or “dominant”--something Spillers also notes
(1987, 74). That is, Black women are constructed as failing to meet the norms of a feminine
gender standard that treats White women as the “benchmark” for womanhood (Deliovsky 2008,
58). Relatedly, Black men are consistently constructed as either hyperagressive (and thus
frightening) or insufficiently masculine (and thus feminized or passive); on either understanding
they are perceived as incorrectly masculine relative to the White-centric norms which are
understood to delineate masculinity (see Curry 2017). This is done in conjunction with what was,
according to Spillers, a history of active ejection from membership in the associated dominant
categories. The category-based view cannot explain how those who are ungendered are
nevertheless treated as evaluable under gender norms.
Relatedly, through Wilchins’ narratives of existing as “gendertrash,” we can see how
exclusion from dominant categories is related to harsh enforcement of associated gender
norms. Although Wilchins and many other trans and GNC people are rendered unintelligible by
local gender classifications, the resulting status of “gendertrash” is nevertheless sufficient for
harsh evaluation on the standards of either masculinity or femininity. That is, they are both
insufficiently masculine and insufficiently feminine--or perhaps too masculine and too feminine
at once. A person ejected from dominant categories as gendertrash is evaluated, not just for
failing on a particular normative gender standard, but for failing on all of the standards.
On each of these examples, the gender norms that apply to the people in question are not
determined by the gender categories that they occupy, but rather by their exclusion or ejection
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from a gender category. There are, I think, many other versions of this point. For example, Thorn
(2021) points out that, under fatphobia, body size can disqualify one from being included in
dominant gender categories. However, it’s not as if fat people are no longer evaluable under the
norms of the gender categories from which they are excluded or ejected. Rather, they are harshly
evaluated according to those norms. In this section, I have focused on what I take to be
particularly clear and stark cases: Lugones’ account of dehumanization, Spillers’ account of
ungendering, and Wilchins’ discussion of gendertrash. The first two are cases raised by
feminists of color in reference to racialized gender under coloniality and chattel slavery. I raise
these particular cases, in part because the deep historical imbrication of gender and race is undertheorized in analytic feminist metaphysics, and in part because the associated harms are
particularly widespread, systematic, and brutal. Relatedly, I raise the experience of trans and
GNC people because we are often used as exemplars of how gender norms can cause harm. On
the whole, however, the point is overdetermined.
In this chapter, I have largely been focusing on the normativity of gender norms in terms
of their effect on individual people. This is so in part because, if the aim is to understand how the
landscape of practical reason and choice is shaped by gender norms, it is often more
straightforward to talk in terms of individual agents and their normative deliberations. That is,
when we are talking of being responsive to and evaluable under a norm or set of norms, it is
sometimes easiest to see this at the level of the individual, whose responsiveness and evaluability
can be more easily articulated.
However, according to Lugones (2007), this is not the only, or perhaps even the primary,
level at which colonial gender norms are enforced on the colonized. In what follows, I will try to
reconstruct Lugones’ argument that the harmful normative practices of the colonial/modern
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gender system are not merely about individual evaluability, but rather affect groups, social
structures, and societies. Put differently, she argues that colonialist attitudes take “macro-level”
social entities, such as groups and their collective attitudes and epistemic practices, to be
evaluable under colonial gender norms.
Lugones articulates the way in which colonial gender norms were and are enforced at a
structural level on non-colonial egalitarianism; that is, ways of understanding the world and
organizing the social life of a group that do not incorporate a binary, hierarchical, category-based
social metaphysics. She discusses both nongendered egalitarianism, such as societies like the
Yoruba which, prior to colonialism, did not organize their societies around anything like gender
roles; and gynecratic egalitarianism, wherein many Indigenous societies rested on spiritual
beliefs that elevated what we might call the feminine, believed that the primary organizing force
in the universe was female, and so forth. To control these egalitarian societies, colonialism did
not merely create a new hierarchical gender system. It had to disrupt the entire social order and
replace it with one conducive to the binary, category-based way of thinking that it imposed, in
order to then mobilize the justification of a patriarchal, hierarchical system of social
organization. These egalitarian societies are therefore subject to what Lugones calls “the
gendered construction of knowledge in modernity”--a colonial attack on entire epistemic
frameworks that are potentially contrary to the project of justifying colonialism. Thus, the
“inferiorization of Indian females was thoroughly tied to the domination & transformation of
tribal life”--a project which requires not just brutality, but the more subtle normative undertaking
of “image and information control” (Lugones 2007, 499). For colonialism to justify itself, it was
necessary both to disrupt the traditions which value the feminine, and to undermine the systems
of social organization and ways of knowing that support this.
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On this picture, it is not enough to say that the differential experiences Black and Brown
colonized people and societies have of gender norms is due to the overlap of categories such as
gender and race. The reality is broader and more complex than that. According to Lugones,
colonial gender norms functioned to shape the very nature of the communities and epistemic
frameworks that constitute non-colonial societies and individuals. Gender’s normativity here is
therefore far more complex than simply those in the category (or even overlapping categories)
are evaluable under the norm. Rather, gender norms are woven into the colonial attitude, on
which certain ways of existing in the world--for individuals as well as cultures and groups--are
treated as normatively superior because they are friendly to a hierarchical, patriarchal
framework, and others (i.e. egalitarian societies) are subordinated and/or brutalized because they
are not. This is true not just because egalitarian or gynecratic practices promote the interests of
individual females or women, but because a colonialist attitude and way of life is fundamentally
incompatible with the prioritization and valuation of features that are, under that metric, coded
feminine. The category-based view is simply too univocal to capture these nuances of gender
normativity--in part, I suggest, because it proceeds from the experiences of those whose gender
categorization proceeds from racial and colonial privilege.
In short, throughout the legacy of colonialism, gender norms are enforced not just on
individual people, but on entire groups, cultures, and ways of life. The effects of this are visible
primarily at the macro-level. The issue at hand is not just that race affects experiences of gender
norms, like overlapping gels on a theater light. Rather, on Lugones’ analysis, we should
understand gender’s normative power as a standard that guides how things ought to be in the
“civilized” world--i.e. the white colonial world. Many non-colonial social organizations are
incompatible with that standard, and as such are coded as normatively inferior. This is not
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straightforwardly a matter of man/woman, but is gendered nevertheless, in a variety of complex
and intersecting ways--including, for example, ways where someone can be interpreted as
masculine and subject to masculine norms (as in the case of colonized men) and still brutally
subordinated.3
In short, I argue that we have reason to question a category-based view as a framework
for understanding gender norms (among other kinds of gender phenomena), because we have
reasons to think that such a view is primarily suited to explain the experiences of individual,
privileged people. This kind of framing cannot capture the way in which gender norms are
enforced on the dehumanized, the ungendered, or the “gendertrash;” nor can it begin to explain
the ways in which colonial gender as a normative framework shapes ways of living and knowing,
as in cases where it works to justify the violent restructuring and devÁstation of gynecratic or
egalitarian ways of life.

2.5 CONCLUSION
I have shown that the category-based view is insufficient to do the explanatory work
necessary to understand the normative power of gender norms. I have articulated two ways in
which it fails to do this. First, it cannot explain the way that agents are responsive to gender

Curry (2017) defends an analogous point about the subordination faced by Black men. According to
Curry, this subordination is explained, not by combining Blackness with the supposedly fundamentally
powerful maleness as he argues that gender studies has historically done, but by understanding Black
maleness as a distinctively subordinated and distinctively gendered or sexed subjectivity. I think again
that a category-based view cannot capture this, at least not as it has been traditionally defended in gender
metaphysics. This may be because that tradition owes much to Haslanger (2012), who famously argued
that gender was defined by hierarchy, where one is a man iff one is systematically privileged along some
dimension on the basis of one’s observed or imagined sexed body (234). The broader point, however, is
that if we want to understand how gender norms work to subordinate, gender categories seem insufficient
as an analytical frame, because they are simply not flexible enough to capture the nuanced varieties of
oppression gender norms can justify. More on this in Chapter 3.
3
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norms. Experiences of cross-category norm responsiveness, where individuals experience
themselves as responsive to gender norms which do not match their gender category,
demonstrate this failure. I called this the responsiveness objection to a category-based
view. Second, it cannot explain the way individuals, as well as groups, cultures, and other macrolevel social phenomena, are evaluable under gender norms. I gave three examples where
individual people are excluded or ejected from particular gender categories, but nevertheless
evaluated according to the associated norms; Lugones’ (2010) example of dehumanization,
Spillers’ (1987) example of ungendering, and Wilchins’ (1997) example of gendertrash. I then
briefly discussed the phenomenon of macro-level social entities such as groups and societies
being evaluable under gender norms, and argued that a category-based view is incapable of
explaining evaluability except in the case of individual people.
I have therefore given many compelling reasons why a category-based view specifically
cannot explain how gender norms attach to agents and other entities in the social world. In the
next chapter, I will lay out a traits-based view, which I will argue can do this.
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CHAPTER 3: THE TRAITS-BASED VIEW
3.0. INTRODUCTION
In analytic gender metaphysics, gender categories are often understood as a foundational
element of the ontology of the social world. Gender categories offer us a clear story of how the
social world is divided, in a way that helps us see how it is also stratified. As Frye wrote, “It is a
fundamental claim of feminism that women are oppressed” (1983, 2). If we are to theorize
outwards from this “fundamental claim,” then perhaps we should proceed from the
understanding that categories like “woman” and “man” are ontologically important, because they
meaningfully divide the world into those who are oppressed and those who are not. The
assumption, then, is that if we are going to understand the oppressive social power of gender
norms, we should begin with the assumption that gender categories are central.
It is perhaps for this reason that feminist metaphysicians have by and large understood
gender norms as applying in virtue of the gender categories that an individual occupies. For
example, recall that Witt writes: “Women and men are responsive to their gendered social roles
[sets of norms] and evaluable by others in relation to those roles just by virtue of their social
position occupancy” (2011, 29, emphasis added). Haslanger writes: “The classification of
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features as masculine or feminine...depends on prior social classifications” (2012, 46). And
Dembroff writes that “norms...are imposed on people based on their gender classification” (2018,
3). I elaborated on each of these important views in Chapter 1, and argued that they share a
commitment to what I called the category-based view. Recall:
The category-based view (CBV): Gender norms apply to individuals only if and
because those individuals belong to the associated gender categories.
The category-based view has several important theoretical advantages, most which I have
already discussed. It gives us a clear and parsimonious account of the grounds on which gender
norms are assigned, in a way that is consistent with several intuitively important features of
gender norms: the fact that they are socially constructed, rather than natural, essential, or innate;
the way in which they are often nonconsensually assigned, and exert force over us whether we
want them to or not; the fact that they are differentially applied to different people, often on the
basis of sexed embodiment; and the way in which, combining several of these features, they
work to enable and justify oppression. However, in Chapter 2 I argued that a category-based
view is too narrow, because it proceeds from the experiences of those who are already privileged
within dominant gender categories. I have suggested that this is reason to reject the view.
However, rejecting a category-based view leaves us somewhat adrift. If we want to
understand how gender norms exert normative force over us, we need an account of how gender
norms attach to us that can capture the important features listed above, without centering the
experiences of those who are privileged by a category-based view.
I will argue that we should understand we understand gender norms as socially assigned
to individuals on the basis of perceived traits. Put very simply, traits are descriptive features of
individuals (Mikkola 2016). Notice, however, that we sometimes also perceive larger-scale
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social entities, such as groups or societies, to have traits (see Zheng 2016, Hofstede 2001). Call
these macro-level social entities. On a traits-based view, particular traits are gender-coded-usually as masculine or feminine. Since dominant systems of power often treat gender as binary,
gender norms are accordingly expected to bifurcate into mutually exclusive, coherent clusters.
That is, masculine traits are expected to occur together with all and only other masculine traits,
and feminine all and only with feminine. The resulting clusters may take on further ontological
significance, perhaps as gender roles, gender identities, or even gender categories. However, I
will hold that the gender-coding of the trait is explanatorily primary to, and can occur without,
this further significance. I want to remain neutral on the relationship between normative role and
gender category--as well as, in general, on the nature of gender categories themselves. To
reiterate, I am not giving an account of what gender categories are. Instead, I want to understand
the way that particular gendered forces shape agency. Following Mikkola (2016), I take this
project to both be possible without, and to have been inhibited in many ways by a theoretical
preoccupation with, category-focused analysis.
I proceed as follows. In 3.1, I will articulate six key desiderata for the project at hand.
The first two will call for the positive view to have the explanatory power to capture the
experiences of marginalized people with respect to responsiveness and evaluability as I identified
them in Chapter 2. The remaining four desiderata will consist of the “intuitively important
features” that I identified above. In 3.2, I will lay the groundwork for the positive view by
sketching some upshots of the desiderata. In particular, I will argue that a commitment to social
construction and nonconsensual assignment suggests that we should adopt what I call
internalization/ habituation about gender norms. In 3.3, I will outline the basics of my positive
traits-based view. I will explain in detail what a “trait” is, and explain how constellations
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norms cluster around particular socially relevant traits. In 3.4, I will explore the traits-based view
further by showing, in turn, how it meets each of the six desiderata. This will also help me
explore the view further. In 3.5, I consider some important objections to the view. In 3.6, I
conclude.

3.1. THE DESIDERATA
3.1.1. In this section, I will identify six key desiderata for an account that aims to explain the way
gender norms are assigned. The first two desiderata involve the view’s ability to explain the
experiences of marginalized people. That is, the view should be able to (1) explain the way that
marginalized people are responsive to gender norms, and (2) explain the way that marginalized
people are evaluable under gender norms. These correspond to the two major objections I raised
against the category-based view in the previous chapter. The remaining desiderata are as follows:
(3) social construction (the account must be consistent with the basic metaphysical position that
gender is socially constructed); (4) nonconsensual assignment (the account must capture the way
that gender norms exert power over us without our participation or consent); (5) differential
assignment and embodiment (the account must capture the intuitively obvious fact that gender
norms apply differently to different people, often on the basis of their observed or imagined
sexed body); and (6) oppression (the account must enable us to explain why many domains of
gender norms are either intrinsically oppressive or serve to justify and enable oppression). I will
discuss and briefly motivate each of these desiderata in turn, and then elaborate on some of the
commitments they generate for the positive view I will give.
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3.1.2. Given my discussion in chapter 2, the first two desiderata need little further elaboration.
Recall my formulation of Witt’s question: What explains responsiveness to and evaluability
under gender norms? In that chapter, I discussed the way in which established views have failed
to answer this question with respect to the experiences of marginalized people. First, I
discussed cross-category norm responsiveness, or the experience of being responsive to some
gender norm which ostensibly hasn’t been assigned to you. Thus, I argued that the categorybased view does not explain responsiveness. Second, I discussed the impact of gender norms on
Black and Brown people, societies, and ways of life, through the legacy of colonialism and
chattel slavery. Thus, I argued that the category-based view cannot explain evaluability. Based
on these examples, I argued that the category-based view fails.
Since I have argued that the view fails on these grounds, a successful view should be able
to explain these phenomena. That is, it should be able to meet the following two desiderata:
(1) Responsiveness. A view of gender norms must be able to explain how marginalized
people are responsive to gender norms.
(2) Evaluability. A view of gender norms must be able to explain how marginalized
people are evaluable under gender norms.
This way of putting the desiderata is, admittedly, quite pointed. It might be objected that this is
too narrow. The view should be able to explain why everyone is responsive to and evaluable
under gender norms. The latter is, of course, correct. However, I still explicitly frame the issue in
terms of marginalized people, for two reasons. First, I don’t think it’s necessary to specify that
those who are privileged within dominant gender categories ought to be covered by the view. My
discussion of desiderata 3-6 capture what I take to be the most intuitively important features of
gender norms for everyone. I do not think there is risk of leaving out those who are typically
centered in such accounts. Second, I do think it’s necessary to specify that the experiences of
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those who are not privileged within dominant gender categories be included. It is (clearly) too
easy to ignore us otherwise. Doing so constitutes a serious theoretical oversight, because such
experiences provide a unique perspective on dominant gender norms--one that can better help us
understand how they work. Let me say a little more about why.
In general, those who are oppressed have a kind of epistemic privilege with respect to
dominant social practices (see Janack 1997, Collins 2000). To navigate a world that is not built
for your benefit--more to the point, one that is built specifically to constrain, control, and harm
you--requires the ability to understand multiple intersecting and sometimes conflicting levels of
social structure, as well as to inhabit the perspective of the privileged in order to navigate their
exercises of power within that structure. The oppressed must therefore develop knowledge that is
not available to those for whose benefit the world is built. To understand how to unpack those
systems of oppression, then, we need this distinctive knowledge. We need to know what the
harms are like and how they are visited on the disempowered in order to ameliorate them.
This is particularly apparent in the case of gender norms. Those who comfortably and
consistently occupy dominant, hegemonic, white-centric gender categories can certainly
experience some of the oppressions and harms they can perpetuate. However, this is only one
dimension of those harms. Of course it is hard to be consistently gendered as a privileged woman
in a privileged man’s world, but at least it is a positionality for which there is a space, a name,
and an intelligible set of gendered expectations (however self-contradictory or full of doublebinds they may be). If we want to understand how gender norms shape behavior; if we want to
know how they can weigh heavy against other considerations, even when we ignore, dislike, or
actively disavow them; if we want to see the deepest and most profound harms that gender norm
enforcement can cause; we need to listen to those whose experiences involving navigating
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multiple, intersecting sets of norms, those for whom the dominant world has no space, no name,
and no way to understand--and for whom expectations nevertheless abound. We need to center
the experiences of those who have “reckoned with the boundaries and the dimensions of
masculinity and femininity in ways [the privileged] have never had to” (Coates 2016). As
Dembroff writes, “The best way to see gendered reality is to be a Tiresias, throbbing between
overlapping but radically segregated worlds” (2018a).
I therefore take the first two desiderata to be especially important for two reasons. First,
the experiences they reference are incredibly relevant and offer distinctive insight. Second, they
are often overlooked within the tradition of feminist metaphysics. A theory of how gender norms
attach to entities must be able to answer Witt’s question specifically as it applies to the
experiences of marginalized people.

3.1.3. The third desideratum for a theory of norms is social construction:
(3) Social construction: the account must be consistent with the basic metaphysical
position that gender is socially constructed.
Put differently: in explaining gender’s normative power, the account must not appeal to intrinsic,
essential, or pre-social features of individuals, groups, or humanity as a whole. In Chapter 1, I
discussed at length the nature of “social construction” as it is being used in this project.4 I
positioned social constructionism in opposition to biological essentialism about gender, or the
view that there is an “intrinsic essence” to individuals’ genders, caused in some way by their

From Chapter 1: “social constructionism in feminist philosophy holds that gender is not a natural or
fixed part of human life. Rather, gender arises out of contingent historical practices of assigning social
significance to certain features. Those features themselves may be natural or fixed parts of human life,
such as reproductive capacities (Witt 2011, 27-29; Ásta 2018, 3); however, the associated social
significance is contingent, and varies across cultures and contexts.”
4
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biology (their chromosomes, hormones, reproductive roles, etc.). I did not give an extended
defense of social construction, nor do I intend to do so here. The importance of a social
constructionist approach has been thoroughly defended by others, and does not need more
attention here (see, among others, Beauvoir 1948, Frye 1983, Butler 1990, Collins 2000,
Lugones 2007, Haslanger 2012, Ásta 2018). It is a basic commitment of this project that a
feminist account of gender norms should maintain social constructionist commitments.
I will pause here to discuss the relationship between social constructionism and the other
desiderata I have identified. Specifically, I will discuss one objection to the possibility that they
can be addressed by the same theory. It is sometimes argued that social constructionism in
general is incompatible with trans and GNC experience. The thought is this: If social
constructionism is true, then individuals should be responsive to the norms that are socially
assigned to them. But trans and GNC experience seems to demonstrate that this is not the case.
Therefore, social constructionism is false.5
One prominent defender of this view is Serano (2007). In explaining her own experiences
of cross-category norm responsiveness, as well as other kinds of gendered feelings she
experienced from a young age, Serano defends what she calls the intrinsic inclinations model.
According to Serano, motivations to behave according to standards of masculinity and
femininity, which often appear at “a very early age” and continue into adulthood, constitute

Another way of interpreting this conflict is to organize these premises differently, as follows: If crosscategory norm responsiveness is a legitimate experience, then social constructionism is false. Social
constructionism is true. Therefore, cross-category norm responsiveness is not a legitimate experience.
Something like this seems to be going on in the most vitriolic versions of so-called “gender-critical
feminism,” or self-described feminist views (such as those defended by Raymond (1979), Bindel (2007),
and more recently, Lawford-Smith (forthcoming)). I do not engage with this argument here, in part
because I do not think it is worth attention; in part because it has already been thoroughly discussed and
answered by others (see, for example, Stone 1987; Finlayson, Jenkins, and Worsdale 2018); and in
perhaps largest part because to respect and take seriously trans and GNC experience is also a basic
commitment of this project.
5
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evidence that “certain expressions of masculinity and femininity represent deep, subconscious
inclinations similar to those of sexual orientation” (98). Serano therefore argues that masculinity
and femininity are deep, subconscious features of individuals (98-100). On Serano’s view, crosscategory inclinations are evidence that responsiveness to gender norms is not a response to social
conditioning, but is already present prior to that conditioning. She writes:
Many girls who are masculine and boys who are feminine show signs of such behavior at
a very early age (often before such children have been fully socialized with regard to
gender norms), and generally continue to express such behavior into adulthood (despite
the extreme amount of societal pressure that we place on individuals to reproduce gender
expression appropriate for their assigned sex). This strongly suggest that certain
expressions of femininity and masculinity represent deep, subconscious inclinations
similar to those of sexual orientation. (2007, 98)
Serano seeks to explain cross-category norm responsiveness by jettisoning social construction.
She is quite explicit that this is her goal, writing that “a strict social constructionist model does
not account for exceptional gender expression” (2007, 98)--by which she means gendered
behavior that conflicts with one’s apparent socialization and training.
An immediate problem with this model is that it assumes that the inclinations or
behaviors in question and the gender norms with which they are associated are conceptually
inseparable. Serano argues that children have deep masculine and feminine tendencies, and that
these “gender inclinations are, to some extent, intrinsic to our persons” (99). “Intrinsic” here
means something like acquired without socialization; she contends that motivations to behave in
a masculine or feminine way “occur naturally (i.e. without social influence)” (99). However,
Serano’s argument only shows that certain inclinations occur naturally or without social
influence. There is no reason to think that these inclinations are inherently gendered. On the
contrary, feminist philosophers at least as far back as John Stuart Mill (1997 [1865]) have
convincingly argued that masculinity and femininity are socially constructed normative
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standards, rather than natural features of individuals. As Haslanger (2012) puts it, “Particular
traits, norms, and identities, considered in abstraction from social context, have no claim to be
classified as masculine or feminine” (46). This is evident in the fact that gender norms vary
widely across cultures, and even across contexts within the same culture. Here is a plausible
interpretation of the phenomena Serano points to, which is also consistent with social
constructionism: children have certain inclinations, some of which are gender-coded post hoc.
A worry remains. Part of Serano’s argument is this: if masculinity and femininity are
socially constructed, how do they hold sway over young children before socialization can
properly take hold? This is an empirical matter, and I can only gesture at the answer here.
Constructed or not, gender runs deep. It is so thoroughly embedded in social experience that
children are unlikely to acquire gender-coded concepts without also knowing that they are so
coded. Moreover, gender training begins early. Children in the United States, for example, learn
to identify the difference between masculine and feminine between 18 and 24 months, and they
typically know their assigned gender by the age of 3 (Mayo Clinic Staff 2017). Gender is
generally identified long before this; consider again the phenomenon of gender reveal parties, in
which gendered features are identified before an infant is even born. I argue, then, that there is no
intelligible time before gendered socialization takes hold. I conclude that we will not need to
reject social constructionism to explain cross-category norm responsiveness.

3.1.4. Accepting social construction implies we should accept another desideratum. In Chapter 1,
I argued that social constructionists should be (thin) ascriptivists6 about gender norms. Recall:

6

I have been calling thin ascriptivism simply ascriptivism for brevity.
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Ascriptivism: Some gender norms apply to subject S because of the practices of others
with respect to S, rather than because of S’s voluntary self-identification, choice, or
preference.
Ascriptivism is a way of satisfying the fourth desideratum for a view of gender norms:
(4) Nonconsensual assignment: the account must capture the way that gender norms can
exert power over us without our participation or consent.
Nonconsensual assignment is not the same thing as ascriptivism. On ascriptivism, gender norms
can in principle be assigned consensually. For example, ascriptivism can accommodate selfascription, where the feature that others are trying to track when determining whether or not
some norm applies to S is whether S would prefer those norms be applied. This is the case in
some trans-inclusive contexts. More in this in 3.4.5.
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are excellent reasons to think that gender norms in
dominant contexts are nonconsensually assigned. We generally do not have a say in which
gender norms others apply to us, nor do we seem to have much say in the norms to which we feel
responsive. We can see this because we have almost no control over such things. Simply refusing
to acknowledge a gender norm’s power over us does not mean that we are no longer responsive
to its pull, or evaluable under it by others. If this were the case, then eliminating the normative
power of gender norms would be as simple as refusing to acknowledge that power. To be sure,
such a refusal can be a kind of resistance. For example, drawing from Spillers’ (1987) discussion
of violent racist ungendering, Bey (2022) argues in favor of an active, subjective project of
ungendering oneself as a form of resistance to hegemonic gender (Bey 2022, 28-29). Similarly,
Dembroff (2018, 2020) argues that adopting a non-binary or genderqueer gender identity can
constitute resistance to dominant gender and its associated norms. However, this alone does not
seem to remove us from the so-called “normative umbrella” of those norms (Witt 2011, 44). If it
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did, then life for many trans and gender-nonconforming folks might be much easier.
Including nonconsensual assignment in our theory of gender norms will therefore speak to
desideratum (6): oppression. More on this in a moment.

3.1.5. Our fifth desideratum is also related to oppression. Gender norms are not assigned equally
to all. One function of such norms is to stratify society, such that the normative permissions
allotted to some are far greater and allow for far more latitude and control than for others. Often,
this stratification seems to be connected to the kind of sexed body that one has. For example,
consider again the phenomenon of a gender reveal party. During an ultrasound on a pregnant
person, a fetus is identified as having either a penis or lacking one. Based on this identification,
the parents will organize a social gathering centered around the “reveal”--a cutting of a cake, a
release of balloons, an explosion, or some other equally dramatic and potentially dangerous
event. What is revealed is traditionally one of two colors: blue for a fetus observed to have a
penis, pink for a fetus not so observed. Such parties are usually deeply gendered in other ways.
For example, cakes are often decorated with an oppositional gender-normative theme: “baseball
or bows,” “wheels or heels,” “tractors or tiaras” (Incoherent Queer Screaming, 2020). Based
solely on this relatively minor piece of information, a constellation of gender norms attaches to
the infant before they are even born.
As discussed, feminist philosophers have often explained this attachment, in terms of
gender category. However, this is not explanatorily sufficient. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
gender norms which are assigned to those who are ejected from dominant categories, or
“ungendered,” may also be differentiated based on embodiment. For example, Spillers articulates
the way that the Black enslaved female body ceases to become properly a body and instead
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becomes flesh, which is then subjected to, among other things, norms of reproduction and sexual
engagement with white men (1987, 76). Similarly, Lugones describes gendered violence against
colonized people:
The colonial ‘‘civilizing mission’’ was the euphemistic mask of brutal access to people’s
bodies through unimaginable exploitation, violent sexual violation, control of
reproduction, and systematic terror (feeding people alive to dogs or making pouches and
hats from the vaginas of brutally killed indigenous females, for example). The civilizing
mission used the hierarchical gender dichotomy as a judgment, though the attainment of
dichotomous gendering for the colonized was not the point of the normative judgment.
(Lugones 2010, 744)
Again, Lugones is clearly arguing here that it is not the gender category of the colonized females
that determined the norms to which they were held. Nevertheless, sexed embodiment certainly
plays a role in how the norms attach and are enforced. This seems true in a wide variety of
incredibly disparate contexts and situations. I suggest, then, that a theory of how gender norms
attach to entities would be deeply unintuitive if it could not capture:
(5) Differential assignment and embodiment: the account must capture the intuitively
obvious fact that gender norms apply differently to different people, often, though not
always, on the basis of their observed or imagined sexed body.
This description aims to be consistent with the position that biological sex is socially constructed
(a la Butler, 1993); that is, I don’t want to claim that the “sexed body” is in any sense natural or
coherent as a category. Rather, I use this phrase to denote the fact that certain bodily features
have traditionally been grouped together under the umbrella of “biological sex,” including but
not limited to: genital structure; secondary sex characteristics (presence or absence of breasts,
density and location of body hair); features presumed to be correlated with, but not directly
connected to secondary sex characteristics (height, weight, body shape); chromosomal makeup;
ability to seed or bear children. “Observed or imagined” is a phrase I borrow from Haslanger
(2012). It denotes that the important factor for gender norm assignment is not whether the
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individual in question really has the feature(s), but whether they are perceived to have the
features by others. Given the desideratum of nonconsensual assignment, this is an important
caveat. (Consider, for example, a doctor who mistakenly identifies a fetus on a sonogram as
having a penis, when in fact it does not. A gender reveal party in this case would attach
masculine norms to that fetus. This may be rescinded when the mistake is corrected; however,
the initial attachment holds until that point.)
It is clear that those who are observed or imagined to have certain sexed bodies are often
thereby assigned certain gender norms. However, it is also clear that there are contexts in which
sexed embodiment may be, as Ásta puts it, “highly irrelevant” (2018, 76). For example, consider
contexts where gender norms are assigned to individuals based on their gender presentation
rather than their sexed embodiment. In the context of a gay club, for example, a gay man, a
straight man, and a drag queen may all be perceived to have the same sexed body. Moreover,
each of these individuals may be perceived as, and perceived themselves as, a man. However,
very different normative gender standards will apply to each, and each will likely be responsive
to different norms. In these cases, there is likely some feature of the individual that fixes gender
norm assignment; however, that feature does not appear to be either a gender category or a
particular kind of sexed embodiment.7

Note that, on one reading of Ásta’s (2018) view, each of these individuals does occupy a different gender
category. Ásta discusses the ways in which gender properties are conferred on individuals in a context
based on the attempt to track some underlying property, such as sexed embodiment, self-identification,
role in social organization, and so on. If we read gender property here as gender category, we might
think that the context of the gay bar has (at least) the following three categories: gay man, straight man,
and drag queen. However, I think this is not the right reading. Ásta’s account of a gender property does
not straightforwardly map onto what I am calling a gender category. I discussed in Chapter 1 the ways in
which I think Ásta defends a category-based view. However, I do not think she is committed to the claim
that there are a multiplicity of context-dependent gender categories, as I argued that, on her view, gender
classifications are broader and more stable than gender properties. Moreover, whatever Ásta’s
commitments, I will argue that positing a multiplicity of context-dependent categories is not a good move
for a category-based view. More on this in 3.5.1.
7
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3.1.6. The final desideratum is politically motivated. This project, like most work in gender
metaphysics, is explicitly liberatory. The aim is not simply to describe or explain what exists, but
to target that description and explanation at the features of the world that are distinctively
harmful or oppressive, in order to identify the levers of change. To that end:
(6) Oppression: the account must enable us to explain why many domains of gender
norms, particularly the hegemonic norms that are operative in dominant contexts, are
either intrinsically oppressive or serve to justify and enable oppression.
Importantly, this desideratum is framed to allow that not all domains of gender norms are
intrinsically oppressive or serve to justify and enable oppression. For example, some domains of
gender norms, such as those constructed in subaltern queer and trans communities (see Bailey
2011, Bettcher 2013), might arise out of a need to make intelligible the experiences of
marginalized people, and, concordantly, can specifically work in opposition or resistance to
dominant, hegemonic norms. This can serve as an important step to undermining the power of
dominant norms. Therefore, a view aimed at liberation ought not preclude the possibility of such
resistance. I discuss this further in 3.4.6.
Taken together, these six desiderata will help frame the positive view I am going to
construct. Notice here that the category-based view as I have framed it already meets several of
these conditions, in particular desiderata 3-6. In 3.2, I will draw on some of the resources those
view can provide, in order to lay the groundwork for the positive view I will give in 3.3

3.2. THE DESIDERATA AND THE CATEGORY-BASED VIEW
Let us consider the interplay between the factors listed in 3.1, with respect to a basic line
of questioning for this inquiry: What explains the normative force of gender norms? Witt’s
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earlier work (2011) has helped frame much of our investigation thus far. In chapter 1, I argued
that the view defended in this work is not interested in what metaethicists call robust or
authoritative normativity, but rather in a somewhat thinner social and psychological notion.
However, in a later study of social normativity, Witt (2019) makes some headway on more
substantive normative questions. She motivates this investigation with the following question:
“How do we explain the idea that obligations or “ought tos” are somehow implanted in the social
world, attached to its positions, practices, and structures?” (2019, 4) This framing focuses
on norm responsiveness, as does much of Witt’s view.8 Explaining this is one of our desiderata.
But what is the relationship between norm responsiveness and the other desiderata--in particular
social construction and nonconsensual assignment? Put differently: How can a socially
constructed phenomenon such as gender norms create reasons for agents to act, even when those
norms are assigned without the agents’ preference or consent?
Witt gives a simple and elegant answer. Her account of social normativity relies on
Aristotelean notions of function and excellence. According to Aristotle, individuals have social
functions which are inherently normative. For example, a flute player has the function of playing
the flute, which “is associated with an excellence in relation to which the function is performed
well (or badly)” (2019, 7). According to Witt, embedded in the Aristotelean concept of an
excellence is the notion of habituation. To be properly excellent at a thing, one must habituate
oneself to it. That is, one must do it regularly and often, such that one does it well without
thinking about it. This understanding of Aristotle is perhaps best summed up by Will Durant, in a

Recall from chapter 2 that one is responsive to a social norm when one experiences the norm as guiding
one’s behavior, which could mean that one experiences any of a “full range of possible reactions to a
norm....from compliance to critique” (Witt 2011, 33). Again, this is compatible with, and indeed indicated
by, what I have called the phenomenology of rebellion; the sense that one is violating a norm.
8
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quote which captures the central idea so well that it is often misattributed to Aristotle: “We are
what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit” (Durant 2006 (1926), 98).9
Put differently, success at one’s function is not merely something evaluated relative to one’s
performance, but rather an “acquired disposition” (Witt 2019).
For Witt, then, each social position has a function, and therefore an excellence. This is
not to say that each social position is in itself excellent or normatively good (as is clearly false),
but rather that each social position generates a role, or collection of norms, relative to its primary
function. Each role can be performed well (or badly), and thus is normative for its constituents
(2019, 10). To perform one’s role well--to instantiate excellence relative to, say, the role of
“teacher”, “mother,” or “woman”--one must acquire the relevant disposition; one must be
habituated to follow the norms. The most excellent of mothers, for example, is fully habituated
to this role and acts in accordance with the norms of motherhood, not because she thinks
carefully about each norm and follows it out of conscious compliance, but because it is her habit;
it is part of her.
Witt’s Aristotelean account aims to explain how individuals come to be responsive to
gender norms. If we combine this with her account in Metaphysics of Gender, we get the
following picture: Someone is assigned to a gendered social position. Each gendered social
position has a function. For Witt, since these functions originated with the human need to
reproduce, the social positions are assigned on the basis of one’s reproductive capacity (e.g.
ability to bear, or seed, children). As she puts it, “Being a man and being a woman are social
positions with bifurcated social norms that cluster around the engendering function” (2011, 40).

This mistake is made even by Aristotelean scholars, to the point that some such scholars have
recommended not correcting it. See Herron 2013 or Caelan 2017.
9
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However, she acknowledges that the roles adapt to varying social contexts, and thus are both
conceptually distinct from and considerably more complex than the basic reproductive functions
which gave rise to them. That is, “the actual content of the social roles is variable” (2011, 40).
Call these two bifurcated norm clusters “masculinity” (the norms relevant to the role “man”) and
“femininity” (the norms relevant to the role “woman”). According to Witt, individuals are
evaluable under these norms as soon as they are assigned the role (at birth, sometimes before).
Over time, they become habituated to their role, and come to act in accordance with its norms
without thinking. This involves being responsive to its norms (often also without thinking).
This understanding of gender norms closely echoes Haslanger’s account of gender norms
as relating to the “proper function” for particular gender kinds (2012, 43). She writes:
But if females are expected to perform the role of mothering and to perform it well, then
rather than coerce them to fulfill this role, it is much better for females to be motivated to
perform it. So the norms must be internalized, that is, they must be understood as part of
one’s identity and defining what would count as one’s success as an individual. Ideally,
one will develop unconscious patterns of behavior that reinforce the role in oneself and
others and enable one to judge others by its associated norms. (Haslanger 2012, 10,
emphasis added)
In addition to the significant similarity to Witt’s view, notice also Haslanger’s language of
internalization. This terminology points to a nice theoretical coherence across disciplines. The
notion of habituation fits well with what is known in the social sciences as the internalization
hypothesis. The internalization hypothesis holds that the motivational power of norms is
explained by the fact that individuals internalize the norms of their local social group (Scott
1971, Sripada & Stich 2007). According to the internalization hypothesis, individuals acquire
norm responsiveness from their surroundings through a process of social reinforcement. They
learn what a norm recommends by connecting it with some sanctions--i.e. rewards for
compliance and punishment for non-compliance. Through a process of social learning, sanctions
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(both reward and punishment) encourage norm-compliant behavior while discouraging noncompliance. On this view, a norm counts as internalized to the extent that the sanctions which
helped to install it no longer need to be regularly applied to ensure compliance--that is, when the
norm is followed at a temporal distance from reinforcement (Scott 1971, 88). The internalization
hypothesis explains why individuals treat social norms that are unique to their societies, contexts,
and identities as authoritative over their conduct, and follow them even when there are no
sanctions present. That is, it explains norm responsiveness in terms that are consistent
with differential assignment. Moreover, according to some theorists, it explains the “intrinsic
motivational effects” that socially constructed norms appear to have on the individual (Sripada &
Stich, 2006).10
The internalization hypothesis is an empirically grounded analog of Witt’s habituation.
Early proponents of the internalization hypothesis even constructed it in direct opposition to
voluntarism (Keeley 1973). Understood together, internalization and habituation nicely capture
the desiderata listed above. Internalization is consistent with norms being socially constructed
and nonconsensually assigned, while habituation explains how they are relevant to individuals.
Internalization explicitly positions us to explain differential assignment and embodiment; if norm
responsiveness is a function of social practices like learning and training, then gender norms may
be assigned differently on the basis of different features, such as embodied features. Given this
theoretical agreement across disciplines, and the agreement of both views with the desiderata

Recall from the introduction that the “founder” of the internalization hypothesis, Scott (1971),
specifically resists this interpretation, arguing that the internal states of norm followers are irrelevant to
an empirical study and that we should instead speak only in terms of behavior. Behaviorism has since
largely fallen out of favor in the social sciences, which might explain the difference in commitments
between these accounts. In either case, however, internalization itself need not posit any internal states to
be well-matched to habituation. It can merely function as the “external analog.”
10
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listed above, I suggest that we should understand gender norm responsiveness as a function of
what I will call internalization/habituation:
Internalization/habituation: In response to sanctions) individuals internalize gender
norms (they respond to them even when they are not being enforced). Over time, they
become habituated to following them (they do it by habit without thinking).
Witt’s version of habituation of course includes a commitment to her version of the categorybased view. However, I argue that we can understand its appealing features independently of this
commitment. The basic idea of internalization/habituation is just this: through regular
performance, individuals come to respond to gender norms even when they are not being
enforced, because they come to respond to them by habit, or without thinking. We might also
think that, to do justice to the view’s Aristotelean roots, we should be able to explain how this
process relates to the notion of a function. But this does not need to involve a category. For
example, a society which does not have a category for servants can nevertheless have someone
who performs the function of service. Similarly, Scott (1971) seems committed to a categorybased view when he writes that “as sex roles become differentiated, [a boy] will learn there are
some acts for which his sister will be rewarded but for which he will be punished, and vice
versa” (56). Again, despite the category-specific language, I argue that the intuitively appealing
features of this view can be maintained without category-based commitments. Specifically, I will
draw on Scott’s account of vicarious learning to explain differentiated norm internalization
without appealing to gender categories. I will say more about this in 3.3.
In preparing to construct the positive view, I will also call attention to the relationship
between nonconsensual assignment and differential assignment and embodiment. That is, our
positive view needs to explain how gender norms attach differently to different individuals, often
on the basis of their perceived sexed bodies, without their consent.
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Category-based views are incredibly well-positioned to handle some elements of this. If
gender categories are nonconsensually assigned to individuals on the basis of their perceived
sexed bodies, and gender norms come with gender category membership, then we have a clear
story about how those norms attach to those perceived to have differently sexed bodies.
However, I think this story has an extra, unnecessary step. To discuss this, I draw
attention to a point made by Dembroff in their discussion of what they call the “dominant
Western gender system.” According to Dembroff, one of the axes of this system is:
The teleological axis: Someone’s gender, by virtue of nature, determines a range of
social, psychological, and physical features—e.g., sexual desire, occupation, family role,
attire, comportment, personality features—that they either must (are determined to) or
ought to have. Males naturally must or ought to have masculine features, females
naturally must or ought to have feminine features. (2020, 15, emphasis added)
Dembroff is speaking here of the differential normative expectations we place on people relative
to gender--that is, gender norms. They articulate this in a way that nicely captures both
nonconsensual assignment and embodiment. As discussed, Dembroff elsewhere claims
allegiance to a category-based view, writing that “norms...are imposed on people based on their
gender classification” (2018, 3). In this passage, however, notice the language of males and
females. Just previously in the same work, they suggest that, on the dominant ideology they are
describing, “men have a male biological sex and women have a female biological sex” (2020,
15). That is, in describing the teleological axis relative to males and females (rather than men and
women), Dembroff appears to speaking in terms of biological sex rather than gender category.
They further note that biological sex is, in most cases, “understood as a feature determined by or
reducible to external genitalia” (15, fn70). According to this view, then, the assignment of gender
norms happens on the basis of biological sex, which is in turn understood as determined by or
reducible to external genitalia--a paradigmatic feature of sexed embodiment.
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This discussion gives us a clue as to the direction we should go. Elsewhere, I have read
Dembroff as holding that a category-based view is necessary to explain gender norm assignment.
However, in this passage, they do not refer straightforwardly to gender categories. Rather, they
are pointing to a phenomenon wherein certain gender norms are assigned on the basis of a
biological sex classification, which in turn reduces down to a single, embodied feature. But this
raises a question: What work is the classification doing in this process? Why should we think
that the gender (or sex) category is the key to assignment, and not the feature itself?
I suggest that we cut out the middleman. Rather than holding that gender norms attach to
gender categories which are then assigned to individuals on the basis of their observed features,
we can simply hold that gender norms are assigned to individuals on the basis of those observed
features. That is, to explain how gender norms attach to entities, I propose that we shift focus
from gender categories to gendered traits. The resulting traits-based view can pay heed to each
of the six desiderata I have identified, as well as providing further attractive theoretical benefits.
In the next section, I will elaborate.

3.3. THE TRAITS-BASED VIEW
To recap: I have identified some problems with the category-based view and articulated
several desiderata for a view that will take its place. What we need is a view that can explain
how gender norms attach to entities in the world. This view should capture how marginalized
people are responsive to and evaluable under gender norms, and that they are socially
constructed, assigned nonconsensually and differentially (often on the basis of perceived sexed
embodiment), and, in many or most cases, oppressive.
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I argue that we ought to adopt a traits-based view about gender norm attachment. What
determines gender norms assignment is not the gender category that an individual occupies, but
rather the traits that an entity is observed, imagined, or otherwise perceived or believed to
display. It does not matter for my purposes whether the entity in fact does have the traits. What
matters is how and whether those traits are perceived by the relevant others. In very broad terms:
Traits are normatively gender-coded in various contexts, generally as masculine or feminine. As
Mikkola puts it, “certain evaluations (like being judged to act, be or appear “feminine”) can be
seen to covary with particular descriptive traits” (2011, 69). If one is perceived to have or
express a gender-coded trait, they are thereby subject to the associated norm. Where norms
“cluster” around a particular social function, certain traits are expected to occur together with
other traits; where this does not happen, punishment can follow.

3.3.1. Traits are non-relational, descriptive features of entities in the world. My understanding
here is much indebted to Mari Mikkola’s trait/norm covariance model (Mikkola 2011). Mikkola
distinguishes between descriptive traits and evaluative norms, where traits “describe ‘the way
the world is’” and “include physical and anatomical traits (e.g., chromosomes, ovaries, testes,
genitalia, body shape and size), one’s appearance (e.g., one’s clothing, make-up, haircut, amount
of body hair), roles (e.g., whether one undertakes caretaking roles, engages in childrearing tasks)
and self-conceptions (calling oneself a woman or a man)” (76-77). Mikkola is here describing
the kinds of traits that individuals can have. However, I argue that entities other than individuals,
such as groups, societies, cultures, and epistemic frameworks--what I call “macro-level social
entities”--can also be interpreted as have traits. For example, these entities might be interpreted
to have have physical traits (e.g. a nation-state has a trait of occupying a certain geographical
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area); behavioral traits (e.g. we might understand U.S. foreign policy as having a trait of
aggression); shared beliefs, values, or self-conceptions (e.g. a religious community has a trait of
believing particular things); and so on.11
I understand the notion of a trait to be very thin. That is, traits are bare descriptive facts
about some entity. For example, when I speak of a trait of self-conception like “calling oneself a
woman or a man” (Mikkola 2011, 77) I certainly don’t take this to be anything as substantive as
a gender identity or gender category. Rather, I mean the bare descriptive fact that the individual,
in fact, calls themself a woman or a man. Relatedly, notice that some traits, like aggression, are
more like collections of traits. Call these aggregate traits. Properly speaking, aggregate traits are
not “traits” in my sense, but rather are a handy way of describing a collection of traits that either
commonly occur together or are perceived to do so. For example, the aggregate trait of
aggression is really a collection of traits such as being willing to attack other entities, exerting
force in pursuit of one’s interests, and so on. These descriptive facts are perceived to occur
together often enough that we have a name for the collection: aggression.
Many traits are gender-coded in various contexts. As Mikkola points out, some traits, like
being short-sighted, are not gender-coded in any or almost any contexts (2011, 77). Other traits
are widely gender-coded; having ovaries, for example, is coded feminine in almost all contexts.12
Still other traits are only locally gender-coded. For example, in some contexts, wearing
jewelry is coded as feminine; that is not the case elsewhere. However, having ovaries is coded as
feminine near-globally. If an entity is interpreted as having a particular trait that is gender-coded

This may be because the entity itself is perceived to have the trait, or because the individuals of which
the entity is composed are perceived to largely share the trait. The truth of the matter doesn’t depend on
your view of collective agency, but rather on what is perceived to be true of these macro-level entities. It is
therefore an empirical question which I don’t address here.
12 I discuss some exceptions to this, as pointed out by Bettcher (2013), in 3.4.6.
11

110

in their context, that entity is thereby evaluated under the associated gender norm. For example, a
person who is interpreted to have the trait of wearing jewelry is thereby judged to be normatively
feminine in many parts of the United States; a person who is perceived to have the trait of having
ovaries is thereby judged to be normatively feminine in most contexts. In general, applications of
gender norms follow from an initial perception of the entity as having particular, gender-coded
traits.
It might be objected that it is not possible to draw a clean distinction between descriptive
and evaluative here. Many gendered norms, particularly norms of appearance, are closely
connected with descriptive features. Take, for example, “being skinny”.13 “Skinny” is ostensibly
descriptive, but it also seems to carry some normative “baggage.” That is, in some contexts,
“skinny” is normatively feminine; however, it might be argued that this is not a matter of gendercoding, but rather is just part of the connotation of “skinny” in those contexts. This raises
questions about the possibility of “pure” descriptive terms and concepts in the realm of gender.
Examples like “skinny” appear to operate as thick terms or concepts. That is, they express both
descriptive and evaluative content. Given how deeply gender is embedded in our thought and
language, won’t all or most descriptive terms and concepts which are gendered will have
normative baggage? This is an interesting question that I aim to explore in further research.
However, the question of whether there are “purely” descriptive gendered terms or concepts
comes apart from the question of whether there are descriptive features which are distinguishable
from their gender-normative upshot. The former is arguable, but I only need the latter. In fact,
the normative connotation of terms or concepts like “skinny” might just be the normative coding
I am talking about at work. Perhaps the traits have, in some contexts, become so closely
13

Thanks to Charlotte Witt for this discussion and example.
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connected with the norms that we cannot understand or speak about them separately. This is far
from inconsistent with my view.

3.3.2. A key feature of this view is that gender norms tend to cluster together. That is, if a trait is
gender-coded, it is often thereby socially expected to occur together with other, similarly-coded
traits--masculine with masculine, and feminine with feminine. This social expectation may be
enforced on those who display traits that do not cluster in this way, on a spectrum of severity
ranging from mild surprise to brutal punishment. While many feminist philosophers have
explained this clustering in terms of gender categories, as discussed, I argue that this is not
necessary. Rather, we might understand gender norms as clustering around traits that have
particular social functions, with the understanding that those social functions will vary widely
and need not be unified by one’s gender categorization.
Recall here Witt’s discussion of norm habituation as related to Aristotelean excellence.
She writes that “Being a man and being a woman are social positions with bifurcated social
norms that cluster around the engendering function” (2011, 40). However, if we reject the
category-based view, and remove the social positions of man and woman from this picture, we
get the following: there are “bifurcated social norms ...that cluster around the engendering
function.” Engendering here is understood as the social process of “differentiating women from
men according to their reproductive functions” in order to codify the social significance of those
reproductive functions (32). Again, if we remove women and men from this picture, we get the
notion of differentiation according to reproductive functions--that is, essentially differential
assignment and embodiment.
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Witt understands “reproductive functions” as involving a kind of aggregate
trait including a collection of bare descriptive facts, such as producing certain kind of gametes
(egg or sperm), possessing a gestational environment for offspring (having a uterus), and so on
(36). According to Witt, these aggregate traits have a particular social function; they are
necessary for a society to persist (100). Recall that, in later work, Witt also explains the
normative force of social norms in terms of functions. That is, social positions have functions,
and to be excellent at a particular function, you must be habituated to the norms that cluster
around the function (Witt 2019). Again, we can understand this without involving the social
position. That is, we can just hold that there are particular functions with associated excellences
and thus clusters of norms. Putting this together, we have the following: Gender norms are social
norms that cluster around the aggregate traits of reproductive functions, because those
reproductive functions have a social function: they contribute to the persistence of a society.
I propose, then, that we adopt Witt’s habituation view, but without including social
positions. Instead, we should understand functions as involving collections of traits which are
socially significant in the relevant context. Moreover, I suggest that we leave it open as to which
traits can be socially significant for gender norm clusters. While Witt thinks that the engendering
function is a necessary part of differential gender norm assignment, other philosophers disagree.
For example, Ásta writes that, when assigning gendered constraints and enablements, “in some
contexts, people are trying to track a sex assignment, in others a role in societal organization, a
bodily presentation, a role in the preparation of food, a role in biological reproduction, a role as a
sexual partner, and so on” (2018, 74). Notice that each of these examples, too, can be interpreted
in terms of trait clusters with a particular social function. A role in the preparation of food, for
example, includes a constellation of traits such as planning meals, shopping for groceries,
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cutting vegetables, and so on. Collectively, these traits have a social function: those who have
them meet the nutritional needs of the people in that society. As Witt points out, social functions
are best performed by those who, habitually and without thinking, have all of the associated
traits.
On a traits-based view, gender norms will tend to cluster around traits that are socially
significant. These significant traits are what I call the core traits of a particular cluster. Generally
speaking, core traits will have the most “weight” in determining whether an individual is
expected to present all of the associated traits. For example, if some norms cluster around a core
aggregate trait of reproductive function, then the traits which constitute reproductive function-such as literally possessing the ability to reproduce, by bearing or seeding children--will
outweigh other, more peripheral traits when determining how to evaluate someone.14 The
peripheral traits will be those that are perceived to aid in or contribute to the function; that is,
those that are desirable, but not necessary. For example, if a core trait is being able to bear
children, peripheral traits may include being risk-averse (to be more likely to survive
pregnancy), being inclined to nurture (to better raise those children), as well as various traits that
are considered desirable to pass on to those children (such as whatever traits are considered
attractive or otherwise independently normatively valuable in the context).

In some cases, such as this one, it is not always feasible to measure or directly observe the actual core
traits. The contexts at hand may therefore assign gender clusters based on markers of these traits, with a
built-in defeasibility condition. Those contextual markers are usually taken to reliably and nonaccidentally predict the relevant characteristics, and will therefore only be investigated when suspicion is
raised--if indeed they can be directly investigated at all. For example, norms that cluster around a core
trait of the reproductive function being able to bear children may not rest on the actual perception that an
individual can in fact bear children, as this can be remarkably difficult to verify. In lieu of this, the norms
may temporarily attach to individuals according to other, more easily observable traits that are believed to
“mark” that ability, such as having breasts and being of childbearing age. For more on the contextual
nature of operative gender markers, see Ásta (2018).
14
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3.3.3. Clustering is not a necessary feature of gender norms. Traits can be coded as masculine or
feminine independently of how, or whether, they cluster around a particular social function. For
example, gender-coding might denote a normative relationship between the trait and some
overarching cultural ideals, such as the “eternal feminine.” The trait could therefore be
normatively feminine without being expected to occur together with other feminine traits.
Moreover, clustering is not fundamentally harmful or oppressive. Consider, for example,
Lugones’ example of Indigenous gynecratic societies, in which we can understand gender norms
as clustering around social functions that are treated as roughly equitable, and also relatively
fluid: “most individuals fit into tribal gender roles on the basis of proclivity, inclination, and
temperament” (2007, 199-200). Consider, also, the possibility of norm clusters in subaltern transinclusive communities, where the core trait of some clusters is self-identification (see Bettcher
2013). The harmfulness or oppressiveness of the cluster will depend on what the core traits are,
and whether and how what I call cluster coherence is enforced.
I have argued that part of the function of most dominant gender norms is to naturalize
certain behaviors--to make it seem as if gender is a unified natural kind that arises spontaneously
from essential facts about the world, such as the so-called “biological features” of individuals
(Lugones 2007, Haslanger 2012, Ásta 2018). In these contexts, then, there is a corollary
expectation that the clusters are mutually exclusive and coherent. In order to successfully
function to naturalize gender in this way, it must appear that individuals “naturally” express
either all and only the traits associated with masculinity, or all and only those associated with
femininity. That is, the expectation that masculine-coded traits occur with masculine-coded traits
is backed up by a normative presumption of “natural”--meaning, of course, “normal” or
“appropriate.” Many dominant contexts work this way; non-coherence is often called “unnatural”
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(abnormal or inappropriate) and severely punished. Since physical features such as sexed bodies
are believed to be relatively stable (as traits go), those whose physical features are gender-coded
in one way but are perceived to have other traits coded in a different way, such as trans and GNC
people, are particularly vulnerable. Similarly, since a major relevant social function in
colonial contexts is to demarcate whiteness, ”being white” or “having white skin” will be core
traits on the clusters in those contexts. Therefore, those who are perceived to have sexed bodies,
but who are not interpreted as white, will be brutally punished for a fundamental kind of noncoherence. More in this in 3.4.
This view openly draws on elements of certain category-based views, most prominently
Witt’s (2011). This is so because, as argued in Chapter 1, these views have many important
insights. The crucial difference between the category-based view and the traits-based view
concerns the order of explanation. On a category-based view, the explanatory story starts with
the existence of the categories; they are the basic unit of gendering, so to speak (hence the
terminology “category-based”). Individuals are sorted into a category and then assigned norms
and expected to display traits based on that assignment. On this view, then, the explanation
begins by positing an entity called a gender category. Individuals either have the ontological
status of belonging to that category, or they don’t. Typically (though not always) the status is
conferred by others on the basis of one’s perceived sexed body. The category has associated
norms. If one belongs to the category, one is assigned the norms.
On a traits-based view, however, no such ontological claims are made. The explanatory
story starts with the normative gender-coding of traits, typically as masculine or feminine.
Insofar as those traits are observed or imagined to occur, whether in individuals or in macro-level
social entities, those individuals or entities are thereby evaluated as masculine or feminine.
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Often, norms cluster around particular core traits that serve social functions. Sometimes, social
practices will expect or mandate coherence and punish non-coherence to varying degrees of
severity, in order to better promote fulfilment of the social function. A major social function in
hegemonic colonial contexts is the stratification of society into categories that appear
natural (e.g. into human/nonhuman, man/woman, etc.). This social function requires that the
clusters of gender norms be mutually exclusive and coherent--that is, that masculine-coded traits
occur together with all and only masculine traits, and feminine with feminine (while both
clusters have whiteness at their core). In these contexts, non-coherence is a threat to the
“naturalistic” normative justification for the entire social structure, and is brutally punished.
A traits-based view therefore makes no claims about the nature or ontological status of
gender categories or their members. It does, however, leave open the possibility that a cluster
might gain ontological significance. In individuals, for example, a cluster might become what
Witt (2011) calls a gender role or a gendered social position, what Ásta (2018) calls a gender
property, or what Haslanger (2012) and Dembroff (2018) refer to as gender classifications.
However, a traits-based view need not be committed to any of these. It need not be committed
even to the claim that the cluster has any particular ontological upshot, over and above being a
contingent cluster of individual norms. At its root, a traits-based view is committed only to the
claim that particular traits become gender-coded through social practices--and, of course, that
normative gender phenomena, such as responsiveness and evaluability, proceed from this initial
step in various ways. More on this in 3.4.
This discussion might seem to raise the following question: What makes these gender
norms? That is, if the relevant gender-coding happens at the level of the trait, and the clustering
is determined by a variety of disparate social functions, what makes it the case that we are
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talking about gender norms and not some other kind of social norms, such as racial norms or
norms of etiquette?
There are two ways of interpreting this question. We might interpret it as asking what the
ontological distinctions are between gender norms and other kinds of norms or forces—that is,
what makes something a gender norm? Alternatively, we might read it as asking how we can
meaningfully identify gender norms as distinct from other kinds of norms, such that we can think
or talk about them as gender norms and understand their effects. I want to sidestep the first
version of the question altogether, as I don’t think it’s helpful. However, I don’t think that stops
us from answering the second version.
On the first reading of the question, it assumes that gender norms are ontologically
separable from other kinds of social norms or forces. This approach gestures at the thought that
gender metaphysics can be “joint-carving”--that the ontology of the social world is neatly
separable, and particular social forces and entities are clearly distinguishable from other forces
and entities. However, in the case of complex social phenomena, this approach is not always
helpful. Many feminists have argued that the oppressive forces which shape the social world,
such as gender, race, heteronormativity, capitalism, and so on, are both causally and
constitutively interdependent (see, for example, hooks 1982, Spelman 1982, Haslanger 2020).
That is, the causes of these forces are not cleanly distinguishable, nor are the features which
make them what they are. Moreover, a long and storied tradition of intersectionality in feminism
holds that trying to understand these forces separately often erases the experiences of those
whose oppression is compounded by this interdependence (Spelman 1982, Crenshaw 1989). That
is, even if such distinctions were possible, it is not always theoretically or politically helpful to
make them. We cannot, for example, understand dominant hegemonic gender norms without also
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understanding their racialization, their heteronormativity, their coloniality, and their imbrication
with, e.g., norms of “rationality” that enforce epistemic violence (Longino 1989, Lugones 2007).
So, if the question is asking how gender norms are ontologically distinguished from other kinds
of norms, one way of answering this is to say that they aren’t. Many or most gender norms are
also racial norms, sexual norms, not to mention epistemic norms and norms of etiquette, etc.-under different descriptions. Talking about them under this description is a useful point of entry
because of the way in which notions of masculinity and femininity have been used in the world.
But perhaps their ontological distinctiveness (not to mention their ontological unity) is merely
apparent.
I say “perhaps” here because I do not want to rule out the possibility that there exists an
explanation of the distinctiveness and unity of gender norms that is consistent with the
commitments I have articulated here. (For example, we might think that all of the various
socially significant traits around which other peripheral traits cluster are unified by a relationship
to the overarching system of gender in an important way--whatever that system may be.)
However, I don’t think I need to give one here, because I don’t think we need it to answer the
second formulation of the question: how can we meaningfully identify and theorize about gender
norms? I think we can answer this question even if we cannot answer--or we flat out reject--the
first. Failing or refusing to give a fleshed-out ontology of what makes a gender norm a gender
norm does not commit us to the claim that we cannot identify those normative forces which have
traveled under the banner of gender, and the way in which those forces and their classification as
gendered have perpetuated distinctive oppressions and harms. Following Mikkola (2016) and
Antony (2020), I suggest that we do not need to give a substantive account of what gender norms
are order to be able to meaningfully understand or talk about their effects in the world. Even
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ordinary speakers generally do not have much disagreement about what they mean when they
say that something is a gender norm, or that it is related to a standard of masculinity or
femininity. In cases where there is disagreement, we might defer to those who have a distinctive
epistemic perspective on the matter. As Mikkola writes,
...if we wish to know about the ordinary usage of snow-related terminology, we should
not look at ordinary language use of speakers who have no conception of snow. Rather, it
would seem more appropriate to consult Finns, Greenlanders, Alaskans, and other
northern peoples. This echoes Talia Mae Bettcher’s (2013) view that in order to analyze
gender concepts, we should not take the dominant cis conceptions as our starting point,
but rather privilege resistant trans* conceptions (2016, 121).
To be clear, I am not trying to defend a kind of nominalism about gender norms on which gender
norms are distinguished and unified simply by the fact that they are all called “gender norms.”
On a view like this, what makes something a gender norm is the fact that it is so named. But this
isn’t my position, because I’d rather remain entirely neutral about what (if anything) makes
something a gender norm. Instead, I claim that we can direct our attention to the ways in which
we use gender norms. Throughout this project I have spoken of gender norms as the evaluative
standards associated with gender, and have talked in terms of the way entities are responsive to
and evaluable under those norms--often in ways that work to perpetuate or justify oppression and
harm. However, I have also resisted, and will continue to resist, addressing the question of what
gender is. The broadest version of the point, then, is that we do not need to say exactly what
gender norms are in order to theorize about what gender norms do. We can do the latter simply
by identifying those normative forces that have traveled under the banner of gender, and tracing
the accordant effects.15

It may be important that individuals understand certain forces as being gendered; that might, for
example, explain how they become responsive to them. But, again, I think we can explain this in terms of
identification and use of gender norms--something we don’t need a clear ontology to be able to do.
15
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To summarize: I have sketched a traits-based view, on which gender norms apply on the
basis of observed or imagined traits. Traits are descriptive features of individuals, groups, or
other social entities. Gender norms tend to (but need not) “cluster” around particular social
functions, like reproduction or food preparation. These social functions are themselves
collections of traits that have some significance in the context; those traits constitute the “core”
of the cluster. The clusters may (but need not) gain further ontological significance, as, for
example, a gender role or a gender category. However, the connection between trait and norm is
the “basic” level of gender norm assignment. This leaves it open that there is no ontological
significance to the “gendering” of gender norms. Even if that’s true, however, we can still
meaningfully speak and theorize about them and their effects.
In the next section, I will discuss, in turn, how a traits-based view meets each of the
desiderata I identified in 3.2. In doing this, I will further explore the view.

3.4. HOW THE VIEW MEETS THE DESIDERATA
In this section I will explain, in turn, how a traits-based view meets the desiderata
outlined in 3.1. Recall the six desiderata: (1) responsiveness, (2) evaluability, (3) social
construction, (4) nonconsensual assignment, (5) differential assignment and embodiment, and (6)
oppression. Importantly, in meeting each of the desiderata, the view must also respect all of the
the other desiderata. The view’s account of responsiveness, for example, cannot conflict with
social construction (as in Serano’s intrinsic inclinations view). In discussing each desiderata and
their interactions, I will further explore the commitments of a traits-based view.
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3.4.1. Responsiveness. The account must be able to explain how marginalized people are
responsive to gender norms.
The major challenge I raised for explaining responsiveness was the phenomenon of
cross-category norm responsiveness, where many trans and GNC people experience norms that
ostensibly have not been assigned to them as nevertheless exerting force over their behavior. A
good explanation of responsiveness must also be consistent with other desiderata, in
particular social construction and nonconsensual assignment. For example, a view like Serano’s
(2007) suggests that that cross-category norm responsiveness is fundamentally incompatible with
these desiderata. Versions of this position have been suggested from a variety of perspectives,
including other trans theorists such as Prosser (1998), but also including many so-called “gendercritical” feminists, who take social construction as paramount and conclude that cross-category
norm responsiveness is either unimportant or spurious (see, for example, Bindel 2014, LawfordSmith forthcoming). I suggest that it is a major advantage of a traits-based view that it can
explain cross-category norm responsiveness in terms that are consistent with social construction
and nonconsensual assignment, thus opening up space for inclusive theorizing.
Recall from 3.2 the discussion of internalization/habituation. Drawing on prominent
perspectives in the metaphysics of gender (Witt 2011, Haslanger 2012) as well as insights from
social science (Scott 1971; Sripada & Stich 2006), I argued that we should hold that agents
become responsive to gender norms because they internalize those norms as a response to
sanctions, and become habituated to them. That is, what explains social norm responsiveness of
all kinds, including gender norm responsiveness, is the following pattern: Agents are trained that
certain behaviors consistently lead to reward and others consistently lead to punishment. Over
time, they internalize the pattern, and consistent reward and punishment are no longer required to
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produce the behavior (Scott 1971). This involves habituation, or the psychological state where
individuals calibrate their behavior according to the norms regularly and without thinking; they
become responsive to those norms (Witt 2011). What do we get when we combine this with a
traits-based view?
I argue that there are two ways in which agents can internalize gender norms and become
responsive to them. First, they can be internalized because of coherence pressure. Second, they
can be internalized through vicarious learning. I will discuss these in turn.
On a traits-based view, children will learn from their surroundings that certain traits are
coded masculine or feminine. Put differently, sociocultural training instils a connection between
trait and norm, and individuals with the relevant trait learn that they ought to follow the norm.
Moreover, those raised in cultures where cluster coherence is mandatory will also learn that
displaying traits which “mismatch” is punishable. However, it is abundantly clear that
individuals are rarely disposed to express a perfectly coherent gender-coded set of traits. If a
person expresses or is disposed to express a trait which is inconsistent with other traits that they
are observed or imagined to have, and, importantly, if they have internalized a cultural
presupposition that clusters of gender-coded traits are naturally coherent and mutually exclusive,
they may feel that they ought to follow the norms associated with the traits they are disposed to
express, in order to maintain coherence. For example, consider someone in dominant colonial
culture who is perceived by others to have primarily masculine-coded physical traits, but is
nevertheless disposed to display feminine-coded traits such as shaving their body hair, wearing a
dress, or identifying themselves as a woman. For this person, the pressure to express a coherent
set of traits may cause them to feel pressure to express other feminine-coded traits. Call this
internalization from coherence pressure.
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Consider an example. Recall Serano’s report: “I had an unexplainable feeling that I was
doing something wrong every time I walked into the boys’ restroom at school” (Serano 2007,
78). Here is one traits-based explanation of this experience. Serano either had, or was disposed to
have, some traits that are coded feminine; these might be behavioral traits, traits of appearance,
physical traits, and so on. (Again, I am not trying to give an empirical explanation for why
individuals have or are disposed to have the traits that they do. Serano, a biologist, gives an
empirical explanation of this; see her 2007, 80-82. Let’s assume that this or some other
explanation is correct.) Since she had learned that gender-coded traits are only supposed to occur
in coherent clusters, and, crucially, that those who display non-coherence are punished, she
experienced coherence pressure to display other feminine-coded traits--such as using the girls’
bathroom. That is, she learned that those with feminine-coded traits go in this bathroom; and
insofar as she experienced herself as either having or being disposed to have some femininecoded traits, she found herself responsive to that norm.
The second way in which agents can become responsive to gender norms is through
vicarious learning. Drawing from social learning theory, Scott (1971) notes that norms can be
internalized directly, as a response to sanctions applied to the individual themself; however, they
can also be internalized vicariously, as a response to sanctions applied to someone else (55). That
is, if an individual observes another person as being rewarded or punished for a behavior, “he
learns that what happens to others can happen to him too” (55), and can internalize that norm
himself. Importantly, for Scott, only observations of individuals who are relevantly similar to the
individual will lead to vicarious learning. For example, “as sex roles become differentiated, [a
boy] will learn there are some acts for which his sister will be rewarded but for which he will be
punished, and vice versa” (56). If gender norms attach to individuals on the basis of their gender
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categories, as Scott suggests, then vicarious learning cannot explain how individuals acquire
cross-category norm responsiveness, for children who believe that they are boys will learn
vicariously only from sanctions applied to other boys. However, if gender norms attach on the
basis of traits, the relevant similarity will be trait, not category. On this picture, individuals
identify others in their environment who exemplify traits that they either have or are disposed to
have. They then learn vicariously from the rewards and punishments applied to those others,
independently of their gender category.
Consider an example. Recall Mock’s report:
I had a vision board of my ideal, pulled mostly from the pop-culture images that MTV
fed me. I wanted Halle Berry’s or Tyra Banks’s breasts, Britney Spears’s midsection,
Beyoncé’s curvy silhouette and long hair, and I prayed that I wouldn’t grow any taller so
I didn’t tower over the petite Asian girls who were the barometer of beauty in the
[Hawaiian] islands. (2014, 122-123)
I argued that we cannot understand this experience in category-based terms. As a trans child and
teenager, Mock was not consistently rewarded for following feminine norms or punished for
failing to follow them. Rather the opposite; throughout this memoir, she recounts the ways in
which she was regularly punished for displaying feminine-coded traits, by her parents, siblings,
and classmates. However, if we understand the norm-responsiveness she displays in the passage
as based on vicarious traits-based learning, it becomes clear. Mock observed others in her
environment as relevantly similar to her, and observed them being rewarded for displaying
particular feminine-coded traits and punished for failing to display them. She then generalized to
her own case; she learned, vicariously, to become responsive to those norms, because she too
was disposed to express those traits.
At this point, it might be objected that it is unclear why an agent would become
responsive to certain norms and not others. For example, someone like Serano or Mock may
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have been disposed to express a variety of feminine-coded traits, but they would have been
expressing a variety of masculine-coded traits as well--in particular the physical traits which led
to their classification by others as boys. It might seem unclear, then, why they would learn
vicariously but not directly, or internalize normative pressure to cohere with a feminine cluster
rather than a masculine one. That is, why would a trans girl become responsive to feminine
norms rather than masculine ones?
I first want to reject the thought that agents are responsive to some norms “instead of”
others, as if they are actually mutually exclusive. Nothing about what I have said so far indicates
that being responsive to different gender norms is impossible. My view suggests the opposite-which is an attractive feature, because reality also suggests the opposite. It is fully consistent
with the accounts listed here, and more broadly with the experiences of many trans and GNC
people, that one can be responsive to a variety of apparently incompatible norms at once. For
example, Mock describes her childhood self as being at times drawn towards masculine norms of
dress and behavior, specifically because she did not want to disappoint her mother (2014, 98).
Many trans and GNC people struggle to interpret our identities and figure out how we want to
behave precisely because we are pulled by multiple, apparently incompatible, sets of norms at
once. As children, we are trained by straightforward reward and punishment that we should
follow some norms, even as we observe that those who are like us in the ways that seem most
important follow other norms. We learn that non-coherence is unnatural or impossible, even as
we experience unprompted non-coherence in ourselves. It is not surprising, then, that we will
experience various norms as exerting force over us.
How, then, do we determine which norms will really guide our actions? If a trans or
gender-nonconforming person is responsive to masculinity and femininity all at once, what’s the
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difference? Why do people often respond as if the cross-category norm responsiveness is more
pressing? I will answer this question at length in Chapter 4. For now, let me just say that certain
traits can feel closer to the core of who one really is; that is, expressing them can feel more
authentic than expressing others. Moreover, given how strongly non-coherence is punished,
perhaps many (apparently) cis or gender-conforming people experience a weaker form of crosscategory norm responsiveness that does not end up guiding their actions, and is ignored in favor
of the more socially acceptable responsiveness. That is, perhaps in a less strongly cis-normative
society, displays of non-coherence would be much more common. This is, of course, an
empirical question that I cannot address in full here. The basic point is this: I do not want to
claim that being responsive to one set of norms is incompatible with being responsive to another
set. I only want to say that being disposed to express traits which are gender-coded in a particular
way can often lead to responsiveness to the associated norms, and that this can explain crosscategory norm responsiveness.

3.4.2. Evaluability. The account must be able to explain how marginalized people are evaluable
under gender norms.
In Chapter 2, I raised the evaluability objection against the category-based view, which is
twofold. First, it cannot explain how those who are excluded from certain gender categories
(such as colonized people who are not counted as “men” or “women” on dominant colonial
frameworks, Black enslaved people who are forcibly “ungendered,” or what Riki Wilchins called
“gendertrash”) are nevertheless subject to the associated gender norms, often in particularly
brutal ways. Second, it cannot explain how gender norms are enforced at what I called the
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“macro-level”--against groups, societies, and epistemic frameworks. A traits-based view,
however, has no trouble explaining this. Here is how.
First, on a traits-based view, one need not occupy a particular gender category in order to
be subject to the associated norms. It is sufficient for one to have, or rather be observed or
imagined to have, the associated traits. In particular, being observed or imagined to have
physical traits that are associated with sexed embodiment is often a key part of being responsive
to and evaluable under particular sets of gender norms. (In 3.2 I argued that a view of gender
norms which does not say this would be unintuitive.) Those who are excluded from dominant
gender categories in various ways are often nevertheless still interpreted as having physical sex
traits. It is no surprise, then, that they are held to the associated norms. Recall Lugones’
discussion of colonized males and females who were historically constructed as “not-human-asnot-men” and “not-human-as-not-women” (2010, 744), but nevertheless subject to brutal
gendered violence, in part for their failure to conform to the standards associated with the whitecentric gender categories “man” and “woman.”
Moreover, as discussed, dominant colonial gender categories notoriously center the traits
associated with certain kinds of embodied privilege. This is likely because the social functions
around which these norms cluster are intimately connected with the perpetuation of a falsely
naturalized social order which privileges certain kinds of bodies, behaviors, and social
organizations. The primary function of dominant colonial gender categories is to privilege white,
non-disabled, cisgender, heterosexual maleness while also making that privilege, and these
classifications themselves, appear natural or normal. The “core” of the associated clusters, then,
will include traits of whiteness (as well as heterosexuality, non-disability, and so forth). Those
who are interpreted as having some of the core traits of these clusters, such as sexed bodies, but
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lacking other core traits, such as whiteness, are therefore exhibiting non-coherence. Moreover,
since whiteness and sexed bodies are both understood to be relatively stable, this non-coherence
is interpreted as permanent or fundamental. On a system which rests its legitimacy on the
existence of naturalized, mutually exclusive, coherent gender clusters, permanent non-coherence
is a grave normative error. However, since these norms exist precisely to encode the dominance
of certain individuals and groups over others into naturalized law, we should not be surprised
that these norms characterize subordinated individuals and groups as permanently failing
according to this system, thus justifying systematic, brutal punishment.
Second, a traits-based view is well-positioned to be able to handle the evaluability of
macro-level social entities. I have already discussed the ways in which groups and cultures can
be interpreted as having traits. Importantly, recall here that it does not matter for the view
whether these entities do in fact have these traits--or even whether such entities can have traits at
all. What matters is whether the social entities are interpreted by the relevant others as having
the traits at hand.
The phenomenon of macro-level social entities being evaluable under gender norms
according to their perceived traits is well-documented. For example, Robin Zheng (2016) notes
the ways in which entire races are gendered; for example, Asians as a racialized group are coded
feminine “due to their purportedly shy, soft-spoken, submissive racial ‘essence’,” while Blacks
as a racialized group are coded masculine “due to their purportedly aggressive ‘essence’” (405406). Similarly, social psychologist Geert Hofstede (2001) argued that different societies,
ethnicities, and countries are gender-coded according to their perceived traits. According to
Hofstede, societies which prioritize achievement and organize structures around money and
things are “masculine,” while societies which prioritize nurture and organize structures around
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relationships are “feminine” (2001, 297-8). Again, it does not matter for my purposes whether
these societies in fact have these traits--or, for that matter, whether Hofstede’s taxonomy of
gender-coding is accurate. What is important is that we see the following pattern correctly
predicted by a traits-based view: Macro-level social entities, such as groups and societies, can be
interpreted as having traits, which are then coded as masculine or feminine. The entities are
thereby evaluable under the relevant gender norms.
3.4.3. Social construction. The account must be consistent with the basic metaphysical position
that gender is socially constructed.
It should be obvious from the discussion so far that a traits-based view meets this
desideratum. It does not suggest that gender is a part of any intrinsic, natural, or “pre-social”
features of individuals, groups, or humanity as a whole. It does, of course, suggest that we often
perceive these entities as having such features. For example, we may interpret entire races as
having “essential” features that are coded masculine or feminine (see again Zheng 2016).
However, such interpretations need not be posited as reliable trackers of real gendered features.
Rather, we are conditioned by a deeply gender-coded world to see such features everywhere. It is
beyond the scope of this view whether there is such a thing as an intrinsic, natural, or pre-social
trait. Again, I am not in the business of explaining why entities have the traits that they do. I am
arguing that certain traits--wherever they come from—are gender-coded by our social world.
In 3.4.1, I argued that it is a major advantage of a traits-based view that it can answer the
argument that cross-category norm responsiveness and social construction are incompatible,
because cross-category norm responsiveness suggests that certain responses to gender norms are
not socially learned but are rather innate or pre-social (see Serano 2007). I pointed out that a
traits-based view avoids this problem, by showing how those responses can be learned--via
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coherence pressure and vicarious learning. A traits-based view is therefore not only compatible
with social construction, but uniquely well-positioned to balance it with other desiderata.

3.4.4. Nonconsensual assignment: The account must capture the way that gender norms can exert
power over us without our participation or consent.
A traits-based view is clearly compatible with nonconsensual assignment. Insofar as we
do not choose which traits we express or are disposed to express--and have even less control over
the traits that we are perceived to have--we do not choose which norms apply to us and exert
power over us. Moreover, the gender-coding of our particular traits is also not a matter of
individual preference and choice, but is determined by one’s community and history.
Notice, however, that a traits-based view can allow that we have some participation in
this process, insofar as we do choose whether or how we express certain traits. For example,
certain traits of appearance, such as wearing makeup or having a full beard, are partially “up to
us;” insofar as we have access to the tools and capacities to express or not express these traits,
we can choose how to present ourselves for evaluation. Other traits are even more under our
control, such as the expression of our gendered self-identifications. In fact, there exist transinclusive domains of gender norms where self-identification is the core trait for particular gender
clusters. (This is still consistent with ascriptivism, insofar as the norms still apply because of the
practices of others with respect to one’s self-identification.) In these domains, the assignment of
gender norms is--or is at least working to be--consensual. The view therefore leaves open the
possibility that not all gender norm assignments are entirely nonconsensual, even if they are all
ascriptivist. Relatedly, subaltern communities may redefine gender-coding of particular traits, so
that, e.g. a full beard may no longer be coded masculine, but can be interpreted as neutral or even
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feminine (Vaid-Menon 2020, 111). I will say more about subaltern communities and gender
norms as resistance in 3.4.6.

3.4.5. Differential assignment and embodiment: the account must capture the intuitively obvious
fact that gender norms apply differently to different people, often on the basis of their observed
or imagined sexed body.
A traits-based view is fully consistent with this desideratum. Some of the most commonly
gendered traits are physical or embodied traits, particularly those associated with the sexed body:
genital structure, reproductive capacity, secondary sex characteristics, body shape and size,
chromosomes, and so on. These traits are often--though not always--at the core of dominant
clusters, sometimes operating under the aggregate label biological sex (as in the discussion of
Dembroff in 3.2). On a traits-based view, then, gender norms will very often apply differently to
different people on the basis of the sexed/embodied traits that they are observed or imagined to
have. Moreover, these will often be the most oppressive and inflexible gender norms, as physical
embodied traits are perceived to be stable or immutable.
A traits-based view has further advantages here. In particular, it leaves much room
for flexibility and nuance in explaining differential assignment that does not involve
embodiment. For one thing, it can explain the way that gender norms are assigned differently on
the basis of other features that have nothing to do with sexed embodiment, such as when
different people observed or imagined to have female-coded bodies are held to different
standards on the basis of their race, class, sexuality, and so on. Similarly, it can explain the way
that one’s sexed embodiment can be interpreted differently in different contexts. This is so
because traits, by their very nature, are often fluid, malleable, and interpreted differently in
different contexts. I will say more about this in 3.5.1.
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3.4.6. Oppression: the account must enable us to explain why many domains of gender norms,
particularly the hegemonic norms that are operative in dominant contexts, serve to justify and
enable oppression.
Throughout this project, I have discussed two prominent ways in which dominant gender
norms do this. First, they work to naturalize gender. As agents become habituated to following
gender norms, they come to do so automatically and without thinking. This makes the gendernormative behavior seem natural or intrinsic, and thus makes gender itself look natural or
intrinsic. Thus, gendered behavior appears as a basic feature of human nature, one that we
cannot, and perhaps should not, try to change. The behavior, and any oppressive effects it may
have, will therefore be justifiable as “natural” and thus treated as immutable and even
desirable.16 Second, and ironically, the apparent “naturalness” of normative gender coding and
norm clusters works to justify punishment of those who do not conform to them, on the grounds
that non-conformity is unnatural. This is also linked with desiderata 4 and 5. Given that the
physical traits of the body are believed to be fixed, pre-determined, and paradigmatically natural
(as in “natural woman”), non-coherence is often most viciously punishable when the clusters in
question are nonconsensually assigned on the basis of one’s body. Moreover, I have argued that
oppression on the basis of gender norms is visited against macro-level social entities, such as
groups and societies.
A traits-based view is consistent with habituation. Children learn that certain traits are
gender-coded, typically from a very early age. As they internalize the connection between trait
and norm, they learn that those who exhibit the trait should follow the associated norm. Over

Recall that, in Chapter 1, I explained that feminist social constructionism is largely motivated by the aim
of “debunking” this justification, in order to resist the claim that the oppressive effects of gender are
immutable or desirable.
16
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time, they become habituated to navigating a world where those norms apply. Moreover, on
many dominant gender norms, mutually exclusive and coherent gender clusters are enforced,
such that agents are likely to internalize coherence pressure and become habituated to
performing coherent clusters.
Moreover, a traits-based view is well suited to explain the way that macro-level social
entities are oppressed according to their perceived gender-coded traits. The prioritization of
white masculinity and all associated features (e.g. rationality, individualism, dominance) on
hegemonic systems of norms suggests that the interpretation of any features determined to be
non-white or non-masculine (inclusive) are appropriate for subordination. Thus, we can
understand the justification of colonial dominance in terms of the traits that non-colonial groups
and societies are interpreted to have. On a colonial gender system, there is a right and wrong way
of organizing the social world, and this is justified in part by associations with the broad-ranging,
traits-based gender norms.
One attractive further upshot of a traits-based view here is that it does not entail that all
gender norms are oppressive. Clustering need not be naturalized or enforced as brutal. (In fact,
gender norms need not cluster at all.) Therefore, it is in principle possible to have domains of
gender norms that do not enable and justify enforcement of norms that are nonconsensually
assigned on the basis of the sexed body. For example, the core traits of a cluster can allow for
consensual assignment, by including traits of self-identification or self-ascription. Moreover, the
clusters themselves can be modified to fit the needs of the community. For example, if some
society needs to make trans experience intelligible, the gender norms in play can cluster
according to the needs of those in that community.
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Luckily for anyone interested in such a project, it is already underway. Bettcher (2013)
points out that within queer and trans subcultures, gender and sex categories are fixed by selfidentification, and their features are defined by those who thereby identify. For example, Bailey
(2011) describes the normative gender practices at work in ballroom culture, queer and trans
communities of color which exist in most major cities in the U.S. According to Bailey, identities
and norms within these cultures are created out of twin needs: to make selves, bodies, and
gendered experiences intelligible to one another, and to navigate the possibility of punishment
and violence visited on the visibly queer in the broader world. The clusters that emerge are
therefore, specifically and by design, tools of resistance against oppressive gender norms. (I say
more about ballroom culture and resistant norms in Chapter 4.)
Some versions of the category-based view seem unfriendly to this possibility. For
example, on Haslanger’s (2012) view (understood very roughly), gender categories are
classifications that create an oppressive hierarchy on the basis of observed or imagined sexed
bodies. Gender norms exist exclusively to perpetuate and naturalize these categories. This view
suggests that gender norms are irredeemable. If gender norms depend metaphysically not just on
oppression, but specifically on nonconsensual assignment on the basis of the sexed body, the
possibility of resistant uses of gender norms seems strange. In fact, Haslanger cautions against
“theoretically appropriating” masculinity and femininity, on just these grounds (47). I worry,
however, that a view which builds oppressiveness into the very nature of gender norms has
problematic implications. On such a view, at best, all gender norms will force diverse individuals
into unnatural boxes for no good reason; at worst, they are fundamentally oppressive and
therefore cannot be used to “dismantle the master’s house,” as it were.
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A traits-based view, however, does not have these implications. Although I have avoided
making claims about the metaphysical nature or origin of gender norms (and will continue to do
so), a traits-based view is clearly very conducive to the possibility of resistant uses of gender
norms. That is, not only can it explain how many domains of gender norms are oppressive, it can
also allow that some domains are constructed not to be oppressive, and indeed specifically work
to resist oppression. I take this to be an attractive feature of the view.
I conclude that, not only can the traits-based view can meet all of the desiderata I have
identified, it also has further benefits for theorizing resistance against dominant gender norms. In
the next section, I will respond to objections against the view.

3.5. OBJECTIONS
In this section I consider three major objections against a traits-based view. Each objection will
suggest that a category-based view has the advantage in explaining particular features of gender
norms. I show how a traits-based view can answer each objection.

3.5.1. First, I consider the objection from multiplied categories. It might be argued that a
category-based view can explain all of the phenomena I am describing, simply by positing a wide
multiplicity of gender categories that are deeply context-dependent and vary according to other
features, such as race, sexuality, disability, various elements of context, and so on. That is, rather
than holding that the gender categories in play are just man and woman, perhaps they are more
fine-grained. For example, in the case of dominant colonial gender norms, perhaps it’s not that
Black and Brown colonized people were excluded from gender categorization altogether;
perhaps it’s that they were simply assigned to specifically subordinated gender categories within
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the system. That is, perhaps the categories at play were not just man and woman, but man
(white), woman (white), male (colonized, non-white), female (colonized, non-white), and so on-with increasing levels of granularity depending on the particular colonizing force and the
existing systems in the non-colonial society. In fact, at times Lugones seems to be suggesting
something like this in her earlier work (2007, 198-200). Similarly, perhaps Wilchins’
gendertrash is its own gender category, and the norms under which Wilchins and others are
evaluated are attached to this category.
Moreover, the objection might go, this account can explain certain features of gender
norms better than a traits-based view can do. Ásta (2018) sometimes appears to defend a view
which suggests this:
Consider this scenario: you work as a coder in San Francisco. You go into your office
where you are one of the guys. After work, you tag along with some friends at work to a
bar. It is a very heteronormative space, and you are neither a guy nor a gal. You are an
other. You walk up the street to another bar where you are a butch and expected to buy
drinks for the femmes. Then you head home to your grandmother’s eightieth birthday
party, where you help out in the kitchen with the other women while the men smoke
cigars. (2018, 73)
According to Ásta, this case demonstrates that the gender properties that are conferred on an
individual by others--e.g. the property of being a guy or a gal or a butch or a femme or an other-vary from context to context. Presumably, since this story is all happening in a single evening,
our protagonist displays similar traits in each of the contexts described here. Nevertheless, the
norms that apply to them seem to vary widely, even in different bars on the same street.
Similarly, we can assume that they are perceived to have the same sexed embodiment as many of
the others in this story. In the non-heteronormative bar, for example, the butches and femmes are
likely read as having similar sexed features. Again, however, the norms that apply vary
significantly. What could explain this? A defender of the category-based view might conclude
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the following: Gender norms are assigned on the basis of fine-grained and context-dependent
gender categories, such that one’s gender category can change between different bars on the
same street. At root, however, what explains the assignment of gender norms is the category into
which one is sorted, rather than the traits that one is perceived to have.
In responding, I first will note that I do not claim that there are not a multiplicity of finegrained, context-dependent categories. In general, I want to have as few commitments about the
nature of gender categories as possible. I am only committed to the claim that gender categories
do not explain gender norm assignment. So, it might be correct that one can change gender
categories going from one bar to another, and that there are multiple gender categories in play
relative to one’s other intersecting features and identities. But I do not think these categories can
explain the assignment of gender norms, for a few reasons.
First, I want to resist the specific claim that a category-based view can explain the
enforcement of gender norms on people ejected from the relevant categories. For example,
consider Lugones’ argument about those who are not included in the colonial categories “man”
and “woman”. Even if we hold that colonized people belonged to racialized subordinated gender
categories, Lugones is still very clear that the norms assigned to colonized people were grounded
in the standards assigned to dominant white colonizers. She writes:
Judging the colonized for their deficiencies from the point of view of the civilizing
mission justified enormous cruelty. I propose to interpret the colonized, non-human
males from the civilizing perspective as judged from the normative understanding of
‘‘man,’’ the human being par excellence. Females were judged from the normative
understanding of ‘‘women,’’ the human inversion of men. (2010, 744)
According to Lugones, colonized people are judged according to the normative standards
associated with the dominant categories man and woman. That is, even if there are different
gender categories for everyone within a colonial gender system, the norms themselves are
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applied from the “top” down. The problem remains: being ejected or barred from a dominant
gender category doesn’t entail not being evaluable under the associated norms. “Colonized
females” are judged specifically for being not women, where “woman” is a status only available
to white colonizers, and the purported features of women are the basis for the associated
normative standard. The norm assignment occurs on the basis of the not-women’s lack of gender
categorization as women, rather than the presence of an alternative categorization.
Relatedly, the move to a multiplicity of categories cannot explain the enforcement of
gender norms on those who are fully ejected from dominant categories--such as Wilchins’
“gendertrash,” or those who are, in Spillers’ terms, “ungendered.” Part of the specific harm that
is being articulated in these cases is the harm that comes from being removed from gender
classification. Spillers is very clear that the brutal violence visited on enslaved “flesh” is “not at
all gender-specific” (1987, 67). Moreover, Wilchins’ locution of “gendertrash” strongly suggests
something similar; their social punishment is a result of being thrown out or ejected from gender
altogether. Lopes (2019) argues that gender intelligibility is necessary for what she calls full
social standing, or the status of being able to stand in certain kinds of social relationships--even
the most basic ones--to other people. Being ungendered or gendertrash is particularly brutal
because it leaves one open to evaluation and punishment for failing to do gender correctly, even
as it makes that impossible by constructing them as outside of gendered intelligibility. If the
objection claims that these systems do in fact have gender classifications for “gendertrash” or
“the ungendered,” it misses the point.
In short, the category-based view trades on the thought that what is harmful or oppressive
about gender norms is the way in which they enforce gender norms on those who occupy a
subordinate category. But cases of non-inclusion or ungendering are not explained by positing
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that there are more subordinate categories than we originally thought. Rather, the thought is that
gender systems can oppress, not just by creating subordinate categories, but by removing some
people from categorization altogether, and then punishing them more harshly according to that
removal. Thus, it is partly the exclusion from categorization which enables gender norm
enforcement--and that cannot by explained by any number of gender categories.
Moreover, I think that the multiple-categories view is misguided, because it abandons the
key important attractive feature about a category-based view: its ontological simplicity. A
category-based view provides a parsimonious explanation for how gender norms are assigned to
individuals, one that easily explains certain commonalities across contexts (such as the
subordination of those perceived to have feminine-coded bodies). In order to accommodate the
objections I have raised, however, the multiplied-categories view will have to be maximally
flexible. It will have to allow that gender categories can vary widely in their natures, membership
conditions, and associated constellations of norms, based on a variety of intersecting features, as
well as context--that is, a huge constellation of disparate factors which share little or nothing in
common. But once a category-based view has conceded this, it loses that ontological
simplicity. It’s not clear what advantage there is here to positing a gender category. On this
view, we are left with something like the following: gender norms apply to people on the basis of
their gender category, which is conferred on the basis of some features they are interpreted as
expressing in the context. But, again, this is just the traits-based view with an extra step. Again,
why not cut out the middleman? What is the gender category really explaining?
It might still be objected that a multiple-categories view has better resources to explain a
case like Ásta’s, where the gender norms which apply to an individual change from context to
context. But I argue that a traits-based view has these resources as well. Traits, in general, are not
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interpreted in isolation. Rather, they are interpreted both in the context of the other traits one is
understood to have, and in the specific context in which they are expressed. Lugones (1987)
points to this phenomenon in her discussion of playfulness. While Lugones’ close friends insisted
that she was playful, her colleagues in academia maintained that she was not at all playful, and
was in fact very serious. She writes that “I was sure I had the attribute in question and, on the
other hand, I was sure that I did not have it. I remain convinced that I both have and do not have
this attribute” (9). On Lugones’ account, this is not a contradiction, but rather a function of the
way in which she was differently interpreted in different social worlds. Her personality did not
change, but others’ readings of her did—based not only on the context, but also on how her other
traits were perceived in that context. Lugones further writes of being understood as “intense” by
many white people, because they also interpret her as being Latin-American, and have
stereotypes about associations between being Latin-American and being intense (13). Certain
behaviors might not count as “intense” when expressed by a white person, but are counted that
way when expressed by Lugones, because of other traits that she has and the way the dominant
social world interprets them together. She therefore understood herself as both playful (in her
“home worlds”) and not playful (in dominant worlds).
Something similar can be true of gendered traits. Just as the same behavior can be
counted as “playful” or “not playful” depending on the world one is in and the other traits one is
perceived to have, certain behaviors or features can be counted as differently-coded traits, partly
in virtue of the world one is in and the other traits that one is perceived to have. It is therefore not
inconsistent with a traits-based view that Ásta’s protagonist would be subject to different norms
in different contexts. For example, at work they might be perceived to have a trait of intelligence,
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while in their traditionally gendered family home, those same behaviors might be perceived very
differently.
Finally, notice that a multiplied-categories view still leaves out the evaluability of macrolevel social entities. In order for a category-based view to explain this, it would have to say that
macro-level social entities, such as groups and societies, can belong to gender categories. But
that seems deeply implausible. To claim this would be to stretch the meaning (and certainly the
usefulness) of a gender category beyond recognition. At its root, a category-based view is
positioned to explain only how gender norms apply to individuals, because individuals are the
kinds of objects that belong to gender categories. It might be objected, then, that a categorybased view is only supposed to apply to individuals, and therefore it doesn’t need to explain how
gender norms are assigned to macro-level social entities. If that’s right, then a traits-based view
has a clear advantage over a category-based view here. It can do both.
I conclude that a multiplied-categories view fails to explain how gender norms work, and
that a traits-based view still has the theoretical advantage.

3.5.2 Second, I will consider the causal story objection. According to this objection, a categorybased view has the following explanatory advantage: It can give us a causal story about why
particular features of the world are gender-coded and others aren’t. This causal story generally
begins with categories that are assigned on the basis of reproductive functionality. For example,
Briggs & George (forthcoming) argue that gender phenomena are individuated “not by their
contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with categories that
were originally closely connected to sex biology” (2). That is, all genders and gender phenomena
(including gender norms) are descended with the “right sort of causal continuity” from
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“primordial” gender categories, which are constituted by, and assigned solely on the basis of, sex
biology (20-21). This is similar to what Witt (2011) describes as the engendering function of
gender categories. On a view like this, most societies have gender norms because they need to
organize the social world around reproductive functions. Thus, they create gendered social
positions (or gender categories) in order to delineate who plays what role. That is why those
social positions, and the associated norms, usually are assigned on the basis of reproductive
function. It also explains why gender norms typically tend to involve norms that are recognizable
as related to reproduction, such as chastity for women. ”The key point is that engendering is a
social function with two primary social positions, and the associated social roles are specified in
contrast to one another” (Witt 2011, 40). According to the causal story objection, it is intuitively
central to the existence of gender norms that they have some important causal connection to
reproductive roles. The category-based view can explain this and the traits-based view cannot.
This is a theoretical advantage for the category-based view.
I do not think this is a real problem, for three reasons. First, as both Briggs & George and
Witt acknowledge, even if there is a historical causal story related to sex biology about how
gender norms came to be, the norms themselves take on a life of their own. That is, wherever the
norms come from, I argue that they can become so separated from their origins that the causal
story gives us little important insight. Moreover, if the sex-based biology view is right, then the
origins of gender norms are so temporally removed from us that we likely have little epistemic
access to what Briggs & George call “primordial gender categories.” Even if these are the causal
origins of gender norms, why should we think those origins tell us how they work now?
Second, there are very many domains of gender norms, and not all of them have the same
causal origins. For example, if we take Lugones’ arguments about the coloniality of gender
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seriously, we get a causal story about many dominant domains of gender norms which merely
appears to be about sex biology, but really is about racialization, Eurocentricity, and global
control. In these cases, the “sex biology” explanation seems to be a smokescreen, meant to direct
our attention away from the real underlying functions of those norms. At the very least, this
shows us that gender norms may have many different causal origins. Why should we think that
all gender norms have the same unbroken causal chain stretching back to primordial times? That
is an empirical claim for which we do not have sufficient justification.
Third, even if it is conceded that gender norms do in fact have this causal chain and that a
view of gender norm assignment should be able to explain it, I don’t see why we need categories
to do this. The views considered above assume that, since gender norms tend to occur together
with gender categories, and gender categories seem importantly connected to reproductive
function, it must be the case that the reproductive functions lead to the construction of the
categories and the categories generate the norms. But I don’t see why this follows. We might
think, instead, that both gender norms and gender categories are caused by some third factor.
That is, perhaps “gender” is a broad and multifaceted system of social organization that has
various features, including both norms and categories. Suppose that this system of social
organization does often have some important connection to reproductive biology; a “gender
system” is however the society organizes itself and its values in connection with reproduction.
Within this system, certain traits, such as the ability to seed or bear children, are very important.
These traits therefore take on various kinds of normative significance within the society. They
might, for example, become the core of normative clusters that are associated with various roles
in child-rearing. Those clusters can take on the further the ontological significance of a gender
category. Alternatively, these traits might also take on independent normative value, such as via
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association with divinity. But none of the above suggests that we need to involve gender
categories in the story.
Taken together, these three responses are sufficient to reject the causal story objection. I
conclude that the objection fails.

3.5.3 The final point I want to consider is not an objection to my positive view so much as it is
an objection to my wholesale rejection of the category-based view. It goes as follows: Even if we
accept the claim that a category-based view cannot explain the experiences of marginalized
people, we need not jettison it altogether. Perhaps a traits-based view is trying to do too much.
Why should we not be be pluralists about gender norm assignment? That is, why not hold that
gender norms are sometimes assigned on the basis of gender categories and sometimes on the
basis of gender-coded traits? There are perhaps good reasons to think this. For example, gender
categories sometimes seem critical in explaining how gender norms are enforced; people will
say, for example, that boys don’t cry or that girls should be polite. Why not think that a traitsbased view explains some cases while a category-based view explains others, and adopt both? I
will call this the why not both objection.17
In response, let me first say that, if this objection works, most of my view remains intact.
At worst, I can bite this bullet. Instead of recommending replacement of the category-based
view, I could simply adjust and say that the traits-based view supplements the category-based
view. That is, even in this objection were to succeed, it would not be so bad for my position.
However, I don’t think the objection does succeed. I concede that it sometimes appears
that gender categories are important in explaining the assignment of gender norms. However,
17

Thanks to Emily Tilton for this objection and name.
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that is easily explained by a traits-based view. This sheds light on one further attractive feature of
a category-based view. My description of traits includes a wide variety of descriptive features,
including those which are often associated with a gender category--such as thinking of oneself as
a woman or being called a boy by others. As a result of enforced coherence, these traits will very
often occur together with other traits, such as physical features or gendered behaviors. When it is
said that boys don’t cry, for example, we can understand this as claiming the following: those
who have traits like being called a boy, having a masculine-coded body, etc., should not also
have traits such as crying. This is non-coherence--perhaps of a particularly vicious sort, since
being called a boy and having a penis are at the core of many dominant clusters. Because these
count as traits, it will still come out as true that the things which are taken to ground gender
categories (such as sexed body, self-ascription, and so on) do in fact play a role in gender norm
assignment. That is, a traits-based view can not only describe many things that a category-based
view cannot, it can also describe everything that a category-based view can--but without the
theoretical baggage.
If one is a nominalist about gender categories, perhaps this is enough for a version of the
pluralistic view to succeed. That is, if gender categories are what they are because they are all
picked out by the same term, then perhaps a traits-based view just encompasses a category-based
view here, because having a gender category will just be a trait (specifically, the trait of being
called a woman, a man, etc.). I have no issue with that outcome. What I want to resist, however,
is the claim that gender norms are assigned on the basis of an entity’s ontological status as a
member of a substantive gender category, rather than on the basis of perceived traits--that
is, bare descriptive facts about that entity. This seems both unnecessary and, insofar as it bogs us
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down in the weeds of category-based metaphysics, distracting. We can do all of the necessary
explanatory work without making this move.
In short, I think that each of these possible rejoinders from the perspective of a categorybased view fails. I conclude that a traits-based view is the best available explanation for the
assignment of gender norms to entities in the social world.

3.6. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have outlined my positive view about how gender norms come to exert
force over entities in the social world; the traits-based view. I began by articulating six desiderata
for such a view: it should explain (1) responsiveness to gender norms, (2) evaluability under
gender norms, (3) social construction of gender norms, (4) nonconsensual assignment of gender
norms, (5) differential assignment of gender norms often on the basis of sexed embodiment, and
(6) oppressiveness of gender norms. I then described the traits-based view at length. On a traitsbased view, entities (such as individuals, groups or societies) are responsive to and evaluable
under gender norms because of the traits they are perceived to display. Traits are understood as
bare descriptive facts, like wearing a dress, having ovaries, or exerting force in pursuit of one’s
interests. Particular traits are gender-coded as either masculine or feminine; if one has the trait,
one is expected to follow the norm. What matters for gender norm assignment is not whether the
entity in fact has the trait, but whether they are perceived to have the trait by others. Gender
norms often cluster around particular traits which serve socially relevant functions, such as
reproduction or food preparation. When this happens, cluster coherence is may be normatively
enforced. That is, traits which “match” a particular cluster are expected to “cohere” or occur
together, and non-coherence is punished to varying degrees.
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I discussed how this view can meet the six desiderata I have identified. In doing so, I
drew out further elements of the traits-based view, including the nuances of how it is consistent
with internalization/habituation, and some possibilities it offers for theorizing resistance to
dominant norms. Finally, I considered three objections to the traits-based view: the objection
from multiplied categories, the causal story objection, and the why not both? objection. Each
objection argued, from various perspectives, that the category-based view has an explanatory
advantage over the traits-based view. In each case, I gave reasons to think that the categorybased view does not, in fact, have any such advantage. I concluded that the traits-based view is a
better available explanation for the phenomena at hand.
In the next chapter, I will explore what it means for a gender norm to be authoritative
over one’s conduct. Drawing from the existentialist tradition, I will articulate a notion of
authenticity on which gender norms can be authentic while also being socially constructed. I
argue that authenticity has normative authority over our conduct. Thus, gender norms can give us
authoritative reasons to act.
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CHAPTER 4: AUTHENTICITY AND NORMATIVE AUTHORITY

4.0. INTRODUCTION
In his autobiography, Becoming a Man, P. Carl describes his experience navigating the
demands of masculinity as a transgender man. He writes,
I am in one way “becoming” a man. But in another way, I have always been one,
and I’m trying out all the ways to live as one, some good, some bad. One night I was in a
Lyft talking to a guy who was a dental technician trying to join the Navy. He told me he
was doing it “for his woman.” “I think she’s the one,” he said tentatively. “They only
want your money, and I’ve told her I haven’t got any, but I’m making her sign a prenup
anyway.”
I heard myself say “Yeah, man, I feel you—all that bullshit about women’s
rights.” He laughed and said “Yeah, you know, my man, you know what I’m saying.” I
tipped him $10 and gave him five stars for letting me indulge my inner sexist jerk. (Carl
2020a)
This story will evoke a familiar, complicated feeling for many readers. Most of us find ourselves
subject to gender norms which demand that we behave in ways that are bad, for us or for other
people. Many gender norms are patriarchal, hierarchical, racist, sexist, and cisnormative; they
recommend behavior contrary to our moral sensibilities, our self-interest, our preferences or
needs. As discussed in Chapter 2, transgender (trans) and gender-nonconforming (GNC) people
often find ourselves responsive to gender norms which ostensibly have not been assigned to us.
Moreover, many such norms are deeply flawed in ways of which we are (painfully) aware.
Nevertheless, these norms can feel right; they can feel like ours in a way that the assigned norms
never did. Put differently: many trans and GNC people experience ourselves as caught between
normative standards, where morality, self-interest, or social expectations pull in one direction,
but a deep and powerful sense of authenticity pulls in another.
In Chapter 3, I argued that people are responsive to gender norms because of the traits
that they are disposed to express. I noted that, for many people, this may mean being responsive
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to multiple sets of norms. For example, a transmasculine person might experience himself as
responsive both to norms of masculinity and femininity, insofar as he has or is disposed to
express traits that are masculine-coded and traits that are feminine-coded. However, this leaves
behind a lingering worry in terms of explaining the experiences of trans and GNC people. For
many of us, there is a distinctive normative difference between our experiences of
responsiveness to different gender norms. Some varieties of norm responsiveness (often, to
norms that match our assigned categories) feel perfunctory and instrumental. We follow them
because we understand that we will face sanctions (disappointment, censure, violence, and so on)
if we do not. Nevertheless, through long habit, we may still become habituated to following
them and feel responsive to them. For example, Wilchins (1997) writes:
To avoid displaying any of the “inappropriate” and prohibited signs about myself, I
policed myself from feeling them, lest I give myself away with a gesture, a stance, or
anything that would allow others to single me out and make me a target for social
retribution…. At certain junctures I didn’t need to police myself; there didn’t seem to be
any choice. I acted “masculine” in those circumstances not because I was forced to, but
because that seemed, in some inexpressible way, to be what I was. (132)
However, other varieties of norm responsiveness (often, the norms that do not match our
assigned categories) feel like they have authority over us; they "really" tell us what to do or give
us reasons to act, in ways that guide us beyond, and sometimes even in conflict with, our fear of
sanctions. This difference seems normatively significant. In this chapter, I argue that this sense
of normative authority is explained by the authenticity of certain norms. Since authenticity has
normative authority over our conduct, authentic norms can be reason-giving in a way that other
norms may not be.
Most dominant gender norms are poor standards for conduct. Macroscopically, the norms
encoded in dominant cultural practices encode a system of colonial gender hierarchy into
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practical law, and thereby provide guidelines for the enforcement of that hierarchy.
Microscopically, the demands of particular gender norms often conflict with what is morally
good, or good for us as individuals. For example, some dominant norms of masculinity excuse
violence and misogynistic behavior but discourage healthy emotional development, while
corresponding norms of femininity promote passivity and self-abnegation. This creates a “boys
will be boys” cultural context where masculinity is bound up with misogyny and poor mental
health, while femininity encourages tolerance of bad behavior by privileged men at a cost to
oneself. As Carl’s account demonstrates, this context makes it difficult to be masculine and
morally good—or to be feminine and maintain a healthy self-interest. For those of us with both
feminist commitments and a persistent sense of the authenticity of certain gender norms,
navigating this territory is a persistent theoretical, ethical, and practical challenge.
I hold that this felt sense of authenticity tracks something real. Gender norms, including
harmful or oppressive gender norms, can be authentic for a person. This is potentially
complicated by the fact that, as I have articulated in previous chapters, I am committed to the
claim that gender norms are socially constructed, and, moreover, that many domains of gender
norms are oppressive. If a gender norm is oppressive, then in many cases, following it will
encourage one to do things that are morally or prudentially bad. Under these conditions, what
does it mean for a gender norm to be experienced as authentic? What is the relationship between
authenticity and other normative standards such that something morally or prudentially bad could
be authentic? If some gender norms are morally or prudentially bad, can they nevertheless give
us reasons to act?
These questions arise for anyone who experiences gender norms as authentic, regardless
of whether those norms were assigned to them at birth. Trans and GNC people are not “problem
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cases” here; gender norms affect nearly everyone. However, this inquiry will center trans and
GNC people, for two reasons. First, the need to explain gender norm authenticity is more
pertinent for those who do not fit comfortably into dominant gender categories and are brutally
punished for it. Attending to our experiences of gendered authenticity can be the difference
between finding the social and hermeneutical resources one needs to have a livable life, or not.
Second, and pursuant to the first, many subaltern trans and GNC communities have engaged in
important work towards solving the practical dilemmas created by gender norms. The discursive
and normative practices present in many such communities therefore represent important sites of
resistance to the harms of dominant norms.
In short, many (though by no means all) trans and GNC people experience some gender
norms as authentic for us. However, the nature of this authenticity remains unclear. A better
understanding is needed to make sense of these experiences and the prominent role they play in
self-understanding and practical deliberation. Moreover, as I will show, certain interpretations of
these experiences characterize them as anti-feminist. I will argue that this is a mistake which
rests on confusions about the nature of authenticity as well as a mischaracterization of trans
subjectivity.
The primary goal of this chapter is to get clear about what is being said when trans and
GNC people claim that gender norms are authentic for us, in order both to explain how these
norms can be reason-giving for us, and to demonstrate the lack of tension between these claims
and central commitments in feminist philosophy. I defend the following main thesis:
Gender Norm Authenticity. Gender norms can be authentic for a person, and thereby
generate authoritative normative reasons for that person to act, even though some gender
norms are morally or prudentially bad, and all are socially constructed.
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I take Gender Norm Authenticity to be a desirable position for anyone interested in theorizing
inclusively about gender liberation. To support this claim while maintaining key commitments
from feminist philosophy, I defend the following two claims:
Social Authenticity. Authenticity is a project of constructing an intelligible self out of
available materials from one’s social context.
Authoritative Authenticity. Authenticity has normative authority over our conduct, but
this does not mean the actions it recommends are (morally or prudentially) good.
On Social Authenticity, social phenomena can be authentic insofar as they are “owned” and
incorporated into one’s self-concept in the right way, an active and constructive process. I draw
here from a family of views in existentialist philosophy, such as those defended by Heidegger
(1962), Taylor (1991), and Guignon (2004). On Authoritative Authenticity, authenticity gives us
powerful reasons to do what is authentic for us, even if there are other powerful reasons (such as
moral or prudential reasons) not to do it. Together, these claims capture trans and GNC
expressions of authenticity, while allowing that gender norms are socially constructed and that
many domains of gender norms conflict with morality or prudence.
In 4.1, I articulate the apparent tension between commitments in feminist philosophy and
Gender Norm Authenticity. I identify two important claims about gender norms in feminist
metaphysics, and show how authenticity claims are sometimes taken to challenge both. In 4.2, I
present Social Authenticity as a plausible positive view and show how it is already implicit in
many trans and GNC narratives. In 4.3, I defend Authoritative Authenticity. I outline three ways
of thinking about authenticity as a normative standard, and show how, on each view, authenticity
need not be always morally good or good for us. In 4.4, I defend Gender Norm Authenticity. I
synthesize preceding sections to outline the way gender norms can be authentic and thus
authoritative over individuals’ conduct, even when those norms are the appropriate target of
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feminist critique. I articulate the practical dilemmas this can generate. I argue that these
dilemmas are faced by all who function in a non-ideal world, and that trans and GNC people
regularly do material, epistemic, and discursive work to solve them by creating spaces for agency
and self-understanding within trans worlds of sense. In 4.5, I conclude with a brief discussion of
authenticity’s role in gender liberation.

4.1 FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY AND GENDER NORMS
In this section I articulate the apparent tension between key commitments in feminist
philosophy and authenticity claims about gender norms, or “authenticity claims” for short. While
authenticity claims are by no means universal in trans narratives, they are common—particularly
when we talk about discovering, exploring, or constructing identities. People might talk of being
real or true to themselves, or of reflecting who they really are in body, dress, presentation,
comportment, name, pronouns, and so on. Gender norms are often divided into standards of
masculinity and femininity. For example, imagine a black-tie event in New York City, where
the feminine norm recommends wearing a gown and the masculine norm recommends wearing a
tuxedo. An authenticity claim here might be the following: “I know that I am supposed to wear a
gown to this event, but wearing a tuxedo feels more like me.” Or: “I won’t be wearing a dress
tonight, because that’s not who I am.” Statements like this are often central to public-facing trans
narratives. For example, the March 2021 issue of TIME Magazine features transmasculine actor
Elliot Page on the cover, dressed in traditionally masculine clothes and sneakers, and sporting a
flat chest and a short haircut, with a quotation which reads “I’m fully who I am” (Steinmetz
2021). Put simply: Authenticity claims hold that some gender norm or set of norms is or is not
authentic for you, that the force of that norm is or is not “true” or “real” for you.
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Broadly speaking, gender norms are the evaluative standards associated with gender:
they are the expectations, constraints and enablements, and spoken and unspoken rules which
apply to individuals in virtue of their position in gendered social space. Since gender practices
vary widely across cultures and contexts, gender norms do as well. However, feminist analysis
has paid special attention to what I call dominant gender norms. Dominant gender norms are the
norms which operate in the mainstream cultural contexts that exert power over the vast majority
of social and material resources. That is, they are the gender norms operative in what Lugones
(2007) calls the “colonial/modern gender system”—a division of resources and roles according
to hierarchical, constructed categories of sex and race. Due to a legacy of imperialism,
psychological oppression, and epistemic violence, dominant gender norms infiltrate lives, minds,
and practical decision procedures across contexts, even when we work to escape or resist them.
As a result, many trans and GNC people are forced to grapple with dominant gender norms in
order to make sense of ourselves and our experiences. We are raised in dominant contexts and
shaped by them; we may have work, family, or other practical responsibilities there. In short,
although dominant gender norms are not the only game in town, they are often the most powerful
and pernicious.
As discussed, feminist philosophy has historically criticized dominant gender norms for
contributing to the oppression of women. For example, Young (1980) argues that the
enforcement of feminine norms in dominant post-industrial societies trains women to treat their
body as a “fragile encumberance” (144), something to be “looked at and acted upon” rather than
lived through (148); this creates a restricted and awkward mode of existence and restricts
women’s embodied agency. Similarly, Manne (2017) argues that the primary function of
feminine norms is to circumscribe and enforce a subordinate social role for women and girls
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across contexts. Moreover, Black feminists such as hooks (1982), Spillers (1987), and Collins
(2000) have argued that gender norms have distinctively racialized harms. Black women have
historically been subjected to strict codes of femininity, while at the same time being
systematically represented in stereotypes which fail at those standards, so that it is “extremely
difficult and oftentimes impossible for the black female to develop a positive self-concept”
(hooks, 1982, 86).
More broadly, feminist philosophers have criticized dominant gender norms for being
oppressive at root. As Lugones (2007, 2010) and others have argued, dominant gender practices
are rooted in colonialism, and thus in the subordination of non-white colonized peoples. They
also subordinate white women, although the experience of white women is integrated with racial
privilege, and thus differs substantially both in kind and in level of brutality from the
subordination of colonized peoples. Dominant gender norms maintain racist colonial structures
of power by designating heteronormative whiteness as central to good gender performance, and
thus to full humanity; non-white peoples are brutally punished for failing to conform to norms
from which they are categorically excluded (Lugones, 2007, 205; see also Spillers, 1987;
Espiritu, 1997). Within this framework, gender norms function to justify and reify interlocking
systems of oppression across the colonized world.
We might conclude here, as many feminist philosophers have done, that we ought to
eliminate, or at least change, these norms. But if it’s true that we ought to change or eliminate
them, it must also be true that we can. There is a widespread belief that gender-normative
behavior is innate or essential to human existence, and thus cannot be changed. But this conflicts
with social constructionism, which I have identified as a key feminist position, and thus a basic
commitment of this project. As discussed in Chapter 1, feminists are therefore often engaged in
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what Haslanger calls the debunking project (Haslanger 2012, Ásta 2018). To recap: the
debunking project arises from a normative position about the badness of dominant gender norms,
together with the metaphysical position that they are socially constructed. Debunking social
constructionists “argue that the rituals or practices in question are unjust and should not be
maintained in their current form and that the supposed metaphysical or natural justification for
them is misguided” (Haslanger, 2012, 127). The aim is “to show that certain claims to objectivity
are unfounded and that any social organization based on such claims is thus unjustified” (Ásta,
2018, 58). The debunking project therefore makes a normative claim that dominant gender
norms ought to be changed or eliminated, because they are both bad in themselves and bad for
people who follow them. Concordantly, it makes a descriptive claim that gender norms can be
changed or eliminated, because they are socially constructed, rather than essential and
inescapable facts about human nature.
Authenticity claims in dominant contexts appear to raise difficulties for a debunking
project, for two reasons. Consider, first, the debunkers’ descriptive claim that gender norms are
socially constructed. The notion of authenticity is sometimes taken to appeal to one’s “inner
self,” and to locate what is authentic for a person within that self. This inner self is understood as
innate, immutable, and socially unmediated. If this is right, then authenticity claims about gender
norms suggest that those norms are somehow innate, immutable, and socially unmediated. A
debunking view, which places gendered phenomena in the external social world, precludes this
understanding.
On the other hand, if gender norms are socially constructed, it is hard to make sense of
authenticity claims. To see this more clearly, we can reverse the dialectic. A gender essentialist
has an easy explanation for claims about gender norm authenticity. They can simply say that
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people have essentially gendered features, and those features motivate people to respond to
gender norms; one’s “internal gender” matches up with some external norms. On this view,
masculinity and femininity are essential features of the self, and the social aspects of gender,
such as gender norms, arise out of a translation of those essential features into socially
intelligible characteristics. This need not entail that gendered features are related to biological
sex. For example, recall that Serano (2007) holds that there are essential masculine and feminine
inclinations which occur irrespective of sex: “While variations in our sex characteristics and
gender inclinations may occur naturally, the way we interpret those traits, and the identities and
meanings we associate with them, can vary significantly from culture to culture” (101).
This would spell trouble for a debunking project. If individuals across contexts have
innate, essential features that just happen to match up with socially constructed gender norms,
that is either a stunning coincidence, or strong evidence that gender norms are importantly
connected to innate, essential features of humans. But social constructionists deny just this. Put
this way, it seems the essentialist has a better explanation of gender norm authenticity than the
social constructionist does; gender norms feel authentic because they are the social expressions
of deep, essential gendered features of individuals. This objection has been raised by trans
theorists such as Serano (2007) and Prosser (1998). If authenticity is wedded to essentialism, and
gender norms can be authentic, then something about gender must be essential. Conversely, if
authenticity is wedded to essentialism, and gender is not essential, authenticity claims about
gender norms either point to a truly remarkable pattern of coincidence, or they seem
straightforwardly false. Either way, authenticity claims seem inimical to social constructionism.
The second apparent tension between the debunking project and authenticity claims is
normative. Recall the debunker’s normative claim; dominant gender norms ought to be changed
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or eliminated. Authenticity is often understood as a moral notion. What is authentic is thereby
taken to be good. To claim that any norm is authentic, then, seems to entail that it doesn’t need to
be changed or eliminated. Then, if the authenticity claims in question are about dominant gender
norms, they are incompatible with the debunker’s normative claim.
One immediate answer to this challenge is to point out that not all gender norms are
created equal. While dominant gender norms are oppressive and harmful, other domains may
escape, or even be constructed specifically to resist, these oppressions and harms. For example,
drawing from Lugones’ work on worlds of sense (1987), Bettcher (2014) argues that there are
resistant trans contexts in which we negotiate “alternative gender practices” that center trans
experience and subjectivity (389-90). In these worlds of sense, domains of gender norms—
masculinities, femininities, or other standards altogether—may arise that are non-coercive, nonhierarchical, and non-oppressive. They may center rather than marginalizing trans experience;
they may actively resist norms of whiteness and coloniality; they may prioritize selfunderstanding and authenticity rather than gendered and racialized hierarchy.18 Many
authenticity claims draw on the gender norms produced in these worlds. To ignore the rich
histories of trans and GNC communities and interpretive practices is to actively misunderstand a
great deal of trans and GNC subjectivity and self-understanding.
However, not all trans or GNC experience of gender norms is grounded in alternative
worlds. Among the most difficult challenges many of us face is the fact that dominant, harmful
gender norms have power over us and our choices. Consider, for example, P. Carl’s account of

For example, Marion (2011) describes alternative normative practices which arise from ballroom
communities. According to Marion, gender practices in these communities actively subvert and resist
dominant gender norms to create space for queer and trans subjectivity, as well as to prepare participants
to move through dominant worlds. I say more about ballroom culture in successive sections.
18
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responding to the demands of a toxic masculinity (Carl 2020a, 2020b). Carl describes himself, a
feminist with a PhD in gender studies, as nevertheless grappling with the persistent sense that
harmful, misogynistic, white American masculinity is a part of him—something he must reckon
with to understand and communicate himself as a man.
Similarly, recall again Mock’s account of her early experiences of femininity:
Like most teen girls (whether they’re trans or cis), I had a vision board of my ideal,
pulled mostly from the pop-culture images that MTV had fed me. I wanted Halle Berry’s
or Tyra Banks’s breasts, Britney Spears’s midsection, Beyoncé’s curvy silhouette and
long hair, and I prayed that I wouldn’t grow any taller so I didn’t tower over the petite
Asian girls who were the barometer of beauty in the [Hawaiian] islands. (Mock, 2014,
122-3)
The norms Mock is describing are not drawn from subaltern, trans-friendly standards, but
straightforwardly dominant standards guided by “pop-culture” and “MTV.” This demonstrates
that, insofar as trans and GNC people find that certain gender norms resonate with us, this can
sometimes occur in dominant worlds. Most of us are not born and raised in resistant contexts.
The gender norms with which we have formative experiences are, very often, not expansive,
inclusive, or affirming, but restrictive, exclusionary, and coercive. As such, authentic selfunderstanding can require reckoning with the power these experiences have over who we are.
Put simply, while many authenticity claims are about gender norms that are not
the appropriate subjects of feminist critique, some are. As Carl and Mock both demonstrate, it’s
not as if trans and GNC people don’t know this. We are deeply, materially, brutally aware that
the dominant gender norms which sometimes shape our choices are harmful. Nevertheless, many
of us have had the unsettling experience of feeling as if some dominant gender norm, a piece of a
hegemonic and harmful system of which we are often the most prominent victims, is an authentic
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part of us. What appears as a theoretical conflict for feminist philosophy is therefore matched by
a genuine practical dilemma for many trans and GNC people.
In the next section, I reject popular “inner self” views of authenticity as implausible, and,
drawing from existentialist views defended by Heidegger (1962), Taylor (1991), and Guignon
(2004), articulate a view of authenticity as socially embedded. I show that what I call social
authenticity is already implicit in many trans and GNC narratives. This will dissolve a tension I
have identified between commitments in feminist philosophy and trans and GNC authenticity
claims. Since authenticity is a socially embedded phenomenon, authenticity claims about gender
norms do not entail the claim that gender norms are not socially constructed.

4.2. SOCIAL AUTHENTICITY
The intuitive idea of authenticity, in the words of Bernard Williams, is “the idea that
some things are in some real sense really you, or express what you [are], and others aren’t”
(Jeffries, 2002). Colloquial definitions include “being true to oneself” or “being who one really
is.” Terms like “true” and “really” are sometimes taken to suggest the presence of something
distinct from one’s outward performances, which are false or façade. According to Guignon
(2004), this “modern ideal of authenticity,” as defended by cultural figures such as Oprah and
Dr. Phil, relies on a presupposition that “lying within each individual, there is a deep, ‘true
self’—the ‘Real Me’—in distinction from all that is not really me” (3). This “true self” consists
of innate, socially unmediated traits which represent “who you really are”. To live authentically,
one must “find” or “get in touch with” oneself—indicating that there is something covered or
hidden, with which one can be out of touch, and which exists apart from the influence of
corrupting external factors such as relationships and social roles.
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This picture is unsatisfying. Given humanity’s deeply social nature, philosophers have
questioned our epistemic access to this core self—if indeed there would be any recognizable
“self” left after all of the “external” factors are stripped away (Adorno, 1973; Rorty, 1989).
Others have argued that the “core self” is not merely a fiction, but a harmful one. Foucault
(1983) argues that the myth of the hidden self encourages the individual to waste time trying to
find it, rather than engaging in the crucial project of creating the self. Taylor (1991) argues that
the notion of authenticity as self-fulfillment, understood as discovering and satisfying one’s deep
desires, is self-indulgent. Furthermore, Guignon (2004) notes themes in art, literature, and
philosophy suggesting that humans are not fundamentally good or pure, but that “what lies
within is characterized by aggression, cruelty and violence” (54). That is, even if there is a “pregiven self,” perhaps it is something we don’t want to be true to.
What I am calling the “inner-self view” is deeply implausible. As such, I argue that it is
uncharitable at best to represent all authenticity claims as presupposing it. Many trans and GNC
people understand our relationship to gender and gender norms as deeply embedded in and
influenced by our upbringing and culture—and no less authentic or real for it. Consider, for
example, Janet Mock’s understanding of her own identity:
I am aware that identifying with what people see versus what’s authentic, meaning who I
actually am, involves erasure of parts of myself, my history, my people, my
experiences.... When I think of identity, I think of our bodies and souls and the influences
of family, culture, and community—the ingredients that make us. (Mock, 2014, 249)
Mock does not understand her authenticity as stripping away her social context in order to
uncover a gendered inner self. Rather, she describes her authentic self as in part made of social
context; her history, people, experiences. This process is not seen as stable or complete, but as
ongoing and constructive (230). At the same time, her authenticity is fundamentally in tension
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with certain social expectations. Mock’s identity as a Black trans woman is a way of representing
herself as intelligible to others in dominant contexts; but this process requires obscuring elements
of herself, and thus is never fully authentic. Mock’s understanding of authenticity here is
consistent with an intuitive understanding of authenticity as distinguishing what is one’s own or
what is true to oneself from what is not, while at the same time reflecting the socially embedded
nature of the self.
To make sense of the richness and complexity of gendered experience, our philosophical
view of authenticity ought to capture both of these features. I propose, then, that we adopt a view
I call “social authenticity,” on which the authentic self is constituted by a certain kind of
relationship to one’s social roles, relationships, and commitments. Views like this are defended
by many in the existentialist tradition, particularly Heidegger (1962), Taylor (1991), and
Guignon (2004). In what follows, I will articulate some common commitments among these
views, and show how they satisfy these desiderata.
For Heidegger, humans are constitutively social beings. We do not exist prior to or apart
from our situations. Rather, we “always-already” find ourselves embedded in a social context,
with a past, a perspective, and roles, tendencies, and traits, all of which come loaded with social
meanings. Indeed, the expression “find ourselves” is misleading; we do not find our “selves” as
pre-given entities, but are constantly making ourselves through our decisions. We must then
choose whether to take responsibility for these decisions, or not. As Carman (2003) puts it, “I am
handed my existence, but then I have to face up to it or not: ‘To be or not to be’“ (289).
Heidegger’s word for “authenticity”, Eigentlichkeit, is perhaps best translated as
“owning” or “being one’s own” (Varga and Guignon, 2020). For Heidegger, authenticity is
constructing oneself in accordance with one’s “that-for-the-sake-of-which”—one’s overarching
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narrative, or life project. It is easy enough to get lost in the “average everydayness” and to just do
“what one does;” this is inauthentic, and according to Heidegger, most of us are inauthentic most
of the time. But authenticity does not require separating oneself from these concerns. Everyday
tasks are done authentically insofar as they are “owned.” I am authentic insofar as I recognize
my activities, concerns, relationships, and roles as mine, done “for-the-sake-of” my life project,
and insofar as I am willing to commit to and defend them as my own. Authenticity is a matter of
“owning up to the concrete situation in which one finds oneself and understanding one’s being
explicitly as one’s own” (Carman, 2003, 297).
In a similar vein, Taylor (1991) argues that human life is fundamentally shared:
We become human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining an
identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression… The genesis of
the human mind is in this sense not “monological,” not something each accomplishes on
his or her own, but dialogical. (33)
Taylor holds that the self is shaped by the background of values and meanings against which it is
formed. The authentic self is therefore not an entity, but a process. In this process, one navigates
the practical realities of existing as a somewhat disjointed socially embedded first-person
perspective with an always-already existing plethora of everyday concerns, while concurrently
trying to make sense of that existence. We aren’t most like ourselves apart from our social
context; rather, we are made of context, or, rather, constantly making ourselves from context.
The “true self” of authenticity is not radically distinguished from the social world. It is a product
and a part of the social world.
One might worry that this picture generates what Korsgaard (2009) calls the “paradox of
self-constitution.” How can we understand this project of making oneself, unless there is already
a “self” there prior to the making to do the making? That is, how can one be “a craftsman who is,
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mysteriously, his own product” (Korsgaard, 2009, 42)? In a post on social media coming out as
trans, actor Elliot Page appears to evoke this concern when he writes “I can’t begin to express
how remarkable it feels to finally love who I am enough to pursue my authentic self” (Page,
2020). Here, Page is describing themself as both already being someone—that is, already having
a self—and also beginning to pursue an authentic self. They do not, however, seem bothered by
the paradox of self-constitution, and their phrasing can help us explain why. We can distinguish
here between a broad class of facts about oneself, and the authentic subset of those facts.
Authenticity is about owning up to and standing up for what may already be facts about oneself.
When Page writes that he loves who he is (present), we can interpret him as saying that he loves
his broader self; his traits, his values, and the other facts that constitute him. When they write
that they mean to pursue their authentic self (future), we can interpret them as saying that they
mean to own parts of themself which they have previously denied, a process which will help
them make sense of themself.
It is important to recognize that social authenticity does not entail the view that the self is
entirely freely chosen or “up to us.” There is certainly an element of choice here—as Heidegger
puts it, a “choosing to choose a kind of being-one’s self” (1962, 314). Every choice I make is a
choice about what kind of person I want to be. However, these choices are constrained by my
facticity, or the set of social and psychological facts which constrain my options. I may be able to
choose whether to marry Frida or Fred, but I cannot fully choose the implications of this choice,
its effect on the world around me, or even what it means for my own emotions and dispositions.
Moreover, one’s choices have value only against background conditions of intelligibility—what
Taylor (1991) calls “horizons of significance.” For our choices to be meaningful, they must work
with existing social meanings that others in our social milieu can understand and interpret. To
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choose authentically, then, I must be aware: both of the significance of each choice, and that the
choice itself is significant; it constitutes me. My choice is free, but not unmoored.
A key feature of the social view, then, is that authenticity requires a relatively clear-eyed
understanding of one’s own history, psychology, and relationship to others. One must know
one’s situation in order to choose well. Moreover, one be aware of one’s own possibilities and
limitations as one always-already finds them to be. Call this the epistemic condition on
authenticity. You cannot own your facticity unless you know what it is you are owning.
However, an awareness of facticity does not commit us to merely accepting the world we
are given. Ortega (2005) points out that our horizons of significance tend to be deeply flawed.
We often “inherit certain possibilities that should not be repeated; we are members of
communities with a past full of bloodshed, racism, and countless unmentionable acts” (28).
Authenticity might therefore require resisting or changing certain shared social meanings or
values. Taylor (1991) argues that the ideal of authenticity is admirable precisely because it
enables the original contribution that each individual can, and should, make to the whole. In a
democratic society, each of us is called on to contribute to the community of ideas from their
own authentic commitments; this is essential to the public good. The ideal of authenticity
therefore encourages each individual to take responsibility for their actions, and to critically
evaluate, challenge, or change the norms and values which guide those actions.
This process therefore involves not just recognition of the self as a part of the world, but
an active, creative process of engagement with one’s world. Authenticity requires a productive
originality that can only be realized by the person in question, in their own unique situation.
Authentic selves create art, philosophy, scientific inquiry, and social change. The relationship
between authentic self and context is a reciprocal one. When the self is fundamentally a part of
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the world, to paint a picture or compose a symphony or propose an idea or start a movement is to
create one’s self by creating one’s world.
This creative process can be crucial for building an intelligible life. The world does not
give marginalized people the materials we need; so, we must make the world into what we need
it to be. This, I suggest, is constantly ongoing in trans lives and worlds of sense, out of necessity.
In Gender Outlaw, Kate Bornstein articulates this kind of construction of the self through art and
activism that change her social context. Bornstein thoroughly rejects an understanding of her
gendered self as “fixed” or “given.” Instead, she describes herself and her gender as
“patchwork”; she writes, “I learned to live my life like I’m making a collage” (148). The
metaphor of “collage” here suggests a creative construction out of available elements. The
created image is new, but it does not spring fully formed from the void. It comes together out of
existing colors, shapes, and images, cut up and glued back together.
Queer and trans communities have long histories of engaging in this project. Consider the
gender practices prevalent in ballroom cultures, queer and trans communities of color which
have evolved in most major cities in the U.S. Ballroom cultures have their own gender
classification system and accordant gender norms. In his study of Detroit’s ballrooms, Bailey
(2011) argues that these practices “are the result of a considerable amount of work, a form of
discursive labor that often goes unnoticed and taken for granted by those outside of the
community” (371-2). These identities and norms are created out of two needs: to make oneself
intelligible to oneself and others both within the community and without, and to avoid the
violence visited on the visibly queer in the broader world. Thus, constituents of ballroom culture
subvert or creatively re-purpose dominant gender norms, at the same time as they prepare one
another to function effectively within them.
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The creative labor of building alternative gender practices, I argue, grows out of a need to
own up to parts of oneself that are not intelligible to others in the dominant context. The process
is beholden to shared intelligibility; it must trade on existing social meanings in order to make
sense. For example, new pronouns are sensible only in an existing grammatical space, in contrast
to existing pronouns. Just as one might compose a piece of music out of existing chords and
tones, trans and GNC people historically create intelligible gender terms and identities for
themselves, and spaces for cultural exploration, out of existing “gender materials”—terms,
practices, categories, and norms.
In sum: On Social Authenticity, a person is given a situation, a set of personal, social, and
psychological facts. That person becomes authentic by owning up to and standing up for
themselves, an active, constructive, and often creative process (contrasted with the passive,
reflective process of finding themself). This project is not undertaken in a vacuum of value, but
rather against a background of shared intelligibility. Social authenticity doesn’t posit a pre-given
self, but neither does it mean that we have a radically free choice about what is authentic for
us—insofar as we don’t always choose what we believe or care about, or what our context is
like. A social view captures the intuitive idea of authenticity without encountering the problems
faced by an “inner-self” view. On social authenticity, what is authentic is yours not merely
because it is given to you, but because it is made yours.
It should be clear from this discussion that, if we adopt Social Authenticity, feminist
commitments about the social construction of gender norms are not in conflict with authenticity
claims. Gender norms and our responsiveness to them are part of the “raw materials” of our
facticity. We do not need to make any claims about their essential origins to acknowledge that
they can be authentic for individuals.
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In the next section, I will discuss the authority of authenticity as a normative standard.
The fact that something is authentic for someone gives them a strong reason to do it. But what is
the source of this reason? I will give several possible answers, and show how none of them
entails that what is authentic must also be, on the whole, prudent or morally good. This will
defuse the normative tension between feminist philosophy and trans authenticity claims.

4.3. AUTHENTICITY AND NORMATIVE AUTHORITY
Metaethicists sometimes distinguish between two kinds of normativity. All normative
domains have the first kind: formal normativity. Something is formally normative just in case it
is possible to succeed or fail according to its guidelines. Consider, for example, the normative
domain “NCAA basketball rules.” A group of people on a court with a basketball might follow
the standard of NCAA basketball rules; they might follow some other standard, such as the
norms of the game HORSE; they might make up their own rules; or they might follow no rules at
all. The choices are entirely up to preferences and goals of the players in question.
However, certain normative standards, such as morality or prudence (self-interest),
appear to have a special power over our choices; they “really” tell us what to do. That is, they
give us reasons to act that weigh heavy against other reasons we may have. This is sometimes
called “robust” or “authoritative” normativity.19 As Paakkunainen (2018) puts it,
Formal normativity is cheap: we can create new formally normative standards simply by
inventing violable rules. Robust normativity is a seemingly more important phenomenon
that many take to be associated with normative reasons. (403)

These terms are roughly interchangeable in the literature. I use the terminology of “authoritative
normativity” in this chapter to better parallel talk of reasons or standards having normative authority.
19
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A standard might be authoritative in some cases, but not others. For example, college players
during a championship game may have strong reasons to comply with NCAA rules, while
children playing after school, or those same college players during the off season, may not.
However, some normative standards seem to be authoritative in themselves. Morality or
prudence appear to give us powerful reasons, full stop.
In this section, I hold that authenticity has normative authority, but distinguish this from
the claim that this is moral authority. If authenticity has moral authority, then claims about
authenticity are also claims about morality. This appears to put some claims about gender norm
authenticity in tension with feminist commitments. I argue that this tension is illusory. I briefly
explore three plausible views on which authenticity has normative authority. On each view,
authentic norms can conflict with moral norms. Therefore, even if some gender norms are
authentic and thereby provide authoritative reasons to act, this would not mean that they are
morally good on the whole.
Authenticity is certainly formally normative. We talk of being more or less authentic,
fully authentic, or altogether inauthentic. Moreover, authenticity appears to hold powerful sway
over our conduct. The fact that something is authentic for us seems, by itself, to provide us with
a powerful reason to pursue it. For example, suppose that I must choose between a career as an
accountant and as a professional dancer. Suppose that I have a plethora of good prudential
reasons to choose accountancy; it is a lucrative, respectable profession, at which I can anticipate
a productive and stable life (all things that I want). Dancing does not have these attributes.
However, suppose that being a dancer feels authentic for me, and accountancy doesn’t.
Intuitively, the choice is a difficult one precisely because authenticity generates strong reasons to
act, reasons that weigh heavy against other strong reasons.
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A full discussion of the nature of normative authority is beyond the scope of this project.
However, it is worth noting that some prominent existing views would identify authenticity as
authoritative. Varieties of constructivism, for example, hold that normative force derives from
the agents who are bound by it. Roughly, the idea is this: since authoritative reasons are
characterized by their power over our practical deliberations, normative authority for agents is
importantly related to the practical interests of those agents. If you have an authoritative reason
to φ, that is because of something about you and your relationship to φ. As Street (2010) puts it,
“the bumper sticker slogan of constructivism is…‘no normative truth independent of the
practical point of view’” (367). On constructivist views, prudence and morality are authoritative
because (or, depending on one’s view, insofar as) we care about our own interests and those of
other agents. Plausibly, on a constructivist view, authenticity is authoritative because (or insofar
as) we care about being ourselves—being the kind of agent who has interests that are their own.
This is one reason authenticity claims have wielded such rhetorical power in discourse
about queer and trans rights. If I say that I am coming out as queer because it is “who I really
am” or that I am following some gender norms because they reflect my “true self,” that provides
an explanation of my reasons for doing it that calls for no further justification. An understanding
of sexuality or gender identity as a part of a person’s authentic self has lent legitimacy to a
movement for social acceptance—precisely, I think, because we understand that authenticity
gives us powerful normative reasons.
This is sometimes interpreted as equivalent to giving us moral reasons. But this needs
further argument; not all powerful reasons are moral reasons. How, then, should we understand
authenticity’s normative force? Here are three plausible answers. 1) It is in one’s interest to be
authentic; authentic norms are prudential norms. 2) It is morally good to be authentic; authentic
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norms are moral norms. 3) Authenticity’s normative force is not reducible to morality or
prudence.20 In what follows, I will briefly discuss each possibility, and show that none of them
entails that authenticity must always be in perfect lockstep with (all) moral norms.
First consider prudence. If the standard of authenticity is about respecting one’s true self,
perhaps authenticity generates reasons of self-interest, also known as prudential reasons. This is
plausible enough. Even if this is right, however, authenticity and other reasons of self-interest
can conflict. Abandoning a stable career as an accountant to pursue a risky career as a dancer
may be deeply imprudent on the whole, even if dancing is genuinely authentic. This does not
undermine the possibility that authenticity is pro tanto prudent. The authentic subset of one’s
prudential reasons may recommend a certain action, even if there are other prudential reasons
against it. Sometimes different prudential norms simply recommend incompatible actions.
Suppose I must choose between marrying Fred and marrying Frida (and I cannot marry both).
Either spouse would be equally good for me, but for different reasons; with Frida I would live a
life of excitement and adventure, with Fred I would live a life of comfort and stability. I have
prudential reasons that pull both ways, but choosing either involves foregoing the other.
A second option is that authenticity is normative because it is morally good. This view is
defended by Rousseau (1953). For Rousseau, the self is the source of goodness, and society is
the source of evil; authenticity requires peeling away the distorting effect of society to uncover
the pure moral power of the self. The self is imbued with a pure moral sensibility which is
debased by society and its conflicting demands. To be authentic, to be good, one must turn
inwards. Similarly, Taylor (1991) defends “the moral force of the ideal of authenticity” (17) on

Note that (1) and (2) are not incompatible; authenticity may be authoritative because it represents some
combination of morality and prudence (a moral duty to do right by oneself, for example).
20
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the grounds that one has a responsibility to contribute to society from one’s personal convictions.
According to Taylor, there is something “noble, courageous, and hence significant to giving
shape to my own life” (39). Authenticity is therefore fundamentally about moral value.
Notice, however, that authenticity can conflict with moral goodness even if authenticity is
a moral ideal. The argument here runs parallel to the prudential argument above. Different moral
norms may recommend incompatible actions; this is the source of moral dilemmas. For example,
suppose that I have promised to pick my friend up on time from the airport. However, just as I
am about to leave, I encounter a lost child who needs help finding his parents. I have, it seems, a
pro tanto moral reason to keep my promise and a pro tanto moral reason to help the child.
Assuming I cannot effectively do both, I have conflicting moral reasons; as a moral agent, I must
weigh my reasons and choose. Similarly, if authenticity generates moral reasons, these reasons
might conflict with other moral reasons. I might have an authentic reason to comply with a norm
of masculinity that recommends misogynistic behavior, but a (different) moral reason not to do
this. As a moral agent, I must weigh my reasons and choose.
A third option is that authenticity is irreducible to either morality or prudence. On this
view, if something is authentic for us, that gives us reason to do it—not because authenticity is
morally or prudentially good, but because authenticity alone is authoritative over us.21 If this is
right, then there is no theoretical issue if the demands of authenticity conflict with the demands
of morality or prudence. On this view, then, what would be the source of authenticity’s
normative authority? If authenticity is moral or prudential, its authority is conferred by the
authority of morality or prudence; but if it is neither of these things, then it must be authoritative

Or, perhaps, because authenticity is a subset of some further authoritative normative domain. If this is
the case, all of our theoretical problems are solved; authenticity need not be either morally or prudentially
good, and it has normative authority.
21
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for a different reason. However, this problem is not unique. Normative authority in general calls
out for explanation. There are intuitive reasons to think that morality and prudence are
authoritative; the fact that something is morally good or good for us seems, by itself, to give us a
powerful reason to do it. This alone does not explain the source of that authority; a major branch
of metaethics exists to tackle this very problem. I take it to be equally intuitive that authenticity
is authoritative, for similar reasons; if something is authentic, that seems, by itself, to give us a
powerful reason to do it.
In short, no matter how we understand the normative force of authenticity, we can
conclude the following: To say that a thing is authentic for someone, and that this authenticity
can generate authentic reasons for that person to act, is not to say that it is either prudentially or
morally good on the whole. A major element of the normative tension I have identified between
feminist philosophy and authenticity claims about gender norms is thus dissolved.
In the next section, I will combine the ideas of social authenticity and authoritative
authenticity to articulate influence of gender norm authenticity on our practical choices as moral
agents.

4.4. GENDER NORM AUTHENTICITY
One aim of this chapter is to show that the authenticity of particular dominant gender
norms can produce genuine practical dilemmas, and to show how trans and GNC communities
have done important labor to solve these dilemmas. I have argued that claims about gender norm
authenticity are not in tension with either normative or descriptive commitments of feminist
philosophy. However, this does not solve the following practical problem: What should we do
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when gender norms which are authentic for us recommend morally or prudentially bad actions?
How do we weigh those reasons?
To address this question, I will first say a bit more about the dilemma itself. While many
feminist philosophers have highlighted the issue with particular gender norms, such as a
masculine norm which recommends misogynistic behavior, I argue that is not the heart of the
issue. Notice that it is just as easy to point to particular gender norms that are not bad in
themselves—a masculine norm which recommends the genuine virtue of courage, for example. I
contend that the more salient critique is about entire domains of gender norms. For example,
Lugones’ (2007) analysis focuses largely on the structural origins of dominant gender norms as a
domain, specifically their construction as bulwarks of the racist, hierarchical “colonial/modern
gender system” (187). Relatedly, Manne (2017) argues that dominant feminine norms work in
concert to delimit a subordinate role for women across contexts. These are not claims about any
particular norm in the set, but rather about what unifies or distinguishes that set.
A normative domain is a set of norms linked by some unifying activity or aim. For
example, formal etiquette is unified by the aim of maintaining polite society. If the unifying aim
of some domain D fails to meet the standard of some other domain E, then D is criticizable as a
domain by the lights of E. For example, we might criticize the unifying aim of formal etiquette
for being classist. “Polite society” is deeply racialized and carries undertones of wealth
stratification and privilege; compliance with its norms signifies adherence to class hierarchy.
Since classism is unjust, formal etiquette as a domain is unjust, and thus morally bad. This will
be true even if particular formal etiquette norms on occasion recommend the same actions as
particular moral norms, as they almost certainly will.
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Many domains of gender norms are analogous to the domain of formal etiquette. For
example, following Lugones, we might think that many domains of gender norms are unified by
the aim of maintaining the colonial social order. Since this social order is unjust, these
normative domains are morally bad. Similarly, since the colonial social order is harmful to
marginalized people, many such domains will also be prudentially bad for those people; it is
generally bad for their self-interest to comply. This is distinct from (although consistent with) the
claim that individual norms within the domain are morally or prudentially bad.
We can see from this discussion that there are at two ways in which we can evaluate
gender norms according to some other domain (such as morality): either the entire domain is
evaluated, or individual norms within it are evaluated. Concordantly, there are two ways in
which some gender norms can be authentic for someone, in virtue of being evaluated according
to the domain of authenticity. First, some entire domain of gender norms can be authentic. For
example, a particular domain of masculinity may be authentic for a person if they “own up to”
that masculinity, by incorporating it as a standard which they take to be relevant to their
behavior. This does not require following every norm in that domain wholesale. On the contrary,
it may require that one interact critically with each norm, and balance it with other desires and
obligations. Authenticity is difficult and may require negotiating between incommensurable
demands. As Jenkins (2016) and Witt (2011) both point out, experiencing a norm as relevant to
you is compatible with refusing to comply; in fact, one cannot rebel against a norm unless it
applies to them.
Alternatively, individual norms within a domain may be authentic for someone, even if
the entire domain is not. Consider, for example, someone who is genderqueer in the sense
articulated by Dembroff (2020); they reject some or all domains of gender norms as binding over
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their conduct. I suggest that rejecting the domain does not entail rejecting each of its norms. Such
individuals may, and in my experience often do, still incorporate individual gender norms as a
part of their authentic selves. For example, they may take themselves to have strong authentic
reasons to wear suits. Insofar as the person understands that their local world of sense
recommends wearing suits as a masculine norm, and they own up to this fact and understand
themselves as masculine, they are incorporating this particular gender norm authentically into
their life project.
This kind of authenticity is particularly apparent in the case of people who incorporate
multiple gender norms that their world of sense takes to be incoherent together. As non-binary
model and activist Alok Vaid-Menon writes: “Over time, I learned that where I was taught
dissonance, I found harmony. This beard, this skirt, this love: There are no contradictions here,
there is just someone trying to figure it out” (Vaid-Menon, 111). Elsewhere, Menon writes that
their femininity is an authentic expression of themself (26), even as they reject the power of
dominant, hegemonic gender norms. There are “no contradictions” precisely because Menon
rejects as illegitimate those domains which hold that skirts and beards are incompatible, even as
specific norms of masculinity and femininity within those domains are understood as their own.
Perhaps most saliently, gender norms can also be counterfactually authentic for someone.
If authenticity is authoritative over our conduct, we may experience normative pressure to
become more authentic—that is, to own up to elements of our facticity which we currently do not
acknowledge. We can imagine, for example, someone who is persistently responsive to a
particular gender norm or set of norms as a matter of psychological fact, but has not yet owned
up to this. As Jenkins (2016) points out, experiencing oneself as responsive to certain gender
norms is often an impetus for understanding oneself as trans or GNC. This psychological fact
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alone would not make a norm authentic in the sense I articulate. However, we might say that, if
the person were to own up to this fact, it would be authentic for them. Moreover, one might find
certain alternative norms strongly and persistently inauthentic—that is, impossible to make
congruent with one’s life project. That person would have authentic reason to disown certain
gender norms. Often, communicating one’s disownment of the norms assigned by others requires
actively abiding by some alternative set of norms; for example, communicating one’s
disownment of femininity in dominant contexts may require performances of masculinity.
If dominant gender norms are morally bad, it is sometimes argued that we should disown
them all. For example, Dembroff (2018) argues that we should reject all gender norms associated
with a harmful binary. They acknowledge, however, that there may be practical reasons to
acknowledge the impact of this binary. For some people, using gendered terms “is important for
describing how they were socialised as children, how others interpret their bodies, or how they
feel about their own bodies” (2018). Dembroff’s account is therefore responsive to concerns of
practical choice. They acknowledge that we do not always have the luxury of being practically
guided by clean theoretical commitments.
This discussion reflects the realities of living authentically in imperfect worlds. Our
normative reasons are not born in ideal settings. Dominant gender norms are ubiquitous, and
their enforcement begins very early, as evidenced by the already-discussed case of the gender
reveal party. Moreover, these norms are mandatory; failing to conform exposes one to censure
and violence. Recall again the epistemic condition: authenticity requires understanding our
surroundings and psychological state, including the norms which already move us. If one finds
oneself responsive to a certain domain of masculine norms, for example, one might find that
owning that domain, or certain norms within it, is the only way to make sense of one’s facticity.
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As Wilchins writes, “If the body is always a sign being read, then not communicating is
impossible” (1997, 152). Put differently: gender norms in various forms are always-already
there. One can own them, creatively re-imagine them, reject them, or be inauthentically swept
along by them; but one cannot simply avoid them. Gender norms demand our attention, and the
question of how to interact with them is not always easy to answer. One may find oneself
always-already moved by them in ways that are impossible to ignore. Rejecting or disowning
certain gender norms may be the inauthentic choice; and given high rates of trans suicides,
inauthenticity may not be a livable option. If a prisoner faces a choice between complicity in an
unjust regime, or a life of suffering escapable only by death, the fact that the regime is morally
bad does not soften the difficulty of the choice.
Put simply, understanding dominant gender norms as bad does not tell us how to navigate
worlds where they have power over us. What, then, should we do?
A major point to make here is that this problem is not unique to the experiences of trans
and GNC people. As Watson (2016) and others have noted, the burden of pushing back is often
unfairly laid on trans and GNC shoulders, when the vast majority of cis and gender-conforming
people are complicit in oppressive norms. What is distinctive about trans and GNC people is not
the gendered practical dilemma we face, but rather the work we do to navigate it. As Bailey
(2011) points out, the creative labor of constructing and articulating alternative gender practices
is undertaken by trans and GNC communities out of dual necessity. First, we need to understand
ourselves when dominant standards actively erase us. Second, we need to pass through dominant
worlds without being assaulted or murdered. The latter is one reason why many gender practices
in these communities do not fully escape the influence of dominant norms; as Bailey notes, such
communities may “end up re-inscribing and relying upon those same norms to view and judge
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each other within the community” (382). However, Bailey explicitly resists the interpretation of
gender norms in ball culture as grounded in the mere internalization of harmful dominant gender
practices. Rather, the “gender and sexual performativity of ballroom culture emerges and
functions at the interstices of hegemony and transformation to create new forms of selfrepresentation and social relations” (384). Trans and gender-nonconforming people of color in
ballroom culture are strategically appropriating, re-imagining, and deploying the norms which
are weaponized against them in order to create possibilities for agency, self-expression and
authenticity—within their own worlds, but also when they are forced to move through dominant
worlds.
I want to close, then, by suggesting two things. First, trans and GNC people are actively
and materially aware that dominant gender norms are harmful to us and to others, even as we
often must engage with them in our project of authenticity. Trans worlds of sense therefore have
a rich history of working towards practical solutions to this problem, through the creative
construction of alternative gender standards which provide opportunities for authenticity that
move away from dominant norms. Second, as Marion (2011) and Bettcher (2014) both suggest,
these alternative practices and norms have great potential as sites of resistance, not only within
trans worlds of sense, but through their influence on dominant worlds. Rather than charge trans
and GNC people with harming ourselves and others through our authentic engagement with
gender norms, theorists should look to those alternative practices as models for how to engage in
a project of authenticity in a non-ideal social world.

4.5 CONCLUSION: AUTHENTICITY AND LIBERATION
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I have argued that the following positions are compatible: 1. Gender norms can be
authentic, and as such can give us powerful normative reasons to act. 2. Gender norms are
socially constructed, and many or most of them are morally bad, prudentially bad, or both. Social
authenticity tells us that the authentic self is constantly under construction, embedded in a
context out of which it must pursue a life project that is uniquely its own. But most social
contexts are imperfect. They are full of unjust power relations, material and social positionalities,
and morally and prudentially bad norms. We would certainly be better off if we never had to
grapple with this in our project of self-construction. But we do. It is not possible to live
authentically without attending to this flawed context. In an ideal world, there might be no
conflict between authenticity and morality or prudence. However, the world is non-ideal, and we
must build our authentic selves with the materials available.
I have relied throughout, without argument, on the understanding that gender norm
authenticity is something worth explaining; that it is both real, and important to inclusive
theorizing. For myself, I take the point to be self-evident. I experience certain gender norms as
authentic for and authoritative over me, despite belief in their social construction and a
theoretical and personal distaste for them. From conversation with other people—trans, GNC,
cis, or gender-conforming—I infer that I am not alone in this, and that the practical dilemmas
this generates are persistent and challenging. I conclude that making sense of felt gender norm
authenticity is crucial to finding the hermeneutical tools to understand our experiences.
Moreover, I believe that this approach can work to ease some tensions in liberatory
discourse. Authenticity claims about gender norms are often treated as evidence of either gender
essentialism, or of the moral goodness of gender norms. This leads some trans and GNC people
to embrace gender essentialism and reject feminist critiques of gender norms, while at the same
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time encouraging some feminists to reject authenticity claims. I think both moves are a mistake. I
have tried to show that authenticity does not entail either moral goodness or essentialism, in the
hope that this will help move us towards a more inclusive theoretical space with respect to
gender and gender norms—a central aim of this project on the whole.
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Faculty Choice: Outstanding Student Award
Department of Philosophy & Humanities, ETSU, Graduating Class 2014

SELECTED RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS
* DENOTES COMPETITIVE SELECTION; † DENOTES INVITED TALK
“The Role of a Lifetime: Trans Experience and Gender Norms.” Accepted for presentation at:
-

* Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality 2022, Vienna, Austria, August 2022.

-

* North American Society for Social Philosophy International Conference: Polarization,
Reconciliation, and Community, Aston, PA, July 2022.

-

* APA Pacific Meeting, Vancouver, BC, April 2022.

* “The Trans Authenticity Paradox.” Presented at the LGBTQ+ Advocacy Committee Session,
Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) Virtual Meeting, September 2021
“It’s Just Science: Thick Concepts and Hermeneutical Injustice.” Accepted for presentation at:
-

* APA Central Meeting, February 2021. (Held virtually)

-

* The Association for Feminist Epistemologies, Methodologies, Metaphysics, and Science
Studies 8. (Postponed indefinitely due to COVID-19)

* “Distorted Identities: Hermeneutical Injustice and Normative Social Roles.” Presented at the
APA Eastern Meeting, January 2021. (Held virtually)
* “Authenticity and Gender Norms.” Presented at MAP Flash Talks, May 2020. (Virtual event)
† “Transgressing Normativity: The Metaphysics of Gender-Nonconformity.” Presented at Trans
Philosophy Spring Workshop Series, Queens University, Kingston, ON, February 2020.
“Inside and Out: Ascriptivism about Gendered Traits.” Presented at:
-

† EQS: Early Queer Scholarship Series, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, October 2019.
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-

* MAPWorks (Minorities And Philosophy Spring Workshop Series), Columbia University,
New York, NY, April 2019.

-

* Liberating the Future: Concordia GSPA Spring 2019 Conference, Concordia University,
Montreal, QC, March 2019.

-

* SWIPShop (Society for Women in Philosophy Workshop), Baruch College, New York,
NY, February 2019.

* “Gender and Traits.” Presented at Social Ontology, Tufts University, Boston, MA, August 2018.
Bell, R.A., Taylor, D.A., White, C.D., Shi, D., Martin, B.A., & Dula, C.S. “Relationship between
Grades, Academic Self-Efficacy, Family Conflict and Church Attendance.” Presented at
Appalachian Student Research Forum, Johnson City, TN, April 2010. First Place Winner
Taylor, D.A., Bell, R.A., Martin, B.A., & Dula, C.S. “We Wouldn't Call It ‘Fighting’: The
differences in how parents and students view conflict and the effects on grades.” Presented at
Tennessee Psychological Association, Nashville, TN, November 2009. Third Place Winner
Taylor, D.A., Martin, B.A., Gibson, B.W., Bell, R.A., & Dula, C.S. “Effects of Home Environment
Type on Family Conflict and Extracurricular Activities.” Presented at Mid-South Psychology
Conference, Memphis, TN, February 2010. First Place Winner

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Teaching Mentor, University-Wide TA Orientation, Syracuse University Graduate School,
2019-present. Competitive position.

Primary Instructor, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University
Spring
Fall
Spring
Fall
Summer
Spring
Fall
Summer

2022
2021
2021
2020
2020
2020
2019
2019

Social & Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Feminism
Logic
Philosophy of Feminism (hybrid)
Philosophy of Feminism (online asynchronous)
Human Nature
Philosophy of Feminism
Philosophy of Feminism (online asynchronous)

Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University
Spring
Fall
Spring
Fall
Spring
Fall

2019
2018
2018
2017
2017
2016

Ethics and the Media Professions
Introduction to Logic
Introduction to Logic
Philosophy of Feminism
Human Nature
Theories of Knowledge and Reality

Paul Prescott
Mark Heller
Michael Rieppel
Kara Richardson
Neelam Sethi
Robert van Gulick

GRANTS AWARDED
$2500. Engaged Humanities Grant, Syracuse University. For Syracuse University’s Philosophy
Lab, a branch of the Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization (PLATO).
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COMMENTARIES
Comments on “Is Gender Fictionalism Defensible and if not, How Should We Think About
Gender?” by Lucia Dikaczova. Syracuse University Philosophy Graduate Conference,
Syracuse, NY, March 2022.
Comments on “The Role of Survival in Constructivism,” by Stacy Kohls. Syracuse University
ABD Workshop Series, Syracuse, NY, March 2022.
Comments on “No Desires are Relevant to Well-Being,” by Nikki Fortier. Syracuse University
ABD Workshop Series, Syracuse, NY, November 2021.
Comments on “Two Conceptions of Essences,” by Laura Nicoera. Syracuse University
Philosophy Graduate Conference, Syracuse, NY, April 2021. (Conference held virtually.)
Comments on “A Sensibility of Humour,” by Zoe Walker. Syracuse University Philosophy
Graduate Conference, Syracuse, NY, August 2020. (Conference held virtually.)
Comments on “The Wrongful Inclusion Problem and Jenkins’s Analysis of Gender Concepts,” by
Evan Woods. Syracuse University Philosophy Graduate Conference, Syracuse, NY, Mar 2017.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AND MEMBERSHIPS
* DENOTES PAID POSITION
Invited Panelist, MAP PhD Panel, Mudd Undergraduate Ethics Conference, March 2022
*President (elected), SU Philosophy Graduate Student Organization, 2020-2021
*Founder and Organizer, MAP Anti-Racist Reading Group, Summer-Fall 2020
Co-Organizer, MANCEPT Workshops, “What Is Gender?” series, Fall 2021 and 2022
Founder and Co-Organizer, Syracuse-Queens Social Metaphysics Group, 2020-2021
Peer Evaluator, Teaching Mentor Selection Committee, Spring 2020 & 2021
*Organizer, SU Philosophy Women & Gender Minorities Group, 2018-2020
*Co-Organizer, SU Philosophy Graduate Conference, 2017-2018
Activities Coordinator, SU Philosophy Graduate Student Organization, 2017-2020
Reviewer, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly
Reviewer, Hypatia
Reviewer, Ergo
Member, American Philosophical Association
Member, Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
Member, International Social Ontology Society
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Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University
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Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Glasgow
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Dr. Kara Richardson
Associate Professor and Department Chair, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University
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Dr. Verena Erlenbusch-Anderson
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University
verlenbu@syr.edu
Dr. Luvell Anderson
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University
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